Knowledge that Transforms

[We employ a novel data set on almost 30,000 trade credit contracts to describe the broad characteristics of the parties that contract together and the key terms of these contracts. Whereas prior work has typically used information on only one side of the buyer-seller transaction, we utilize information on both, allowing for the first analysis of buyer-seller pairs. An equally important distinction is that we have multiple contracts for the same buyer or supplier firms, rather than a firm-average response, allowing for the correction of time-invariant firm characteristics that might determine the choice of credit terms. We find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities from smaller suppliers, and that discounts for early payment tend to be offered to riskier buyers.]

[We decompose aggregate market variance into an average correlation component and an average variance component. Only the latter commands a negative price of risk in the cross section of portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic volatility. Portfolios with high (low) idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama-French (1993) model have positive (negative) exposures to innovations in average stock variance and therefore lower (higher) expected returns. These two findings explain the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle of Ang et al. (2006, 2009). The factor related to innovations in average variance also reduces the pricing errors of book-to-market and momentum portfolios relative to the Fama-French (1993) model.]

[We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the preannouncement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.]

[Order flow is toxic when it adversely selects market makers, who may be unaware they are providing liquidity at a loss. We present a new procedure to estimate flow toxicity based on volume imbalance and trade intensity (the VPIN toxicity metric). VPIN is updated in volume time, making it applicable to the high-frequency world, and it does not require the intermediate estimation of non-observable parameters or the application of numerical methods. It does require trades classified as buys or sells, and we develop a new bulk volume classification procedure that we argue is more useful in high-frequency markets than standard classification procedures. We show that the VPIN metric is a useful indicator of short-term, toxicity-induced volatility.]

[We study the role of firm-and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time-invariant firm and, especially, manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the article has a number of potential applications in financial economics.]

[Intuition suggests that firms with higher cash holdings should be "safer" and have lower credit spreads. Yet empirically, the correlation between cash and spreads is robustly positive. This puzzling finding can be explained by the precautionary motive for saving cash, which in our model causes riskier firms to accumulate higher cash reserves. In contrast, spreads are negatively related to the part of cash holdings that is not determined by credit risk factors. Similarly, although firms with higher cash reserves are less likely to default in the short term, endogenously determined liquidity may be related positively to the longerterm probability of default. Our empirical analysis confirms these predictions, suggesting that precautionary savings are central to understanding the effects of cash on credit risk.]

[We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world. Many features of governance and compensation that have caused consternation among commentators arise naturally in this dynamic setting, even though boards are rational and managers are powerless. Compensation changes depend on changes in the evolution of a latent state variable outside the manager's control.Board passivity is positively correlated with both the value of management compensation and the firm's good fortune. Managerial opportunism tends to follow sudden reversals of good fortune. Moreover, managerial private benefits, by increasing managers' stake in the long-run viability of the firm, may actually ameliorate agency conflicts.]

[We study the government equity infusions into banks under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Strong banks opted out of CPP, and equity infusions were provided to banks that posed systemic risk and faced high financial distress costs but had strong asset quality. Concerns over executive compensation led banks to reject CPP infusions and exit the program. CPP infusions did not have meaningful certification effects, but the subsequent stress tests conducted for the major banks had significant certification effects. CPP equity infusions increased investor expectations regarding future regulatory interventions in the banking sector.]

[This article investigates the predictability of jump arrivals in U.S. stock markets. Using a new test that identifies jump predictors up to the intraday level, I find that jumps are likely to occur shortly after macroeconomic information releases, such as the Federal Reserve announcements, nonfarm payroll reports, and jobless claims, as well as market index jumps. I also find firm-specific jump predictors related to earnings releases, analyst recommendations, past stock jumps, and dividend dates. Evidence suggests that distinguishing systematic jumps from idiosyncratic jumps is possible using the characteristics of jump predictors. Finally, I present a short-term jump size clustering.]

[We analyze whether risk shifting by a hedge fund manager is related to the manager's incentive contract, personal capital stake, and the risk of fund closure. We find that the propensity to increase risk following poor performance is significantly weaker when incentive pay is tied to the fund's high-water mark and when funds face little immediate risk of liquidation. Risk shifting is also less prevalent when a manager has a significant amount of personal capital invested in the fund. Overall, high-water mark provisions, managerial stake, and low risk of fund closure appear to make a hedge fund manager more conservative with regard to risk shifting.]