Knowledge that Transforms

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Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(4), 1405-1432
[We evaluate why individuals invest in high-fee index funds. In our experiments, subjects each allocate $ 10,000 across four S&P 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio's subsequent return. Subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees. We reject the hypothesis that subjects buy high-fee index funds because of bundled nonportfolio services. Search costs for fees matter, but even when we eliminate these costs, fees are not minimized.Instead, subjects place high weight on annualized returns since inception. Fees paid decrease with financial literacy. Interestingly, subjects who choose high-fee funds sense they are making a mistake.]

The Determinants of Stock and Bond Return Comovements

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(6), 2374-2428
[We study the economic sources of stock-bond return comovements and their time variation using a dynamic factor model. We identify the economic factors employing a semistructural regime-switching model for state variables such as interest rates, inflation, the output gap, and cash flow growth. We also view risk aversion, uncertainty about inflation and output, and liquidity proxies as additional potential factors. We find that macroeconomic fundamentals contribute little to explaining stock and bond return correlations but that other factors, especially liquidity proxies, play a more important role. The macro factors are still important in fitting bond return volatility, whereas the "variance premium" is critical in explaining stock return volatility. However, the factor model primarily fails in fitting covariances.]

SEO Risk Dynamics

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(11), 4026-4077
[We theoretically and empirically investigate firm-level risk dynamics around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Empirically, beta increases before SEOs and decreases gradually thereafter. Using real options theory, commitment-to-invest generates a gradual postissuance beta decline whereas instantaneous investment and time-to-build do not. In a behavioral theory, systematic mispricing can cause increasing pre-issuance and decreasing post-issuance risk but idiosyncratic mispricing cannot. In the empirical cross-section, investment, own-firm runup, SEO proceeds, and primary issuance—associated with the real options theory—predict beta declines. Sentiment proxies have weaker effects in the full sample, but are significant in a post-1996 subsample. SEOs coincide with low firm-and market-volatility, suggesting volatility-timing in corporate decisions.]

Learning by Trading

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(2), 705-739
[Using a large sample of individual investor records over a nine-year period, we analyze survival rates, the disposition effect, and trading performance at the individual level to determine whether and how investors learn from their trading experience. We find evidence of two types of learning: some investors become better at trading with experience, while others stop trading after realizing that their ability is poor. A substantial part of overall learning by trading is explained by the second type. By ignoring investor attrition, the existing literature significantly overestimates how quickly investors become better at trading.]

Distance and Private Information in Lending

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(7), 2757-2788
[We study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets. Using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank, we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information, leading to a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit, which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus. Analyzing loan rates and firms' decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks' strategic use of private information. However, distance erodes our lender's ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets, suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local.]

Insider Trades and Demand by Institutional and Individual Investors

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(4), 1544-1595
[There is a strong inverse relation between insider trading and institutional demand the same quarter and over the previous year. Our analysis suggests a combination of factors contribute to this relation. First, institutional investors are more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for insiders to trade. Second, insiders are more likely to buy low valuation and low lag return stocks while institutions are attracted to the opposite security characteristics.Last, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that insiders are more likely to view their securities as overvalued (undervalued) following a period when institutions were net buyers (sellers).]

Do Envious CEOs Cause Merger Waves?

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(2), 487-517
[We develop a theory which shows that merger waves can arise even when the shocks that precipitated the initial mergers in the wave are idiosyncratic. The analysis predicts that the earlier acquisitions produce higher bidder returns, involve smaller targets, and result in higher compensation gains for the acquirer's top management team than the later acquisitions in the wave. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. The model also generates additional predictions, some of which remain to be tested.]

Temporary versus Permanent Shocks: Explaining Corporate Financial Policies

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(7), 2591-2647
[We investigate corporate financial policies in the presence of both temporary and permanent shocks to firms' cash flows. In our framework, cash flows can be negative and are imperfectly correlated with firm value, and earnings volatility differs from asset volatility. These results are consistent with empirical stylized facts. They are also contrary to the implications of existing dynamic capital structure models that allow only for permanent shocks to cash flows. Temporary shocks increase the importance of financial flexibility and may provide an intuitively simple and realistic explanation of empirically observed financial conservatism and low leverage phenomena. The theoretical framework developed in this article general enough to be used in various corporate finance applications.]

Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(3), 3245-3285
[As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from twenty-nine countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.]

The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(10), 3700-3737
[This article examines the determinants of financial covenant thresholds in bank loan agreements and information conveyed through the selection of tight financial covenants. We find that riskier firms and firms with fewer investment opportunities select tighter financial covenants. We also find that selection of tight covenants is associated with improvements in the covenant variable and declines in investment spending and net debt issuance. We observe these changes also for borrowers that do not breach their covenants, suggesting that they are not simply the result of creditor influence conditional on a technical default. Furthermore, we find that violations of tightly set covenants have significantly less of an impact on the borrower's investment spending and net debt issuance than violations of loosely set covenants. Overall, our results suggest that the selection of tight covenants conveys information concerning future changes in covenant variables, investment and financial policies, and the outcome of covenant violations.]