Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We document lead-lag effects on returns between coheadquartered firms in different sectors. Geographic lead-lags yield risk-adjusted returns of 5%–6% annually, half that observed for industry lead-lag effects. Whereas industry lead-lag effects are strongest among small, thinly traded stocks with low analyst coverage, geographic lead-lags are unrelated to these proxies for investor scrutiny. We propose an explanation linked to the structure of the investment analyst business, which is organized by sector, not by geographic region. Our findings suggest that in lead-lag relationships, analysts common to both leading and lagging firms are important, regardless of the number of analysts covering each individually.

Abstract We propose a tractable model of an informationally inefficient market featuring nonrevealing prices, general preferences and payoff distributions, but not noise traders. We show the equivalence between our model and a substantially simpler one in which investors face distortionary investment taxes depending on both their identity and the asset class. This equivalence allows us to account for such phenomena as underdiversification. We further employ the model to assess approaches to performance evaluation and find that it provides a theoretical basis for some intuitive practices, such as style analysis, that have been adopted by finance professionals. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We provide a new framework for using text as data in empirical models. The framework identifies salient information in unstructured text that can control for multidimensional heterogeneity among assets. We demonstrate the efficacy of the framework by reexamining principal-agent problems in residential real estate markets. We show that the agent-owned premiums reported in the extant literature dissipate when the salient textual information is included. The results suggest the previously reported agent-owned premiums suffer from an omitted variable bias, which prior studies incorrectly ascribed to market distortions associated with asymmetric information. (JEL D82, G14, R00) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract The efficiency of financial markets and their potential to produce bubbles are central topics in academic and professional debates. Yet, little is known about the contribution of financial professionals to price efficiency. We run 116 experimental markets with 412 professionals and 502 students. We find that professional markets with bubble drivers – capital inflows or high initial capital supply – are susceptible to bubbles, although they are more efficient than student markets. In mixed markets with students, bubbles also occur, but professionals act as price stabilizers. We show that heterogeneous price beliefs drive overpricing, especially in bubble-prone market environments. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We propose a new method for estimating latent asset pricing factors that fit the time series and cross-section of expected returns. Our estimator generalizes principal component analysis (PCA) by including a penalty on the pricing error in expected returns. Our approach finds weak factors with high Sharpe ratios that PCA cannot detect. We discover five factors with economic meaning that explain well the cross-section and time series of characteristic-sorted portfolio returns. The out-of-sample maximum Sharpe ratio of our factors is twice as large as with PCA with substantially smaller pricing errors. Our factors imply that a significant amount of characteristic information is redundant. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We model risk management as information acquisition that delays trading decisions. In markets with preemptive competition, this can lead to a race to the bottom, where prioritizing trade execution over risk management is optimal for each firm, but collectively inefficient. As time competition intensifies, mean trading profit supplants risk concerns as the main driver of risk management quality, causing risk misallocation to rise with trading speed and volume. This pathology of risk management failure—the trio of time-consuming risk assessment, preemptive competition, and boom markets—has distinctive regulatory implications. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract A core responsibility of the Federal Reserve is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its discount window (DW). Historically, however, the DW has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we develop a coordination game with adverse selection, and we test in the lab policies that have been proposed to mitigate DW stigma. We find that lowering the DW cost and making DW borrowing difficult to detect are ineffective, but regular random DW borrowing can overcome DW stigma. Implications for other forms of stigma in finance are discussed.

Abstract We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive 3 times more money from employees than candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with their CEOs’ political preferences are more likely to leave their employer. (JEL G30, G38, D72, P48) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix and Data Supplement, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We analyze how Dodd-Frank-mandated risk retention affects the information investors extract from issuers’ retention choices in the CMBS market. We show that the required retention level is both binding and stringent. Although this implies issuers cannot signal using the level of retention, we provide a model showing that signaling can occur by varying the retention structure. The model is consistent with spreads being empirically lower in deals with a purely first-loss retention structure. A stated concern of rulemakers is asymmetric information. However, we show that, post-crisis, the level of asymmetric information in this market is quite low.

Abstract This paper studies how access to financial services among a previously unbanked group affects human capital, labor market, and wealth outcomes. We use novel data from the Freedman’s Savings Bank—created following the American Civil War to serve free Blacks—employing an instrumental variables strategy exploiting the staggered rollout of bank branches. Families with accounts are more likely to have children in school, be literate, work, and have higher occupational income, business ownership, and real estate wealth. Placebo effects are not present using planned but unbuilt branches, or for Whites, suggesting significant positive effects of financial inclusion.