Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the relation between returns on stock indices and their corresponding futures contracts to evaluate potential explanations for the pervasive yet anomalous evidence of positive, short-horizon portfolio autocorrelations. Using a simple theoretical framework, we generate empirical implications for both microstructure and partial adjustment models. The major findings are (i) return autocorrelations of indices are generally positive even though futures contracts have autocorrelations close to zero, and (ii) these autocorrelation differences are maintained under conditions favorable for spot-futures arbitrage and are most prevalent during low-volume periods. These results point toward microstructure-based explanations and away from explanations based on behavioral models.

This article provides several new insights into the economic sources of skewness. First, we document the differential pricing of individual equity options versus the market index and relate it to variations in return skewness. Second, we show how risk aversion introduces skewness in the risk-neutral density. Third, we derive laws that decompose individual return skewness into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Empirical analysis of OEX options and 30 stocks demonstrates that individual risk-neutral distributions differ from that of the market index by being far less negatively skewed. This article explains the presence and evolution of risk-neutral skewness over time and in the cross section of individual stocks.

I test the hypothesis that short debt maturity attenuates the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage. Using simultaneous equations with leverage and maturity endogenous, I find strong support for an economically significant attenuation effect. The negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage for firms with all shorter-term debt is less than one-sixth as large as the effect for firms with all longer-term debt. Short maturity also increases liquidity risk, however, which negatively affects leverage. The results suggest that firms trade off the cost of underinvestment problems against the cost of liquidity risk when choosing short maturity.

This paper analyzes corporate bond valuation and optimal call and default rules when interest rates and firm value are stochastic. It then uses the results to explain the dynamics of hedging. Bankruptcy rules are important determinants of corporate bond sensitivity to interest rates and firm value. Although endogenous and exogenous bankruptcy models can be calibrated to produce the same prices, they can have very different hedging implications. We show that empirical results on the relation between corporate spreads and Treasury rates provide evidence on duration, and we find that the endogenous model explains the empirical patterns better than do typical exogenous models.

Substantial academic research explains why firms should hedge, but little work has addressed how firms should hedge. We assume that firms can experience costly states of nature and derive optimal hedging strategies using vanilla derivatives (e.g., forwards and options) and custom “exotic” derivative contracts for a value-maximizing firm facing both hedgable (price) and unhedgable (quantity) risks. Customized exotic derivatives are typically better than vanilla contracts when correlations between prices and quantities are large in magnitude and when quantity risks are substantially greater than price risks. Finally, we discuss how our model may be applied in practice.

We provide empirical evidence on the economic benefits of negotiating trades in the upstairs trading room of brokerage firms relative to the downstairs market. Using Helsinki Stock Exchange data, we find that upstairs trades tend to have lower information content and lower price impacts than downstairs trades. This is consistent with the hypotheses that the upstairs market is better at pricing uninformed liquidity trades and that upstairs brokers can give better prices to their customers if they know the unexpressed demands of other customers. We find that these economic benefits depend on price discovery occurring in the downstairs market.

. We develop models of robust decision-making and pricing when there are contemporaneous big and small shocks. We illustrate these models using a stochasticgrowth economy. Large shocks are infrequent changes in the technological growth rate, and small shocks are continuous movements in the technology process. Large shocks evolve as a Markov jump process whereas small shocks are a Brownian motion. Robust decision-making is formalized as a two-player game. In contrast to rational expectations agents, our investors are decision-makers who treat models as approximations and fear misspecication. As an algorithmic device to enforce robustness, investors imagine a second, malevolent player, who has the ability to perturb the baseline model. We study two economies, each of which decentralizes a robust resource allocation problem with hidden growth rates. The economies dier in the manner in which the the model is viewed as an approximation. We compare the pricing implications to those that em...

We find that analysts’ forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals (adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings) among both equity issuers and nonissuers. Analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue-year accruals. The predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation. Predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long-term underperformance of new issuers. The predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts’ credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency.

One reason why funds charge different prices to their investors is that they face different demand curves. One source of differentiation is asset retention: Performance-sensitive investors migrate from worse to better prospects, taking their performance sensitivity with them. In the cross-section we show that past attrition significantly influences the current pricing of retail but not institutional funds. In time-series we show that the repricing of retail funds after merging in new shareholders is predicted by the estimated effect on its demand curve. This result is robust to other influences on repricing, including asset and account-size changes.

This article investigates investor activism when there are a number of strategic investors that are capable of intervening in corporate governance. These strategic investors can monitor and/or trade in anonymous financial markets. In equilibrium, a core group of monitoring investors emerges endogenously to curtail managerial opportunism. These core activists both intervene and trade aggressively. Although the smallest investors are passive, there is no monotonic relationship between the size of preexisting shareholdings and activism. In fact, among those investors who choose activism, those with the smallest holdings are the most aggressive.