Knowledge that Transforms

Since liquidation and bankruptcy are costly, researchers have tried to find out why the claimants of a troubled firm do not work out a deal to avoid these costs. In this article we show that if a creditor has to deal with multiple borrowers who might default, it may be optimal for the creditor to randomly reject requests for a loan workout. We further demonstrate that the optimal acceptance rate used by a creditor is positively related to the liquidating cost and negatively related to the default benefit. Our model is particularly relevant when analyzing the default decisions of mortgage borrowers and small business owners.

An informed financial institution can trade on private information and also sell it to clients through a managed fund. To provide an incentive for the informed agent to trade in the interest of her client, the optimal contract requires that she be compensated as an increasing function of the profits of the fund. The optimal contract is also designed to limit the aggressiveness of the sum of the fund’s trade and the proprietary trade. This reduces information revelation and thus leads to greater overall trading profits than if the informed agent only conducted proprietary trades.

This article studies the contracting problem between an individual investor and a professional portfolio manager in a continuous-time principal-agent framework. Optimal contracts are obtained in closed form. These contracts are of a symmetric form and suggest that a portfolio manager should receive a fixed fee, a fraction of the total assets under management, plus a bonus or a penalty depending upon the portfolio's excess return relative to a benchmark portfolio. The appropriate benchmark portfolio is an active index that contains risky assets where the number of shares invested in each asset can vary over time, rather than a passive index in which the number of shares invested in each asset remains constant over time.

We show an isomorphism between optimal portfolio selection or competitive equilibrium models with utilities incorporating linear habit formation, and corresponding models without habit formation. The isomorphism can be used to mechanically transform known solutions not involving habit formation to corresponding solutions with habit formation. For example, the Constantinides (1990) and Ingersoll (1992) solutions are mechanically obtained from the familiar Merton solutions for the additive utility case, without recourse to a Bellman equation or first-order conditions. More generally, recent solutions to portfolio selection problems with recursive utility and a stochastic investment opportunity set are readily transformed to novel solutions of corresponding problems with utility that combines recursivity with habit formation. The methodology also applies in the context of Hindy–Huang–Kreps (1992) preferences, where our isomorphism shows that the solution obtained by Hindy and Huang (1993) can be mechanically transformed to Dybvig’s (1995) solution to the optimal consumption-investment problem with consumption ratcheting.

Higher initial margin requirements are associated with lower subsequent stock market volatility during normal and bull periods, but show no relationship during bear periods. Higher margins are also negatively related to the conditional mean of stock returns, apparently because they reduce systemic risk. We conclude that a prudential rule for setting margins (or other regulatory restrictions) is to lower them in sharply declining markets in order to enhance liquidity and avoid a depyramiding effect in stock prices, but subsequently raise them and keep them at the higher level in order to prevent a future pyramiding effect

Previous studies document negative long-term abnormal stock returns following seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuances and conclude that markets are inefficient. Other studies, however, argue that these results are a manifestation of risk mismeasurement (i.e., the bad-model problem), not market inefficiency. We test the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and avoid the bad-model problem by examining the long-term performance of our sample firms' bonds and stocks following their SEOs. Our results are inconsistent with the EMH. We also provide evidence that SEOs transfer wealth from shareholders to bondholders because SEOs reduce default risk. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

This article studies information blockages and the asymmetric release of information in a security market with fixed setup costs of trading. In this setting, “sidelined” investors may delay trading until price movements validate their private signals. Trading thereby internally generates the arrival of further news to the market. This leads to (1) negative skewness following price run-ups and positive skewness following price rundowns (even though the model is ex ante symmetric), (2) a lack of correspondence between large price changes and the arrival of external information, and (3) increases in volatility following large price changes.

The fee structure used to compensate investment advisers is central to the study of fund design, and affects investor welfare in at least three ways: (i) by influencing the portfolio-selection incentives of the adviser, (ii) by affecting risk-sharing between adviser and investor, and (iii) through its use as a signal of quality by superior investment advisers. In this paper, we describe a model in which all of these features are present, and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of fee contracts, the “fulcrum” and the “incentive” types, from the standpoint of investor welfare. While the former has some undeniably attractive features (that have, in particular, been used by regulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context), we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often more attractive from the standpoint of investor welfare. Our model is a flexible one; our conclusions are shown to be robust to many extensions of interest. The results are also extended to consider unrestricted fee structures and competitive markets for fund managers.

The relationship between affine stochastic processes and bond pricing equations in exponential term structure models has been well established. We connect this result to the pricing of interest rate derivatives. If the term structure model is exponential affine, then there is a linkage between the bond pricing solution and the prices of many widely traded interest rate derivative securities. Our results apply to m-factor processes with n diffusions and l jump processes. The pricing solutions require at most a single numerical integral, making the model easy to implement. We discuss many options that yield solutions using the methods of the article.

This article studies the role of risk arbitrageurs in takeovers and the source of their advantage. We show how the presence of arbitrageurs affects the value of the target shares, since arbitrageurs are more likely to tender. Therefore an arbitrageur has the informational advantage of knowing he bought shares. In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares and the price they pay are determined endogenously. We also present several empirical implications, including the relationship among trading volume, takeover premium, liquidity of the shares, and the number of risk arbitrageurs investing in one particular deal.