Knowledge that Transforms

[This article establishes a role for corporate governance regulation. An externality operating through executive compensation motivates regulation. Governance lowers agency costs, allowing firms to grant less incentive pay. When a firm increases governance and lowers incentive pay, other firms can also lower executive compensation. Because firms do not internalize the full benefit of governance, regulation can improve investor welfare. When regulation is enforced, large firms increase in value, small firms decrease in value, and all firms lower incentive pay. Distinct cross-sectional and cross-country predictions for the number of voluntary governance firms are provided.]

[Based on a sample of highly leveraged Austrian ski hotels undergoing debt restructurings, we show that reducing a debt overhang leads to a significant improvement in operating performance. Changes in leverage in the debt restructurings are instrumented with Unexpected Snow, which captures the extent to which a ski hotel experienced unusually good or bad snow conditions prior to the debt restructuring. Unexpected Snow provides lending banks with the counterfactual of what would have been the ski hotel's operating performance in the absence of strategic default, allowing them to distinguish between ski hotels that are in distress due to negative demand shocks (" liquidity defaulters") and those that are in distress due to debt overhang ("strategic defaulters").]

[We provide evidence for the importance of information asymmetry in asset pricing by using three natural experiments. Consistent with rational expectations models with multiple assets and multiple signals, we find that prices and uninformed demand fall as asymmetry increases. These falls are larger when more investors are uninformed, turnover is larger and more variable, payoffs are more uncertain, and the lost signal is more precise. Prices fall partly because expected returns become more sensitive to liquidity risk. Our results confirm that information asymmetry is priced and imply that a primary channel that links asymmetry to prices is liquidity.]

[The third moment of returns is important for asset pricing, but it is hard to measure precisely, particularly at long horizons. This paper proposes a definition of the realized third moment that is computed from high-frequency returns. It provides an unbiased estimate of the true third moment of long-horizon returns, doing for the third moment what realized variance does for the second moment. The methodology is used to demonstrate that the skewness of equity index returns, far from diminishing with horizon, actually increases with horizons up to a year, and its magnitude is economically important.]

[Default probability plays a central role in the static trade-off theory of capital structure. We directly test this theory by regressing the probability of default on proxies for costs and benefits of debt. Contrary to predictions of the theory, firms with higher bankruptcy costs, i.e., smaller firms and firms with lower asset tangibility, choose capital structures with higher bankruptcy risk. Further analysis suggests that the capital structures of smaller firms with lower asset tangibility—which tend to have less access to capital markets—are more sensitive to negative profitability and equity value shocks, making them more susceptible to bankruptcy risk.]

[By buying convertibles and shorting the underlying stock, hedge funds distribute equity exposure to well-diversified shareholders. We find that firms with characteristics that make seasoned equity offerings expensive are more likely to issue convertibles to hedge funds. We conclude that hedge funds provide opportunities for firms to issue convertible securities at a lower cost than seasoned equity by serving as relatively low-cost distributors of equity exposure. A higher fraction of a convertible is privately placed with hedge funds when institutional ownership, stock liquidity, issue size, concurrent stock repurchases, and limitations on callability suggest that shorting costs will be lower.]

[This article proposes a novel method of extracting the cost of default from the change in the market value of a firm's assets upon default. Using a large sample of firms with observed prices of debt and equity that defaulted over fourteen years, we estimate the cost of default for an average defaulting firm to be 21.7% of the market value of assets. The costs vary from 14.7% for bond renegotiations to 30.5% for bankruptcies, and are substantially higher for investment-grade firms (28.8%) than for highly levered bond issuers (20.2%), which extant estimates are based on exclusively.]

[We derive a measure of aggregate systemic risk, designated CATFIN, that complements bank-specific systemic risk measures by forecasting macroeconomic downturns six months into the future using out-of-sample tests conducted with U.S., European, and Asian bank data. Consistent with bank "specialness," the CATFIN of both large and small banks forecasts macroeconomic declines, whereas a similarly defined measure for both nonfinancial firms and simulated "fake banks" has no marginal predictive ability. High levels of systemic risk in the banking sector impact the macroeconomy through aggregate lending activity. A conditional asset pricing model shows that CATFIN is priced for financial and nonfinancial firms.]

[Although it is well known that appearance-based impressions affect labor market and election outcomes, little is known about the role appearance plays in financial transactions. We address this question using photographs of potential borrowers from a peer-to-peer lending site. Consistent with the trust-intensive nature of lending, we find that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have higher probabilities of having their loans funded. Moreover, borrowers who appear more trustworthy indeed have better credit scores and default less often. Overall, our findings suggest that impressions of trustworthiness matter in financial transactions as they predict investor, as well as borrower, behavior.]

[We present a model in which issuers of asset-backed securities choose to release coarse information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We show that various types of public intervention (mandatory transparency standards, provision of liquidity to distressed banks, or secondary market price support) have quite different welfare implications. Finally, we extend the model by endogenizing the private and social value of liquidity and the proportion of sophisticated investors.]