Knowledge that Transforms

We document strong comovement in the returns of hedge funds sharing the same prime broker. This comovement is driven neither by funds in the same family nor in the same style, and it is distinct from market-wide and local comovement. The common information hypothesis attributes this phenomenon to the prime broker providing valuable information to its hedge fund clients. The prime broker-level contagion hypothesis attributes the comovement to the prime broker spreading funding liquidity shocks across its hedge fund clients. We find strong evidence supporting the common information hypothesis, but limited evidence in favor of the prime broker-level contagion hypothesis.

We model the interplay between trade in the interbank market and creditor runs on financial institutions. We show that the feedback between them can amplify a small shock into "interbank market freezing" with "liquidity evaporating." Credit crunches of the interbank market drive up the interbank rate. For an individual institution, a higher interbank rate — meaning a higher funding cost — results in more severe coordination problems among creditors in debt rollover decisions. Creditors thus behave more conservatively and run more often. Facing an increased chance of creditor runs, institutions demand more and supply less liquidity, tightening the interbank market.

We provide evidence that higher-quality disclosure standards are associated with stock returns that are less sensitive to noise driven by investors' moods. We identify return-mood sensitivity (RMS) based on the association between index returns and urban cloudiness, a source of short-term variation in mood. Based on a stylized model, we predict and find evidence consistent with higher-quality disclosure standards reducing RMS by tilting susceptible investors' trades toward information and by facilitating sophisticated investors' arbitrage. Our findings suggest that disclosure standards play an important role in enhancing price efficiency by reducing noise in returns, particularly noise related to investors' short-term moods.

We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage, while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust-preferred securities issuance, a form of regulatory arbitrage available to almost all U.S. banks from 1996 to Dodd-Frank. We also find support for predictions that constrained banks are riskier, perform worse during the crisis, and use multiple forms of regulatory arbitrage. We show that neither too-big-to-fail incentives nor misaligned managerial incentives are first-order determinants of this type of regulatory arbitrage.

This study shows that shifts in political climate influence stock prices. As the party in power changes, there are systematic changes in the industry-level composition of investor portfolios, which weaken arbitrage forces and generate predictable patterns in industry returns. A trading strategy that attempts to exploit demand-based return predictability generates an annualized risk-adjusted performance of 6% during the 1939 to 2011 period. This evidence of predictability spans 17%–27% of the market and is stronger during periods of political transition. Our demand-based predictability pattern is distinct from cash flow-based predictability identified in the recent literature.

In standard production models, wage volatility is far too high, and equity volatility is far too low. A simple modification-sticky wages because of infrequent resetting together with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function leads to both smoother wages and higher equity volatility. Further, the model produces several other hard-toexplain features of financial data: high Sharpe ratios, low and smooth interest rates, time-varying equity volatility and premium, a value premium, and a downward-sloping equity term structure. Procyclical, volatile wages are a hedge for firms in standard models; smoother wages act like operating leverage, making profits and dividends riskier.

This paper shows the importance of correcting for sample selection when investing in illiquid assets that trade endogenously. Using a sample of 32,928 paintings that sold repeatedly between 1960 and 2013, we find an asymmetric V-shaped relation between sale probabilities and returns. Adjusting for the resulting selection bias reduces average annual index returns from 8.7% to 6.3%, lowers Sharpe ratios from 0.27 to 0.11, and materially impacts portfolio allocations. Investing in a broad portfolio of paintings is not attractive, but targeting specific styles or top-selling artists may add value. The methodology naturally extends to other asset classes.

When a proxy contest is looming, the rate at which CEOs exercise options to sell (hold) the resulting shares slows down by 80% (accelerates by 60%), consistent with their desire to maintain or strengthen voting rights when facing challenges. Such deviations are closely aligned with features unique to proxy contests, such as the record dates and nomination status, and are more pronounced when the private benefits are higher or when the voting rights are more crucial. The distortions suggest that incumbents value their stocks higher than the market price when voting rights are valuable for defending control.

In many countries, poorly functioning bankruptcy procedures force viable but insolvent firms to restructure out of court, where banks may have a bargaining advantage over other creditors. We model the choice of restructuring process and derive implications for the corporate mix of bank and bond financing. Empirical patterns match the model: inefficient bankruptcy in a country is associated with less bond issuance by risky, but not by safe, borrowers. This pattern holds for both levels of and changes in bankruptcy recovery. Our results establish a link between bankruptcy reform and corporate bond markets, especially high-yield markets.

When assessing a fund manager's skill, sophisticated investors will consider all factors (priced and unpriced) that explain cross-sectional variation in fund performance. We investigate which factors investors attend to by analyzing mutual fund flows as a function of recent returns decomposed into alpha and factor-related returns. Surprisingly, investors attend most to market risk (beta) when evaluating funds and treat returns attributable to size, value, momentum, and industry factors as alpha. Using proxies for investor sophistication (wealth, distribution channels, and periods of high investor sentiment), we find that more sophisticated investors use more sophisticated benchmarks when evaluating fund performance.