Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines stock return predictability via lagged financial variables with unknown stochastic properties. We propose a novel testing procedure that (1) robustifies inference to regressors' degree of persistence, (2) accommodates testing the joint predictive ability of financial variables in multiple regression, (3) is easy to implement as it is based on a linear estimation procedure, and (4) can be used for long-horizon predictability tests. We provide some evidence in favor of short-horizon predictability during the 1927-2012 period. Nevertheless, this evidence almost entirely disappears in the post–1952 period. Moreover, predictability becomes weaker, not stronger, as the predictive horizon increases.

This paper shows that housing wealth helps alleviate credit constraints for potential entrepreneurs by enabling home owners to extract equity from their property and invest it in their business. Using a large U.S. individual-level survey dataset for the 1996–2006 period, we find that a 10% increase in home equity raises the share of individuals who transition into self-employment each year from 1% to 1.07%. Our results persist when we use proxies for aggregate housing demand shocks and for the topological elasticity of housing supply to generate variation in home equity that is orthogonal to entrepreneurial choice.

We study distress risk premia around a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress from debtholders to shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The reform effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effect leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.

Following corporate spinoffs, unit boards are formed from scratch. We find that these "de novo" boards are smaller, more independent, include more outside directors with relevant industry expertise, and derive more industry expertise from outsiders than do industry- and size-matched peers. These differences are observed only when the unit CEO was not the CEO or a director of the pre-spinoff parent firm—that is, when there is a greater need to assess the CEO's ability and match with the firm. We conclude that the need for CEO assessment is an important element of the structure of newly formed boards.

This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on firm productivity using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves production efficiency in the 3 years after intervention, with stronger improvements in business strategy-oriented interventions. Plants sold after intervention improve productivity significantly under new ownership, suggesting that capital redeployment is an important channel for value creation. Employees of target firms experience stagnation in work hours and wages despite an increase in labor productivity. Additional tests refute alternative explanations attributing the improvement to mean reversion, management's voluntary reforms, industry consolidation shocks, or activists' stock-picking abilities.

The Russell 1000 and 2000 stock indexes comprise the first 1000 and next 2000 largest firms ranked by market capitalization. Small changes in the capitalizations of firms ranked near 1000 move them between these indexes. Because the indexes are value-weighted, more money tracks the largest stocks in the Russell 2000 than the smallest in the Russell 1000. Using this discontinuity, we find that additions to the Russell 2000 result in price increases and deletions result in price declines. We then identify time trends in indexing effects and the types of funds that provide liquidity to indexers.

The media has an incentive to publish sensational news. We study how this incentive affects the accuracy of media coverage in the context of merger rumors. Using a novel dataset, we find that accuracy is predicted by a journalist's experience, specialized education, and industry expertise. Conversely, less accurate stories use ambiguous language and feature well-known firms with broad readership appeal. Investors do not fully account for the predictive power of these characteristics, leading to an initial target price overreaction and a subsequent reversal, consistent with limited attention. Overall, we provide novel evidence on the determinants of media accuracy and its effect on asset prices.

We propose a new method for constructing the hedge component in Merton's ICAPM that uses a daily summary measure of economic activity to track time-varying investment opportunities. We then use nonparametric projections to compute a robust estimate of the conditional covariance between stock market returns and our daily economic activity index. We find that the new conditional covariance risk measure plays an important role in explaining time variation in the equity risk premium. Specification tests as well as out-of-sample forecasts of aggregate stock returns suggest that the new covariance risk measure performs well compared to alternative covariance measures previously proposed in the literature.

Evidence shows that the stochastic discount factor (SDF) is not always a downward-sloping function of S&P 500 returns when estimated using options data. In contrast, our results suggest that SDFs as functions of individual stock returns are generally downward sloping. A simple jump-diffusion model can reconcile these empirical findings. The same model also implies a steeper implied-volatility curve for the index than for the typical stock, a well-known empirical fact from the options literature. Both the SDF and volatility-curve results can be explained by a common source of jump risk among stocks, together with diversification of Brownian risk in the index. We also devise novel empirical tests of SDF monotonicity based on average returns of option trading strategies, thus avoiding the estimation of the return density functions.

We derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders (but not executives). Having its hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance-contingent contracts. This has implications for the ideal composition of the board. The analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive-compensation reform.