Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We show that larger trades incur lower trading costs in government bond markets (“size discount”), but costs increase in trade size after controlling for client identity (“size penalty”). The size discount is driven by the cross-client variation of larger traders obtaining better prices, consistent with theories of trading with imperfect competition. The size penalty, driven by the within-client variation, is larger for corporate bonds, during major macroeconomic surprises and during COVID-19. These differences are larger among more sophisticated clients, consistent with information-based theories.

Abstract We present a theory in which the interaction between limited sharing of idiosyncratic labor income risk and labor adjustment costs (that endogenously arise through search frictions) determines interest rate dynamics. In the general equilibrium, the interaction of these two ingredients relates bond risk premiums, cross-sectional skewness of income growth, and labor market tightness. Our model rationalizes an upward-sloping average yield curve and predicts a negative relation between labor market tightness and bond risk premiums. We provide evidence for our theory’s mechanism and predictions.

Abstract The paper uses bids submitted by primary dealer banks at auctions of sovereign bonds to quantify the price elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand correlates strongly with the volatility of returns of the same bonds traded in the secondary market but only weakly with their bid-ask spread. It predicts same-bond post-auction returns in the secondary market, even after controlling for pre-auction volatility. The evidence suggests that the price elasticity of demand is associated with the magnitude of price pressure in the secondary market around auction days and proxies for primary dealer risk-bearing capacity.

Abstract We test for gender bias in promotions at financial institutions using two central predictions of Becker’s (1957, 1993) model: firms with bias will (1) raise the promotion bar for marginally promoted female workers, and (2) incur costs from forgoing efficient employment practices. We find support for both of these predictions using a new nationwide panel of mortgage loan officers and their managers encompassing approximately 72,000 workers from over 1,000 shadow banks from 2014 to 2019. Overall, our findings provide evidence that gender bias is an important factor in gender gaps at financial institutions.

Abstract We construct a novel panel data set to provide new evidence on how the largest nonfinancial firms manage their financial assets. Our granular data show that, over the past decade, bond portfolios have grown to be at least as large as cash-like instruments, driven by the meteoric rise of corporate bond holdings. To shed light on the drivers of this growth, we conduct a pair of event studies around the 2017 tax reform and the 2020 liquidity crisis. We find that large holdings of marketable securities are primarily driven by cross-border tax incentives, while cash-like instruments are driven by liquidity motives. (JEL G32, G35, G11, E440)

Abstract We study a large currency cross-section using asset pricing methods that account for omitted-variable and measurement-error biases. First, we show that the pricing kernel includes at least three latent factors that resemble (but are not identical to) a strong U.S. “dollar” factor and two weak high Sharpe ratio “carry” and “momentum” slope factors. Evidence for an additional “value” factor is weaker. Second, using this pricing kernel, we find that only a small fraction of the over 100 nontradable candidate factors considered have a statistically significant risk premium, mostly relating to volatility, uncertainty, and liquidity conditions, rather than macro variables. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress.

Abstract We study financial effects of remote product delivery in the healthcare industry. Exploiting staggered law adoption for identification, we find that telehealth provision redistributes hospital operations and access to capital away from rural communities. As urban telehealth providers acquire rural patients, rural hospitals experience decreased revenue and profit, credit rating downgrades, increased cost of capital, and ultimately risk of closure. Although telehealth reduces travel costs, some communities lose access to acute care. Overall, we conclude that remote healthcare services have financial consequences as well as real effects, and their benefits are unequally distributed.

Abstract We analyze the distributional effects of macroprudential policy on mortgage cycles by exploiting the U.K. mortgage register and a 2014 15% limit imposed on lenders’ high loan-to-income (LTI) mortgages. Constrained lenders issue fewer and more expensive high-LTI mortgages, with stronger effects on low-income borrowers. Unconstrained lenders strongly substitute high-LTI loans in local areas with higher constrained lender presence, but not high-LTI loans to low-income borrowers—consistent with adverse selection problems—implying lower overall credit to low-income borrowers. Consistently, policy-affected areas experience lower house price growth postregulation and, following the Brexit referendum (negative aggregate shock), better house price growth and lower mortgage defaults for low-income borrowers.

Abstract When can financial advisor conflicts of interest generate worse outcomes for clients? A regulation following from Dodd-Frank prohibits municipal advisors from simultaneously acting as bond underwriters. Using a difference-in-differences approach and 20,051 bond auctions, I test whether limited advisor privileges affect financial advice and borrower outcomes. Financing costs of bonds with potential dual advisor-underwriters fall by 11.4 basis points after the advisor is no longer allowed to underwrite. The decline follows from increases in standardization, third-party certification, and auction participation, all of which are consistent with limiting the adverse selection that arises from advisors withholding information from the market. (JEL D44, D53, G12, G14, G28, H74)