Knowledge that Transforms

[We study the effect of introducing a nonredundant derivative on the volatilities of the stock market return and the locally risk-free interest rate. Our analysis uses a standard, frictionless, full-information, dynamic, continuous-time, general-equilibrium, Lucas endowment economy in which there are two classes of agents who have time-additive power utility functions and differ only in their risk aversion. Our main result is to show analytically that if the intensity of the precautionary demand for savings is not too high, then the introduction of a nonredundant derivative increases the volatility of stock market returns. Furthermore, in the economy with the derivative, the volatility of stock market returns can be substantially greater than that of aggregate dividend growth (fundamental volatility). We also show that the volatility of the locally risk-free interest rate increases with the introduction of the derivative.]

[Since bank credit lines are a major source of corporate funding, we examine the determinants of their usage with a comprehensive database of Spanish corporate credit lines. A line's default status is a key factor driving its usage, which increases as firm financial conditions worsen. Firms with prior defaults access their credit lines less, suggesting that bank monitoring influences firms' usage decisions. Line usage has an aging effect that causes it to decrease by roughly 10% per year of its life. Lender characteristics, such as the length of a firm's banking relationships, as well as macroeconomic conditions, affect usage decisions.]

[We study holdings in merger and acquisition (M& A) targets by financial conglomerates in which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M& A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium. We argue that this can be explained in terms of advisors who are privy to important information about the deal, investing in the target in the expectation of its price increasing. We document the high profits of this strategy. The advisory stake is positively related to the likelihood of deal completion and to the termination fees. However, these deals are not wealth creating: there is a negative relation between the advisory stake and the viability of the deal.]

[There is little evidence in the literature on the relative importance of the underlying sources of merger gains. Prior literature suggests that synergies could arise due to taxes, market power, or efficiency improvements. Based on Value Line forecasts, we estimate the average synergy gains in a broad sample of 264 large mergers to be 10.03% of the combined equity value of the merging firms. The detailed data in Value Line projections allow for the decomposition of these gains into underlying operating and financial synergies. We estimate that tax savings contribute only 1.64% in additional value, while operating synergies account for the remaining 8.38%. Operating synergies are higher in focused mergers, while tax savings constitute a large fraction of the gains in diversifying mergers. The operating synergies are generated primarily by cutbacks in investment expenditures rather than by increased operating profits. Overall, the evidence suggests that mergers generate gains by improving resource allocation rather than by reducing tax payments or increasing the market power of the combined firm.]

[This article analyzes the relationship between the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds and their proximity to investments using data on Asia-focused hedge funds. I find, relative to an augmented Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor model, that hedge funds with a physical presence (head or research office) in their investment region outperform other hedge funds by 3.72% per year. The local information advantage is pervasive across all major geographical regions, but is strongest for emerging market funds and funds holding illiquid securities. These results are robust to adjustments for fund fees, serial correlation, backfill bias, and incubation bias. I show also that distant funds, especially those based in the United States and the United Kingdom, are able to raise more capital, charge higher fees, and set longer redemption periods, despite their underperformance relative to nearby funds. It appears that distant funds trade investment performance for better access to capital.]

[This paper investigates a little studied but common mechanism that firms use to obtain state favors: business owners themselves seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that the more business owners rely on government concessions or the wealthier they are, the more likely they are to run for top office. Once in power, the market valuation of their firms increases dramatically. Surprisingly, the political power does not influence the financing strategies of their firms. Instead, business owners in top offices use their policy-decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. Such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but also foreign investors. As a result, these politically connected firms are able to capture more market share.]

[Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide (mis-)valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding.]

[This article reports a unique analysis of private engagements by an activist fund. It is based on data made available to us by Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme, on engagements with management in companies targeted by its UK Focus Fund. In contrast with most previous studies of activism, we report that the fund executes shareholder activism predominantly through private interventions that would be unobservable in studies purely relying on public information. The fund substantially outperforms benchmarks and we estimate that abnormal returns are largely associated with engagements rather than stock picking.]

[This paper characterizes performance measures satisfying a set of proposed axioms. We develop four new measures consistent with the axioms and show that they improve on the economic properties of the Sharpe Ratio and the Gain-Loss Ratio. In our treatment, the performance measures, or the indexes of acceptability, are linked to positive expectations resulting from a stressed sampling of the cash-flow distribution. Theoretically, it is shown that the level of acceptability varies directly with the amount of stress tolerated. In an empirical application, the performance measures are applied to cash flows generated by writing options on the SPX and the FTSE. This exercise reveals that acceptability levels are U-shaped in the strike direction.]

[Theory suggests that greater hierarchical distance between a subordinate and his boss makes it more difficult to share abstract and subjective information in decision making. A novel dataset put together from credit dossiers of large corporate loan applicants enables us to observe the information collected by loan officers, and how it is used by the ultimate loan approving officer. We find that greater hierarchical/geographical distance between the information collecting agent and the loan approving officer leads to less reliance on subjective information and more on objective information. By exploiting nonlinearities in the "assignment rules" that determine an applicant's hierarchical distance, and using information collecting agent fixed effects, we show that our result cannot be driven by endogenous assignment of applicants. We also find that higher frequency of interactions between the information collecting agent and loan approving officer, both over time and through geographical proximity, helps mitigate the effects of hierarchical distance on information use. Our results show that hierarchical distance influences information use, and highlights the importance of "human touch" in communication.]