Knowledge that Transforms

We examine whether the quality differentials in earnings forecasts between reputable and nonreputable analysts vary with the severity of conflicts of interest. We measure personal reputation using the Institutional Investor All-American (AA) awards, and bank reputation using Carter-Manaster ranks. While both personal and bank reputation are associated with higher quality forecasts overall, their effectiveness against conflicts of interest differs. The severity of conflicts has a negative and significant effect on the performance of non-AAs at top-tier banks relative to other analysts, while it has a positive and significant effect on the performance of AAs at top-tier banks relative to others. Thus personal reputation is an effective disciplinary device against conflicts of interest, while bank reputation alone is not.

[We test a catering theory describing how stock market mispricing might influence individual firms' investment decisions. We use discretionary accruals as our proxy for mispricing. We find a positive relation between abnormal investment and discretionary accruals; that abnormal investment is more sensitive to discretionary accruals for firms with higher R&D intensity (opaque firms) or share turnover (firms with shorter shareholder horizons); that firms with high abnormal investment subsequently have low stock returns; and that the larger the relative price premium, the stronger the abnormal return predictability. We show that patterns in abnormal returns are stronger for firms with higher R&D intensity or share turnover.]

[Based on a multivariate extension of the constrained locally polynomial estimator of Aït-Sahalia and Duarte (2003), we provide one of the first nonparametric estimates of probability densities of LIBOR rates under forward martingale measures and state-price densities (SPDs) implicit in interest rate cap prices. The forward densities and SPDs depend significantly on the slope and volatility of LIBOR rates, and mortgage markets activities have strong impacts on the shape of the forward densities. The SPDs exhibit a pronounced U-shape as a function of future LIBOR rates, suggesting that the state prices are high at both extremely low and high interest rates, which tend to be associated with recessions and periods of high inflation, respectively. Our results provide nonparametric evidence of unspanned stochastic volatility and suggest that the unspanned factors could be partly driven by activities in the mortgage markets.]

[The institutional brokerage industry faces an ever-increasing pressure to lower trading costs, which has already driven down average commissions and shifted volume toward low-cost execution venues. However, traditional full-service brokers that bundle execution with services remain a force and their commissions are still considerably higher than the marginal cost of trade execution. We hypothesize that commissions constitute a convenient way of charging a prearranged fixed fee for long-term access to a broker's premium services. We derive testable predictions based on this hypothesis and test them on a large sample of institutional trades from 1999 to 2003. We find that institutions negotiate commissions infrequently, and thus commissions vary little with trade characteristics. Institutions also concentrate their order flow with a relatively small set of brokers, with smaller institutions concentrating their trading more than large institutions and paying higher per-share commissions. These results are stable over time, are consistent with our predictions, and cannot be explained by cost-minimization alone. Finally, we discuss the evolution of the institutional brokerage market within the proposed framework and make informal predictions about future developments in the industry.]

[We argue that the cointegrating relation between dividends and consumption, a measure of long-run consumption risks, is a key determinant of risk premia at all investment horizons. As the investment horizon increases, transitory risks disappear, and the asset's beta is dominated by long-run consumption risks. We show that the return betas, derived from the cointegration-based VAR (EC-VAR) model, successfully account for the cross-sectional variation in equity returns at both short and long horizons; however, this is not the case when the cointegrating restriction is ignored. Our evidence highlights the importance of cointegration-based long-run consumption risks for financial markets.]

[We examine whether explicitly controlling for the fixed-income exposure of mutual funds affects conclusions drawn in performance assessment. We focus on daily return data from two hybrid mutual fund samples. Comparing abnormal performance estimates from the Carhart (1997) model to extensions designed to correct for bond holdings, we find that the estimates within one of our samples change from positive to significantly negative. Additional evidence indicates that cash flows to the funds are more closely correlated with the traditional Carhart measure, clearly indicating that the absence of bond indices misleads investors who use a fund's risk-adjusted performance as the basis for investment decisions.]

[Using recent data, we reject the hypothesis that the buyback anomalies first reported by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990, Journal of Finance 45:455-77) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995, Journal of Financial Economics 39:181-208) have disappeared over time. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that open market repurchases are a response to a market overreaction to bad news: significant analyst downgrades, combined with overly pessimistic forecasts of long-term earnings. Stock prices after tender offers are set as if all investors tender their shares, but empirically they do not. Thus, the arbitrage opportunity persists because the market sets prices as if the average, not the marginal investor, determines the stock price]

[We analyze the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts as a specific example of the contractual assignment of property rights under asymmetric information. Specifically, we consider a setting where managers are better informed than lenders regarding potential transfers from debt to equity associated with future investments. This simple adverseselection problem leads to the allocation of greater ex ante decision rights to the creditor (the uninformed party), i.e., tighter covenants, than would follow under symmetric information. This corresponds well to empirical evidence indicating that covenants are very tight upon inception and are frequently waived (and never tightened) upon renegotiation.]

[We analyze capital allocation in a conglomerate where divisional managers with uncertain abilities compete for promotion to CEO. A manager can sometimes gain by unobservably adding variance to divisional performance. Capital rationing can limit this distortion, increase productive efficiency, and allow the owner to make more accurate promotion decisions. Firms for which CEO talent is more important for firm performance are more likely to ration capital. A rationed manager is more likely to be promoted even though all managers are identical ex ante. When the tournament payoff is relatively small, offering an incentive wage can be more efficient than rationing capital; however, when tournament incentives are paramount, rationing is more efficient.]

[This paper considers the impact of the takeover likelihood on firm valuation. If firms are more likely to acquire when there is more free cash or lower required rates of return, the targets become more sensitive to shocks to cash flows or the price of risk. Ceteris paribus, firms exposed to takeovers have different rates of return than protected firms. Using takeover likelihood estimates, we create a "takeover factor," buying (selling) firms with a high (low) takeover likelihood, which generates "abnormal" returns. Several tests confirm that the takeover factor helps explaining cross-sectional differences in equity returns and is related to takeover activity.]