Knowledge that Transforms

[We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtorfriendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for this claim by employing patents as a proxy for innovation. Using time-series changes within a country and cross-country variation in creditor rights, we confirm that a creditor-friendly code leads to a lower absolute level of innovation by firms, as well as relatively lower innovation by firms in technologically innovative industries. When creditor rights are stronger, technologically innovative industries employ relatively less leverage and grow disproportionately slower.]

[This paper proposes a new method of forming basis assets. We use return correlations to sort securities into portfolios and compare the inferences drawn from this set of basis assets with those drawn from other benchmark portfolios. The proposed set of portfolios appears capable of generating measures of risk-return trade-off that are estimated with a lower error. In tests of asset pricing models, we find that the returns of these portfolios are significantly and positively related to both CAPM and Consumption CAPM risk measures, and there are significant components of these returns that are not captured by the three-factor model.]

[In this paper, we investigate the disciplining role of banks and bank debt in the market for corporate control. We find that relationship bank lending intensity and bank client network have positive effects on the probability of a borrowing firm becoming a target. This effect is enhanced in cases where the target and acquirer have a relationship with the same bank. Moreover, we utilize an experiment to show that the effects of relationship bank lending intensity on takeover probability are not driven by endogeneity. Finally, we also investigate reasons motivating a bank's informational role in the market for corporate control.]

[We show that the introduction of a large asset permanently affects the prices of existing assets in a market. Using data from 254 initial public offerings (IPOs) in 22 emerging markets, we find that portfolios that covary highly with the IPO experience a decline in prices relative to other portfolios during the month of the issue. The effects are stronger when the IPO is issued in a market that is less integrated internationally and when the IPO is bigger. This evidence is consistent with the idea that shocks to asset supply have a significant effect on asset prices]

[Empirical evidence of imperfect integration across world capital markets suggests a role for cross-border arbitrage by multinationals. Consistent with multinational arbitrage as a determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns, we find that FDI flows increase sharply with source-country stock market valuations--particularly the component of valuations that is predicted to revert the next year, and particularly in the presence of capital account restrictions that limit other mechanisms of cross-country arbitrage. The results suggest the existence of a cheap financial capital channel in which FDI flows reflect, in part, the use of relatively low-cost capital available to overvalued parents in the source country.]

[This study demonstrates the impact of systematic risk on the prices of individual equity options. The option prices are characterized by the level and slope of implied volatility curves, and the systematic risk is measured as the proportion of systematic variance in the total variance. Using daily option quotes on the S&P 100 index and its 30 largest component stocks, we show that after controlling for the underlying asset's total risk, a higher amount of systematic risk leads to a higher level of implied volatility and a steeper slope of the implied volatility curve. Thus, systematic risk proportion can help differentiate the price structure across individual equity options.]

[We examine the problem of motivating privately informed managers to engage in entrepreneurial activity to improve the quality of the firm's investment opportunities. The firm's investment and compensation policy must balance the manager's incentives to provide entrepreneurial effort and to report private information truthfully. The optimal policy is to underinvest (compared to first-best) and provide weak incentive pay in low-quality projects and overinvest (compared to first-best) and provide strong incentive pay in highquality projects.]

[We study the change in government control of privatized firms in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. At the end of 2000, after the largest privatization wave in history, governments retained control of 62.4% of privatized firms. In civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions, whereas in common law countries they typically use golden shares. When we combine these two mechanisms, we find no association between a country's legal tradition and the extent of government control. Rather, we document more prevalent government influence over privatized firms in countries with proportional electoral rules and with a centralized system of political authority. of political authority.]

This paper examines the secondary market for loan sales and, in particular, loan contract design as a mechanism to resolve informational issues in loan sales and associated costs and benefits. Using loan-level data, we find that sold loans contain additional covenants and more restrictive net worth covenants, particularly when agency and informational problems are more severe. Why do borrowers agree to incur the additional costs associated with loan sales? Our evidence suggests that these borrowers benefit through increased private debt availability. Further, loan sales go hand in hand with more durable lending relationships, suggesting that risk management aids continued relationship lending.

[Are there important cyclical fluctuations in bond market premiums and, if so, with what macroeconomic aggregates do these premiums vary? We use the methodology of dynamic factor analysis for large datasets to investigate possible empirical linkages between forecastable variation in excess bond returns and macroeconomic fundamentals. We find that "real" and "inflation" factors have important forecasting power for future excess returns on U. S. government bonds, above and beyond the predictive power contained in forward rates and yield spreads. This behavior is ruled out by commonly employed affine term structure models where the forecastability of bond returns and bond yields is completely summarized by the cross-section of yields or forward rates. An important implication of these findings is that the cyclical behavior of estimated risk premia in both returns and long-term yields depends importantly on whether the information in macroeconomic factors is included in forecasts of excess bond returns. Without the macro factors, risk premia appear virtually acyclical, whereas with the estimated factors risk premia have a marked countercyclical component, consistent with theories that imply investors must be compensated for risks associated with macroeconomic activity.]