Knowledge that Transforms

Many experiments have found that participants take more investment risk if they see less frequent returns, portfolio-level returns (rather than each individual asset's returns), or long-horizon (rather than one-year) historical return distributions. In contrast, we find that such information aggregation treatments do not affect total equity investment when we make the investment environment more realistic than in prior experiments. Previously documented aggregation effects are not robust to changes in the risky asset's return distribution or to the introduction of a multiday delay between portfolio choice and return realizations.

I develop a simple competitive equilibrium model and derive the prediction that CEO pay-size elasticity increases when more firms compete for an inelastic supply of managers. Using industry-level IPO waves as a proxy for increased competition for CEOs, I find that pay-size elasticity increases by 6% with a one-standard-deviation increase in IPO activity. This effect is stronger in specialized industries. In addition, increased IPO activity leads to a greater likelihood of executive transitions between firms. These findings indicate that market forces play a key role in the determination of CEO pay.

We study the design and incentive effects of contingent convertible debt. With contingent convertibles, the endogenous bankruptcy boundary can be at either of two levels: one with lower default risk or one at which default precedes conversion. An increase in debt moves the firm from the first regime to the second, a phenomenon we call debt-induced collapse. Setting the conversion trigger sufficiently high avoids this hazard. Given this condition, we investigate the effect of contingent capital and debt maturity on optimal capital structure, debt overhang, and asset substitution. We calibrate the model to large banks during the financial crisis.

A common approach to comparing asset pricing models involves a competition in pricing test-asset returns. In contrast, we show that for models with traded factors, when the comparison is framed appropriately in terms of success in pricing both the test-asset and factor returns, the extent to which each model is able to price the factors in the other model is what matters for model comparison. Test assets are irrelevant based on several prominent criteria. For models with nontraded factors, test assets are relevant for model comparison insofar as they are needed to identify factor-mimicking portfolio returns.

This paper links the CEO's concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. We identify short-term concerns using the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter. Vesting equity is associated with a decline in the growth of research and development and capital expenditure, positive analyst forecast revisions, and positive earnings guidance, within the same quarter. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities, we provide evidence that CEO contracts affect real decisions.

We study the nature of deflation risk by extracting the objective distribution of inflation from the market prices of inflation swaps and options. We find that the market expects inflation to average about 2.5% over the next 30 years. Despite this, the market places substantial weight on deflation scenarios in which prices significantly decline over extended horizons. The market prices the economic tail risk of deflation similarly to other types of tail risks, such as corporate default or catastrophic insurance losses. We find that deflation risk is strongly negatively correlated with outcomes in the financial markets and with consumer confidence.