Knowledge that Transforms

[This paper demonstrates how the principal-agent problem between venture capitalists and their investors (limited partners) causes limited partner returns to depend on diversifiable risk. Our theory shows why the need for investors to motivate VCs alters the negotiations between VCs and entrepreneurs and changes how new firms are priced. The three-way interaction rationalizes the use of high discount rates by VCs and predicts a correlation between total risk and net of fee investor returns. We take our theory to a unique data set and find empirical support for the effect of the principal-agent problem on equilibrium private equity asset prices.]

[A new methodology for equity valuation arises from the perspective of managers' supply of capital assets. Under q-theory, managers optimally adjust the supply of assets to changes in their market value. The first-order condition of investment then provides a valuation equation that infers asset prices from managers' costs of supplying the assets. This equation fits well the Tobin's q levels across many testing assets, including portfolios formed on q. With current investment-to-capital as the only input, the supply approach does not require cash flow forecasts or discount rate estimates, both of which are notoriously difficult to obtain in practice.]

[We provide a model of governance in which a board arbitrates between an activist investor and a manager facing reputational concerns. The optimal level of internal board governance depends on both the severity of the agency conflict and the strength of external governance. Internal governance creates a certification effect, so greater intervention by the board can lead to worse managerial behavior. Internal and external governance are substitutes when external governance is weak (the board commits to an interventionist policy to induce participation from the activist) and complements when external governance is strong (the board relies to a greater extent on the activist's information).]

[We propose a clientele-based model of the yield curve and optimal maturity structure of government debt. Clienteles are generations of agents at different lifecycle stages in an overlapping-generations economy. An optimal maturity structure exists in the absence of distortionary taxes and induces efficient intergenerational risksharing. If agents are more risk-averse than log, then an increase in the long-horizon clientele raises the price and optimal supply of long-term bonds—effects that we also confirm empirically in a panel of OECD countries. Moreover, under the optimal maturity structure, catering to clienteles is limited and long-term bonds earn negative expected excess returns.]

[Financial distress can disrupt a durable goods producer's provision of complementary goods and services such as warranties, spare parts and maintenance. This reduces consumers' demand for the core product, causing indirect costs of financial distress. We test this hypothesis in the market for used cars sold at wholesale auctions. An increase in a manufacturer's credit default swaps significantly decreases the prices of its cars at auction, especially cars with longer expected service lives. Our estimates imply substantial indirect costs of financial distress for car manufacturers. These costs have occasionally even exceeded the tax savings benefits for General Motors and Ford.]

[We analyze optimal financial contracts when the specificity of investments is endogenous. Specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets, but improves the asset's long-term productivity. While the former is known to make financing more difficult, we show that the latter can ease financing constraints and increase financing capacity by improving an entrepreneur's incentive to repay. The overall impact of specialization on the terms of financing depends on which effect is more important. Specialization decisions interact with the nature of investments, their timing, the need for outside financing, and an entrepreneur's ability to commit to a level of specialization.]

[We develop a GARCH option model with a new pricing kernel allowing for a variance premium. While the pricing kernel is monotonic in the stock return and in variance, its projection onto the stock return is nonmonotonic. A negative variance premium makes it U shaped. We present new semiparametric evidence to confirm this U-shaped relationship between the risk-neutral and physical probability densities. The new pricing kernel substantially improves our ability to reconcile the time-series properties of stock returns with the cross-section of option prices. It provides a unified explanation for the implied volatility puzzle, the overreaction of long-term options to changes in short-term variance, and the fat tails of the risk-neutral return distribution relative to the physical distribution.]

[This paper shows that economic linkages among commodities create a source of long-term correlation between futures returns. We extend the theory of storage to a multi-commodity level and find that the convenience yield of a commodity depends on its relative scarcity with respect to other related commodities. This implies a feedback effect between commodities that is necessary to replicate the upward-sloping correlation term structure of futures returns observed for related commodities. We present a multi-commodity affine model that validates our theoretical predictions and considerably reduces the pricing errors in out-of-sample crack spread options.]

[We study dynamic equilibrium in a Lucas economy with two stocks, two heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion investors, and portfolio constraints. We focus on margin and leverage constraints, which restrict access to credit. We find a positive relationship between the amount of leverage in the economy and magnitudes of stock return correlations and volatilities. Tighter constraints generate rich patterns in correlations and volatilities, make them less countercyclical, increase risk premia proportionally to assets' margins, and increase prices of low-margin assets more than prices of high-margin assets. We derive closed-form solutions for the unconstrained case and the case of leverage constraints.]

[Using deal-level data from transactions initiated by large private equity houses, we find that the abnormal performance of deals is positive on average, after controlling for leverage and sector returns. Higher abnormal performance is related to improvement in sales and operating margin during the private phase, relative to that for quoted peers. General partners who are ex-consultants or ex—industry managers are associated with outperforming deals focused on internal value-creation programs, and ex-bankers or ex-accountants with outperforming deals involving significant mergers and acquisitions. The findings suggest the presence, on average, of positive but heterogeneous skills at the deal-partner level in large private equity transactions.]