Previous studies document negative long-term abnormal stock returns following seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuances and conclude that markets are inefficient. Other studies, however, argue that these results are a manifestation of risk mismeasurement (i.e., the bad-model problem), not market inefficiency. We test the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and avoid the bad-model problem by examining the long-term performance of our sample firms' bonds and stocks following their SEOs. Our results are inconsistent with the EMH. We also provide evidence that SEOs transfer wealth from shareholders to bondholders because SEOs reduce default risk.

Swedish government lottery bonds have coupon payments determined by lottery. They offer a unique opportunity to study a security with uncertain payoffs having a known, observable distribution. The risk associated with the lotteries is idiosyncratic by construction and should not command a risk premium in equilibrium. The bonds are traded in two forms, allowing us to evaluate the rewards to bearing extra lottery risk. Despite its idiosyncratic nature, we find prices appear to reflect aversion to this risk. We evaluate the empirical determinants of this differential pricing and possible explanations for it.

Swedish government lottery bonds have coupon payments determined by lottery. They offer a unique opportunity to study a security with uncertain payoffs having a known, observable distribution. The risk associated with the lotteries is idiosyncratic by construction and should not command a risk premium in equilibrium. The bonds are traded in two forms, allowing us to evaluate the rewards to bearing extra lottery risk. Despite its idiosyncratic nature, we find prices appear to reflect aversion to this risk. We evaluate the empirical determinants of this differential pricing and possible explanations for it.

We use futures transaction data to investigate cross-sectional relationships between market-maker inventory positions and trade activity. The investigation documents strongly that traders control inventory throughout the trading day. Despite this evidence of inventory management, typical inventory control models are contradicted by our data. These inventory models predict that market-maker reservation prices are negatively influenced by inventory. Surprisingly, our evidence shows, as a strong and consistent empirical regularity, that correlations between inventory and reservation prices are positive. We interpret the evidence as consistent with active position taking by futures market floor traders.

[We use futures transaction data to investigate cross-sectional relationships between market-maker inventory positions and trade activity. The investigation documents strongly that traders control inventory throughout the trading day. Despite this evidence of inventory management, typical inventory control models are contradicted by our data. These inventory models predict that market-maker reservation prices are negatively influenced by inventory. Surprisingly, our evidence shows, as a strong and consistent empirical regularity, that correlations between inventory and reservation prices are positive. We interpret the evidence as consistent with active position taking by futures market floor traders.]

[We derive and test a dynamic discrete-time model of asset returns. Both the risks of individual securities and equilibrium risk premia change predictably in the model, but these changes can be attributed to movements in the returns and prices of only two well-diversified portfolios. Any other components of returns should be unpredictable. Using the generalized method of moments, the model is estimated and tested on portfolios of equities. We find the data supportive of the model's restrictions, even when instruments designed to capture the January effect are employed.]

[This article documents an apparent pricing anomaly involving 91/4 percent, 30-year Treasury bonds during the months of May and June 1986. During this period, the price of the 91/4s rose sharply relative to the prices of other long-term Treasury bonds and created a potential arbitrage opportunity. In addition, owners of the 91/4 bonds were able to borrow at a zero interest rate by pledging their bonds. Detailed examination reveals that this relative pricing anomaly cannot be attributed to changes in the level or term structure of interest rates or to differences between the bonds with respect to liquidity, taxation, or duration.]

This article documents an apparent pricing anomaly involving 94 percent, 30-year Treasury bonds during the months of May and June 1986. During this period, the price of the 94s rose sharply relative to the prices of other long-term Treasury bonds and created a potential arbitrage opportunity. In addition, owners of the 94 bonds were able to borrow at a zero interest rate bypledging their bonds. Detailed examination reveals that this relative pricing anomaly cannot be attributed to changes in the level or term structure of interest rates or to differences between the bonds with respect to liquidity, taxation, or duration.

[We examine how bank capital and borrower bargaining power affect loan spreads. Consistent with previous studies, higher bank capital has a negative impact on loan rates, but borrower cash flow has a significant effect on this impact: compared with high-capital banks, lowcapital banks charge more for borrowers with low cash flow, but offer greater marginal discounts as these borrowers’ cash flow rises. These effects are largely focused on more bank-dependent borrowers. We find some evidence that low-capital banks charge a higher premium for bank-dependent borrowers’ systematic risk, but not for their total equity risk or default risk.]

We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt, and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers’preferences. Managers with power utility set investment, debt, and payout proportional to the firm’s net worth, generating a constant (possibly negative) net debt ratio. With exponential utility, investment decisions are separated from decisions about debt and payout. More profitable firms become cash cows, and less profitable firms accumulate debt, as in a pecking-order model.