Knowledge that Transforms

Debt; Bank loans

Abstract: China is often mentioned as a counterexample to the findings in the finance and growth literature since, despite the weaknesses in its banking system, it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The fast growth of Chinese private sector firms is taken as evidence that it is alternative financing and governance mechanisms that support China’s growth. This paper takes a closer look at firm financing patterns and growth using a database of 2400 Chinese firms. We find that a relatively small percentage of firms in our sample utilize formal bank finance with a much greater reliance on informal sources. However, our results suggest that despite its weaknesses, financing from the formal financial system is associated with faster firm growth, whereas fund raising from alternative channels is not. Using a selection model, we find no evidence that these results arise because of the selection of firms that have access to the formal financial system. While firms report bank corruption, we do not find evidence that it significantly affects the allocation of credit or the performance of firms that receive the credit. Our findings suggest that the role of reputation and relationship based financing and governance mechanisms in financing the fastest growing firms in China is likely to be overestimated.

We examine how long-run consumption risk arises endogenously in a standard pro-duction economy model where the representative agent has Epstein-Zin preferences. We show that even when technology growth is i.i.d., optimal consumption smoothing induces long run risk- highly persistent variation in expected consumption growth. As a consequence, the model can account for a high price of risk although both consump-tion growth volatility and the coe ¢ cient of relative risk aversion are low. The asset pricing implications of endogenous long-run risk depend crucially on the persistence of technology shocks and investorspreference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty.

We study the economic sources of stock-bond return comovements and their time variation using a dynamic factor model. We identify the economic factors employing a semistructural regime-switching model for state variables such as interest rates, inflation, the output gap, and cash flow growth. We also view risk aversion, uncertainty about inflation and output, and liquidity proxies as additional potential factors. We find that macroeconomic fundamentals contribute little to explaining stock and bond return correlations but that other factors, especially liquidity proxies, play a more important role. The macro factors are still important in fitting bond return volatility, whereas the "variance premium" is critical in explaining stock return volatility. However, the factor model primarily fails in fitting covariances. (JEL G11, G12, G14, E43, E44) Stock and bond returns in the United States display an average correlation of about 19% during the post-1968 period. Shiller and Beltratti (1992) underestimate the empirical correlation using a present value with constant discount rates, whereas Yet, these models generate realistically positive correlations using economic state variables.

International audience

We argue that dividend stickiness, the tendency of managers to keep dividends unchanged, implies that managers use a partially pooling dividend policy. We offer a model that demonstrates how such a policy can evolve endogenously in equilibrium. An informed manager who cares about the firm's intrinsic value as well as short-term stock price allocates earnings between investments and dividends. We show that there is a continuum of equilibria in which the dividend is constant for a range of realized earnings. Compared with the standard separating equilibrium, this partial pooling behavior induces higher firm value and lower underinvestment. We offer new empirical implications relating the pooling nature of dividend stickiness to the information environment of the firm, dividend prediction models, managerial incentives, and investment.

We examine the behavior of call options surrounding the underlying stock's ex-dividend date. The evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of a rational exercise policy; a significant fraction of the open interest remains unexercised, resulting in a windfall gain to option writers. This triggers a sophisticated trading scheme that enables short-term traders to receive a significant fraction of the gains. The trading scheme inflates reported volume and distorts its traditional relations to liquidity. The dramatic increases in the volume of trade on the last cum-dividend day are facilitated by limitations on transaction costs passed by the various option exchanges.

The paper explores how legal change affects lending behavior of banks in twelve transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to previous studies, we use bank level rather than aggregate data, which allows us to control for country level heterogeneity and analyze the effect of legal change on different types of lenders. Using a differences-in-differences methodology to analyze the within country variation of changes in creditor rights protection, we find that the credit supplied by banks increases subsequent to legal change. Further, we show that collateral law matters more for credit market development than bankruptcy law. We also show that entrants respond more strongly to legal change than incumbents. In particular, foreign-owned banks extend their lending volume substantially more than do domestic banks, be they private or state owned. The same holds when we use foreign greenfield banks as proxies for new entrants. These results are robust after controlling for a wide variety of possibilities.

We exploit an unexpected inflow of liquidity in an emerging market to study how capital is intermediated to firms. We find that backward-looking credit limit constraints imposed by banks make it difficult for firms to borrow, despite readily available bank liquidity, healthy aggregate demand, and a sharply falling cost of capital. The resulting aggregate failure to extend and retain capital in the economy suggests that agency costs that force banks to rely on sticky balance-sheet-based credit limits prevent emerging economies from effectively intermediating capital.

Using a large sample of cross-border mergers, we measure the effect of a change in location on systematic risk. When a target firm's location moves, a large part of its systematic risk switches from being related to its home equity market to that of the acquirer. On average, the change in betas is equivalent to an excess shift of about 0.5 in the target's beta from its home market to that of the acquirer. We test whether the change in systematic risk can be explained by fundamental factors related to changes in the operations of the firm or merger synergy and find that it cannot. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected], Oxford University Press.