Knowledge that Transforms

We document substantial cross-individual dispersion in U.S. credit card borrowing costs, even after controlling for borrower risk and card characteristics. That remaining dispersion arises because cross-lender pricing heterogeneity generates dispersion in annual percentage rate (APR) offers to borrowers, and borrowers vary in shopping intensity. Our empirics match administrative data to self-reported card shopping intensity and use instruments suggested by fair lending law to account for the endogeneity between APRs and search. The results show that shoppers versus nonshoppers pay APRs as different as those paid by borrowers in the best versus worst credit score deciles. We discuss implications for policy and practice.

We examine the capital-market effects of changes in securities regulation in the European Union aimed at reducing market abuse and increasing transparency. To estimate causal effects for the population of E.U. firms, we exploit that for plausibly exogenous reasons, such as national legislative procedures, E.U. countries adopted these directives at different times. We find significant increases in market liquidity, but the effects are stronger in countries with stricter implementation and traditionally more stringent securities regulation. The findings suggest that countries with initially weaker regulation do not catch up with stronger countries, and that countries diverge more upon harmonizing regulation.

I provide a measure for the value that investors place on trust and relationships in asset management by examining mutual fund flows around announced changes in the ownership of fund management companies. I find a decline in flows of around 7% of fund assets in the year following the announcement date, resulting primarily from fund outflows. Retail investors and investors in funds with higher expense ratios are most responsive to ownership changes, providing evidence that such investors appear to place a significant value on trust and are more likely to respond to a relationship disruption by withdrawing their assets.

We analyze a new dataset on workers' career paths to examine whether private equity (PE) investments can have positive spillover effects on workers. We study leveraged buyouts in the context of recent information technology (IT) diffusion, and find evidence supporting the argument that many employees of companies acquired by PE investors gain transferable, IT-complementary human capital. Our estimates indicate that these workers experience increases in both long-run employability and wages relative to what they would have realized in the absence of PE investment. The findings underscore PE's role in mitigating the effects of workforce skill obsolescence resulting from technological change.

We quantify the importance of collateral versus taxes for firms' capital structures. We estimate a dynamic model in which a taxable firm seeks financing for investment, and a dynamic contracting environment motivates endogenous collateral constraints. Optimal leverage stays a safe distance from the constraint, balancing the tax benefit of debt with the cost of lost financial flexibility. We estimate this flexibility cost to be 7.2% of firm assets, a percentage that is comparable to the tax benefit. Models with different tax rates fit the data equally well, and leverage responds to the tax rate only when taxes are low.

We quantify investors' preferences over the dynamics of shocks by deriving frequency-specific risk prices that capture the price of risk of consumption fluctuations at each frequency. The frequency-specific risk prices are derived analytically for leading models. The decomposition helps measure the importance of economic fluctuations at different frequencies. We precisely quantify the meaning of "long-run" in the context of Epstein-Zin preferences -centuries -and measure the exact relevance of business-cycle fluctuations. Finally, we estimate frequency-specific risk prices and show that cycles longer than the business cycle -long-run risks -are significantly priced in the equity market.

We examine whether the stock market considers corporate lobbying to be value enhancing, using an event that potentially limited the ability of firms to lobby but was exogenous to their characteristics and prior lobbying decisions. The results show that this exogenous shock negatively affects the value of firms that lobby. In particular, we estimate that a firm that spends 100,000 more on lobbying in the 3 years before the shock (where sample average lobbying expenses are about 4 million), experiences a loss of about $1.2 million in shareholder value on average. We also examine the channels through which lobbying may create value for firms.

We document the existence of a strategy designed to circumvent limits to arbitrage. Faced with short-sale constraints and noise trader risk, small arbitrageurs publicly reveal their information to induce the target's shareholders ("the longs") to sell, thereby accelerating price discovery. Using data for 124 short-sale campaigns in the United States between 2006 and 2011, we show that investors respond strongly to the information, with spikes in SEC filing views, volatility, order imbalances, realized spreads, turnover, and selling by the longs. Share prices fall by an aggregate $ 14.8 billion. Our findings imply that even extreme short-sale constraints need not constrain arbitrage.

We explore a new mechanism by which investors take correlated shortcuts and present evidence that managers—using sales management—take advantage of these shortcuts. Specifically, we exploit a regulatory provision wherein a firm's primary industry is determined by the highest sales segment. Exploiting this regulation, we provide evidence that investors classify operationally nearly identical firms as starkly different depending on their placement around this sales cutoff. Moreover, managers appear to exploit this by manipulating sales to be just over the cutoff in favorable industries. Further evidence suggests that managers engage in activities to realize large, tangible benefits from this opportunistic action.

We document that CRSP and Thomson contain many voluntarily reported mutual fund portfolios that are not in SEC filings while, additionally, CRSP and Thomson are missing many SEC mandated portfolios available in SEC filings. We document that the voluntary disclosures are likely driven by convenience rather than duplicity. Although mandated portfolios contain securities with more return momentum, we find use of SEC or Thomson data lead to similar empirical findings. CRSP, however, contains inaccurate position information prior to 2008. Our findings have important implications, such as highlighting a 35% increase in observed manager trading by combining data sources.