Knowledge that Transforms

[This paper shows how chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics affect the performance of acquirers in diversifying takeovers. When the acquirer's CEO has previous experience in the target industry, the acquirer's abnormal announcement returns are between 1.2 and 2.0 percentage points larger than those generated by a CEO who is new to the target industry. This outcome is driven by the industry-expert CEO's ability to capture a larger fraction of the merger surplus. Industry-expert CEOs typically negotiate better deals and pay a lower premium for the target. This effect is stronger when information asymmetry is high and in bilateral negotiations compared to auctions. We also find that industry-expert CEOs on average select lower surplus deals. This evidence is consistent with industry-expert CEOs having superior negotiation skills.]

[I model an entangled financial system in which banks hedge their portfolio risks using over-the-counter (OTC) contracts. However, banks choose not to hedge counterparty risk, and thus the idiosyncratic failure of a bank can lead to a systemic run of lenders. An inefficiency arises because banks engage in a version of risk shifting through the network externalities created by OTC contracts. Banks do not take into account that the costly hedging of low-probability counterparty risk also benefits other banks. In the model, it is welfare improving to tax OTC contracts to finance a bailout fund.]

[Over-the-counter (OTC) stocks are far less liquid, disclose less information, and exhibit lower institutional holdings than do listed stocks. We exploit these different market conditions to test theories of cross-sectional return premiums. Compared with premiums in listed markets, the OTC illiquidity premium is several times higher, the size, value, and volatility premiums are similar, and the momentum premium is three times lower. The OTC illiquidity, size, value, and volatility premiums are largest among stocks held predominantly by retail investors and those not disclosing financial information. Theories of differences in investors' opinions and limits on short sales help explain these return premiums.]

[We study the simultaneous impact of fiscal policy decisions on macroeconomic activity, wealth distribution, and asset prices. We consider a general equilibrium, overlapping generations model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents, where government debt and capital are imperfect substitutes. Increases in public debt lead to significant increases in the riskless rate and to a reduction in the equity premium, while higher capital income tax rates lead to a higher equity premium. The crowding-out effects (on capital and output) are much higher than in models where government debt and capital are perfect substitutes, which thus ignore households' portfolio reallocation decisions.]

[Observable covariates are useful for predicting default, but several studies question their value for explaining credit spreads. We introduce a discrete-time no-arbitrage model with observable covariates, which allows for a closed-form solution for the value of credit default swaps (CDS). The default intensity is a quadratic function of the covariates, specified such that it is always positive. The model yields economically plausible results in terms of fit, the economic impact of the covariates, and the prices of risk. Risk premiums are large and account for a smaller percentage of spreads for firms with lower credit quality. Macroeconomic and firm-specific information can explain most of the variation in CDS spreads over time and across firms, even with a parsimonious specification. These findings resolve the existing disconnect in the literature regarding the value of observable covariates for credit risk pricing and default prediction.]

[Standard theory predicts a positive relationship between risk and return, yet recent data show that housing returns vary positively with risk in some markets but negatively in others. This paper rationalizes these cross-market differences in the risk-return relationship for housing, and in so doing, explains the puzzling negative relationship. The paper shows that when the current house provides a hedge against the risk associated with the future housing consumption, households are willing to accept a lower return to compensate for risk, thus weakening the positive risk-return relationship. Further, in markets with less elastic housing supply and a growing population, hedging incentives can be sufficiently strong to make the relationship negative. The empirical analysis confirms these predictions, suggesting that hedging incentives, housing supply, and urban growth are indeed central to understanding the risk-return relationship for housing.]

[Using the historical random assignment of MBA students to sections at Harvard Business School (HBS), I explore how executive peer networks can affect managerial decision making. Within an HBS class, firm outcomes are significantly more similar among graduates from the same section than among graduates from different sections, with the strongest effects in executive compensation and acquisitions strategy. I demonstrate the role of ongoing social interactions by showing that peer effects are more than twice as strong in the year following staggered alumni reunions. Supplementary tests suggest that peer influence can operate in ways that do not contribute to firm productivity.]

[We develop a new method for measuring moment risk premiums. We find that the skew premium accounts for over 40% of the slope in the implied volatility curve in the S&P 500 market. Skew risk is tightly related to variance risk, in the sense that strategies designed to capture the one and hedge out exposure to the other earn an insignificant risk premium. This provides a new testable restriction for asset pricing models trying to capture, in particular, disaster risk premiums. We base our results on a general trading strategy by replicating contracts that swap implied for realized conditional asset moments.]

[We study whether and how family control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008–2009 financial crisis using a sample of more than 8,500 firms from 35 countries. We find that family-controlled firms underperform significantly, they cut investment more relative to other firms, and these investment cuts are associated with greater underperformance. Further, we find that within family groups liquidity shocks are passed on through investment cuts across the group. Our evidence is consistent with families taking actions to increase the likelihood that the firms under their control and their control benefits survive the crisis, at the expense of outside shareholders.]

[This paper documents significant momentum in a comprehensive sample of 81,491 U.S. corporate bonds with both transaction and dealer-quote data from 1973 to 2011. Momentum is driven by noninvestment grade (NIG) bonds. Momentum profits have increased over time, along with the growth of this segment. From 1991 to 2011, they average 59 basis points (bps) per month across all bonds and 192 bps in NIG bonds. NIG bonds issued by private firms earn even higher profits (282 bps). Momentum profits do not appear to compensate for risk or persist as a result of trading frictions. Bond momentum is not just a manifestation of equity momentum.]