Knowledge that Transforms

[Using a large sample of bank loans issued to U. S. firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by the lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) significantly increase the cost of loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay a 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared with firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans.]

[Despite the central importance of investors to all initial public offering (IPO) theories, relatively little is known about their role in practice. This article is based on a survey of how institutional investors assess IPOs, what information they provide to the investment banking syndicate, and the factors they believe influence allocations. We find that investor characteristics, in particular brokerage relationships with the bookrunner, are perceived to be the most important factors influencing allocations, which supports the view that IPO allocations are part of implicit quid pro quo deals with investment banks. The survey raises doubts as to the extent of information production or revelation]

[Structural models of default calibrated to historical default rates, recovery rates, and Sharpe ratios typically generate Baa-Aaa credit spreads that are significantly below historical values. However, this "credit spread puzzle" can be resolved if one accounts for the fact that default rates and Sharpe ratios strongly covary; both are high during recessions and low during booms. As a specific example, we investigate credit spread implications of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) pricing kernel calibrated to equity returns and aggregate consumption data. Identifying the historical surplus consumption ratio from aggregate consumption data, we find that the implied level and time variation of spreads match historical levels well.]

[We evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the sample-based mean-variance model, and its extensions designed to reduce estimation error, relative to the naive 1/N portfolio. Of the 14 models we evaluate across seven empirical datasets, none is consistently better than the 1/N rule in terms of Sharpe ratio, certainty-equivalent return, or turnover, which indicates that, out of sample, the gain from optimal diversification is more than offset by estimation error. Based on parameters calibrated to the US equity market, our analytical results and simulations show that the estimation window needed for the sample-based mean-variance strategy and its extensions to outperform the 1/N benchmark is around 3000 months for a portfolio with 25 assets and about 6000 months for a portfolio with 50 assets. This suggests that there are still many "miles to go" before the gains promised by optimal portfolio choice can actually be realized out of sample.]

[Over the past 40 years, the volatility of the average stock return has drastically outpaced total market volatility. Thus, idiosyncratic return volatility has dramatically increased. We estimate this increase to be 6% per year. Consistent with an efficient market, this result is mirrored by an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of fundamental cash flows. We argue that these findings are attributable to the more intense economy-wide competition. Various cross-sectional and time-series tests support this idea. Economic competitiveness facilitates reinterpretation of the results from the cross-country R² literature, as well as the US idiosyncratic risk literature.]

[Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers. A part of the value of failing passes through to options prices: when failing is cheaper than borrowing, the relation between borrowing costs and options prices is significantly weaker. The remaining value is profit to the market maker, and its ability to profit despite competition between market makers appears to result from the cost advantage of larger market makers.]

[This paper investigates empirically the dynamics of investors' beliefs and Bayesian uncertainty about the state of the economy as state variables that describe the time-variation in investment opportunities. Using measures of uncertainty constructed from the state probabilities estimated from two-state regime-switching models of aggregate market return and of aggregate output, I find a negative relationship between the level of uncertainty and asset valuations. This relationship shows substantial cross-sectional variation across portfolios sorted on size, book-to-market, and past returns, especially conditional on the state of the economy. I show that a conditional model with investors' beliefs and an uncertainty risk factor is remarkably successful in explaining a large part of the cross-sectional variation in average portfolio returns. The uncertainty risk factor retains its incremental explanatory power when compared to other conditional models such as the conditional CAPM.]

[This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO's utility and production functions, we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models. First, both the CEO's low fractional ownership (the Jensen-Murphy incentives measure) and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting, and thus need not reflect rent extraction. Second, the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value, divided by annual pay, is independent of firm size, and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives. Third, incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value, such as strategy choice. However, additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring.]

[In this paper, I study how corporate governance influences firms' choices between cash and lines of credit. Stakeholders may disagree about firms' liquidity choices because they differ in the allocation of ex-post control rights for the firms' liquidity reserves. Using state-level changes in takeover protection as exogenous shocks to corporate governance, I find that firms increase cash relative to lines of credit when the threat of takeover weakens. Consistent with the theory, this tendency is weaker for firms with good internal governance. Overall, my findings suggest the choice of corporate liquidity is a channel through which corporate governance works.]

[We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002.]