Knowledge that Transforms

[In any canonical Gaussian dynamic term structure model (GDTSM), the conditional forecasts of the pricing factors are invariant to the imposition of no-arbitrage restrictions. This invariance is maintained even in the presence of a variety of restrictions on the factor structure of bond yields. To establish these results, we develop a novel canonical GDTSM in which the pricing factors are observable portfolios of yields. For our normalization, standard maximum likelihood algorithms converge to the global optimum almost instantaneously. We present empirical estimates and out-of-sample forecasts for several GDTSMs using data on U.S. Treasury bond yields.]

[Uncertainty plays a key role in economics, finance, and decision sciences. Financial markets, in particular derivative markets, provide fertile ground for understanding how perceptions of economic uncertainty and cash-flow risk manifest themselves in asset prices.We demonstrate that the variance premium, defined as the difference between the squared VIX index and expected realized variance, captures attitudes toward uncertainty. We show conditions under which the variance premium displays significant time variation and return predictability. A calibrated, generalized long-run risks model generates a variance premium with time variation and return predictability that is consistent with the data, while simultaneously matching the levels and volatilities of the market return and risk-free rate. Our evidence indicates an important role for transient non-Gaussian shocks to fundamentals that affect agents' views of economic uncertainty and prices.]

[We use a natural experiment to investigate the impact of participation constraints on individuals' decisions to invest in the stock market. Unexpected inheritance due to sudden deaths results in exogenous variation in financial wealth, and allows us to examine whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non-participation. We have three key findings. First, windfall wealth has a positive effect on participation. Second, the majority of households do not react to sizeable windfalls by entering the stock market, but hold on to substantial safe assets—even over longer horizons. Third, the majority of households inheriting stock holdings actively sell the entire portfolio. Overall, these findings suggest that participation by many individuals is unlikely to be constrained by financial participation costs.]

[We use a sample of 8,163 venture-backed companies over three decades to test the competing hypotheses that levels and relative shares of IPO (initial public offering) and M&A (mergers and acquisitions) exits are affected by market timing, versus pseudo-market timing that reflects market conditions. We find evidence of pseudo-market timing. Venture-backed issuers react to market or sector runups but do not predict downturns. We find no evidence that firm-specific market timing contributes to IPO or M&A waves. We also find that acquirers turn to acquisition when other opportunities are unattractive, and that the market may be slow to recognize that such opportunities are declining.]

[In contrast to previous studies documenting positive abnormal returns to target shareholders, we find that hedge fund activism significantly reduces bondholders' wealth. The average excess bond return is —3.9% around the initial 13D filing, and is an additional —4.5% over the remaining year. Excess bond returns are related inversely to subsequent changes in cash and assets (loss of collateral effects) and directly to changes in total debt. Confrontational campaigns and the acquisition of at least one seat on the target's board elicit more negative bond returns. We also find an expropriation of wealth from the bondholder to the shareholder.]

[Academics responded to the challenges posed by the 2008 financial crisis with a flurry of studies. This collection of articles is just the academic community's first look into it. The articles begin with an examination at the last national housing price crash: the great depression of the 1930s. This is followed by articles looking at the current mortgage market and how it behaved. Did modern innovations reflect or add to the downturn? The next set of papers examines how non-financial firms were impacted by the crash. To what degree did credit worthy firms nevertheless find themselves without access to capital? The papers then end with a look into how the banking sector itself fared throughout this period.]

[During the recent financial crisis, ABX.HE index credit default swaps (CDS) on baskets of mortgage-backed securities were a benchmark widely used by financial institutions to mark their subprime mortgage portfolios to market. However, we find that prices for the AAA ABX.HE index CDS during the crisis were inconsistent with any reasonable assumption for mortgage default rates, and that these price changes are only weakly correlated with observed changes in the credit performance of the underlying loans in the index, casting serious doubt on the suitability of these CDS as valuation benchmarks. We also find that the AAA ABX. HE index CDS price changes are related to short-sale activity for publicly traded investment banks with significant mortgage market exposure. This suggests that capital constraints, limiting the supply of mortgage-bond insurance, may be playing a role here similar to that identified by Froot (2001) in the market for catastrophe insurance.]

[We model a microstructure effect on daily security returns, embodied by zero returns and the bid-ask spread, and derive a closed-form solution for the resulting bias in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility. Our empirical tests show that controlling for the bias eliminates the ability of idiosyncratic volatility estimates to predict future returns. We also find a significant reduction in the pricing ability of idiosyncratic volatility after exogenous shocks to liquidity evidenced in the 1997 reduction in the quotes to sixteenths and the 2001 decimalization. Finally, minimizing liquidity's influence on the estimated idiosyncratic volatility, by orthogonalizing the percentage of zero-return and spread effects on the estimated idiosyncratic volatility, demonstrates that the resulting idiosyncratic volatility estimate has little pricing ability.]

[Problems with mortgage financing are widely considered to be a major cause of the recent financial meltdown. Several modern programs have been designed to mimic the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) of the 1930s. We analyze the impact of the HOLC on the nonfarm rental and owned home markets for over 2,800 counties in the United States in the 1930s. In sparsely populated counties, where financial markets were not as well developed as in larger cities, the HOLC stimulated demand for owned housing more than it influenced supply. In rental markets the HOLC appears to have contributed to an increase in supply.]

[This article uses a unique dataset to study how firms managed liquidity during the 2008—2009 financial crisis. Our analysis provides new insights on interactions between internal liquidity, external funds, and real corporate decisions, such as investment and employment. We first describe how companies used credit lines during the crisis (access, size of facilities, and drawdown activity), the characteristics of these facilities (fees, markups, maturity, and collateral), and whether managers had difficulties in renewing or initiating lines. We also describe the dynamics of credit line violations and the outcome of subsequent renegotiations. We show how companies substitute between credit lines and internal liquidity (cash and profits) when facing a severe credit shortage. Looking at real-side decisions, we find that credit lines are associated with greater spending when companies are not cash-strapped. Firms with limited access to credit lines, in contrast, appear to choose between saving and investing during the crisis. Our evidence indicates that credit lines eased the impact of the financial crisis on corporate spending.]