Knowledge that Transforms

[This paper shows that during episodes of market turmoil, 13F institutional investors with short trading horizons sell their stockholdings to a larger extent than 13F institutional investors with longer trading horizons. This creates price pressure for stocks held mostly by short-horizon investors, which, as a consequence, experience larger price drops, and subsequent reversals, than stocks held mostly by long-horizon investors. These findings, obtained after controlling for the withdrawals experienced by the investors, are not driven by other institutional investors' and firms' characteristics. Overall, the evidence indicates that investors with short horizons amplify the effects of market-wide negative shocks by demanding liquidity at times when other potential buyers' capital is scarce.]

[What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default as debt builds up and net new borrowing becomes difficult, because of the adverse consequences from default to the domestic financial sector. More myopic governments default less often, but tax in a more distortionary way and increase the vulnerability of the domestic financial sector to future government debt default.]

[This paper demonstrates a positive effect of stock liquidity on blockholder governance. Liquidity increases the likelihood of block formation. Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that the blockholder governs through voice (intervention)—as shown by the lower propensity for active investment (filing Schedule 13D) than passive investment (filing Schedule 13G). The lower frequency of activism does not reflect the abandonment of governance, but governance through the alternative channel of exit (selling one's shares): A 13G filing leads to positive announcement returns and improvements in operating performance, especially in liquid firms. Moreover, taking into account the increase in block formation, liquidity has an unconditional positive effect on voice as well as exit. We use decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to identify causal effects.]

[We compare the stability and timeliness of credit ratings produced by a traditional issuer-paid rating agency (Moody's Investors Service) and a subscriber-paid rater (Rapid Ratings). Moody's ratings exhibit less volatility but are slower to identify default risk. We control for Moody's aversion to ratings volatility and still find its ratings lag Rapid Ratings'. More importantly, accuracy ratios indicate that Rapid Ratings provides a better ordinal ranking of credit risk. We quantify the loss avoidance associated with Rapid Ratings' signals to estimate costs associated with regulatory and contractual systems based on issuer-paid ratings.]

[Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.]

[We model investment options as intangible capital in a production economy in which younger vintages of assets in place have lower exposure to aggregate productivity risk. In equilibrium, physical capital requires a substantially higher expected return than intangible capital. Quantitatively, our model rationalizes a significant share of the observed difference in the average return of book-to-market-sorted portfolios (value premium). Our economy also produces (1) a high premium of the aggregate stock market over the risk-free interest rate, (2) a low and smooth risk-free interest rate, and (3) key features of the consumption and investment dynamics in the U.S. data.]

[We demonstrate that a firm's ability to innovate is predictable, persistent, and relatively simple to compute, and yet the stock market appears to ignore the implications of past successes when valuing future innovation. We show that two firms that invest the same in R&D can have quite divergent, but predictably divergent, future paths based on their past track records. A long-short portfolio strategy that takes advantage of the information in past track records earns abnormal returns of roughly 11% annually. Importantly, these past track records also predict divergent future real outcomes in patents, patent citations, and new product innovations.]

[Market liberalization may not result in full market integration if implicit barriers are important. We test this proposition for investable and non-investable segments of twenty-two emerging markets (EMs). We also measure the degree of integration for six major developed markets (DMs) as a meaningful benchmark. We find that while the DMs are close to fully integrated, both EM segments are not effectively integrated with the global economy. We quantify the importance of implicit barriers and show that better institutions, stronger corporate governance, and more transparent markets in EMs would jointly contribute to a higher degree of integration by about 20% to 30%.]

[We examine the potential for selection bias in voluntarily reported hedge fund performance data. We construct a set of hedge fund returns that have never been reported to a commercial hedge fund database. These returns allow a direct comparison of performance between funds that choose to report to commercial databases and funds that do not. We find that funds that report their performance to commercial databases significantly outperform nonreporting funds. Our results suggest that the voluntarily reported performance in commercial databases suffers from a selection bias that may exaggerate the average skill of the universe of hedge fund managers.]

[Average return differences among firms sorted on valuation ratios, past investment, profitability, market beta, or idiosyncratic volatility are largely driven by differences in exposures of firms to the same systematic factor related to embodied technology shocks. Using a calibrated structural model, we show that these firm characteristics are correlated with the ratio of growth opportunities to firm value, which affects firms' exposures to capital-embodied productivity shocks and risk premia. We thus provide a unified explanation for several apparent anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns—namely, predictability of returns by these firm characteristics and return comovement among firms with similar characteristics.]