Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract In a novel model mining experiment, we data mine hundreds of randomly constructed three-factor models and find that many outperform well-known models from the literature, including those with four and five factors. The results provide compelling evidence that the threshold of factor model success needs to be raised. Confidence intervals for model rankings, derived from a bootstrap simulation, offer new insights into the consistency of a model’s pricing ability. Rankings for some well-known models are unusually volatile, which have wider confidence intervals than that of most of the random factor models.

Abstract Individuals increasingly buy mutual funds via online platforms, whose “best-buy” recommendations heavily influence flows. As intermediaries of mutual funds, platforms provide none of the unobservable interaction or intangible benefits of brokers, and so allow clean tests of the determinants, influence, and value of their fund recommendations. Using unique U.K. data, we find that platforms favor “own-brand” funds and those paying them a higher commission share. Investors discount own-brand recommendations, but not those paying high commission shares (which were not observable in the United Kingdom). A regulatory ban on commission sharing lowered costs and improved the informativeness of platform recommendations.

Abstract The informativeness principle states that a contract should depend on informative signals. This paper studies how it should do so. Signals indicating that the output distribution has shifted to the left (e.g., weak industry performance) reduce the threshold for the manager to be paid; those indicating that output is a precise measure of effort (e.g., low volatility) decrease high thresholds and increase low thresholds. Surprisingly, “good” signals of performance need not reduce the threshold. Applying our model to performance-based vesting, we show that performance measures should affect the strike price, rather than the number of vesting options, contrary to practice.

Abstract This paper examines how minimum wages affect lender and borrower interactions with consumer credit markets. We find that higher state minimum wages increase the supply of unsecured credit, reduce payday loan usage, decrease delinquency, and increase credit scores. Overall, minimum wages reduce borrowing costs and have positive spillover effects on disposable income and liquidity. A back-of-the-envelope of the cost savings indicates that higher minimum wages increase disposable income by 1.3% more than implied by estimates of the direct effect on earnings.

Abstract An artist’s death constitutes a negative shock to his future production; death permanently decreases the artist’s float. We use this shock to test predictions of speculative trading models with short-selling constraints. As predicted in our model, we find that an artist’s premature death leads to a permanent increase in prices and turnover; this effect being larger for more famous artists. We document that premature death increases prices (by 54.7%) and secondary market volume (by 63.2%).

Abstract Using detailed order handling data, we find that institutional brokers who route more orders to affiliated alternative trading systems (ATSs) are associated with lower execution quality (i.e., lower fill rates and higher implementation shortfall costs). To separate clients’ preference for ATSs from brokers’ routing decisions, we confirm these results for orders where brokers have more order handling discretion, matched broker analysis that accounts for ATS usage, matched child orders that account for client intent, and based on an exogenous constraint on ATS venue choice. Our results suggest that increased transparency of order routing practices will improve execution quality.

Abstract This paper provides novel evidence that corporate political influence operates through renegotiations of existing government contracts. Using detailed data on contractual terms and renegotiations around sudden deaths and resignations of local politicians, the estimates show that politically connected firms initially bid low and successfully renegotiate contract amounts, deadlines, and incentives. The effects hold across different industries and contract types, enhance firm value, and persist around the exogenous increase in contract supply due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Overall, this paper establishes an unexplored link between political influence, ex post renegotiations, and ex ante bidding of government contracts.

Abstract We develop a theory of innovation waves, investor sentiment, and merger activity based on Knightian uncertainty. Uncertainty-averse investors are more optimistic on an innovation when they can make contemporaneous investments in multiple uncertain projects. Innovation waves occur when there is a critical mass of innovative companies, and are characterized by stronger investor sentiment, higher equity valuation, and hot initial public offering markets. Our approach to investor sentiment is not based on erroneous beliefs disjoint from economic fundamentals, but depends on uncertainty on the fundamentals. Our model can explain sector-specific booms uncorrelated with aggregate economic activity and the overall stock market.

Using a quantitative theoretical framework this paper analyzes how problems of self-control influence housing and mortgage decisions. The results show that people with stronger problems of self-control are less likely to become homeowners, even though houses serve as commitment for saving. The paper then investigates the welfare effects of regulating mortgage products if people differ in their degree of self-control. Holding house prices fixed, higher down payment requirements and restrictions on refinancing turn out to be beneficial to people with sufficiently strong problems of self-control, even though these policies restrict access to the commitment device.

Abstract We study an economy’s response to an unexpected epidemic. The spread of the disease can be mitigated by reducing consumption and hours worked in the office. Working from home is subject to learning-by-doing. Private agents’ rational incentives are relatively weak and fatalistic. The planner recognizes infection and congestion externalities and implements front-loaded mitigation. Under our calibration, the planner reduces cumulative fatalities by 48% compared to 24% by private agents, although with a sharper drop in consumption. Our model can replicate key industry and/or occupational-level patterns and explain how large variations in outcomes across regions can stem from small initial differences.