Knowledge that Transforms

This paper derives and analyzes dynamic timing strategies of a fund manager with private information. Endogenous timing strategies generated by various information structures and skills, and associated fund styles, are identified. Endogenous fund returns are characterized in the public information of an uninformed observer. Timing components are identified. The paper provides foundations for regression analyses of fund returns and tests of market timing.

I provide a new characterization of internal capital markets in an emerging economy using daily divisional data on all Peruvian fish-processing firms. A regression discontinuity model exploiting government production bans on regulated divisions (“fishmeal”) shows that the increased investment in the nonfishmeal divisions due to the bans is substantial (over 30 % of the mean value), after controlling for productivity. The redeployment of financial capacity into nonfishmeal investments is particularly sharper when external financing is more costly and when firms are more closely monitored by creditors. The value-creating nature of this redeployment is supported by its positive effects on nonfishmeal exports. (JEL G30, G31, G32, Q56) The pursuit of value-creating opportunities in emerging economies has become an increasingly important theme for investors and scholars. Accordingly, a growing body of research on global stock market integration, privatization waves, mergers and acquisitions, and banking has led to important lessons about financial markets in emerging economies. Yet surprisingly little is known about how real firms based in emerging economies allocate their internal capital to different investment opportunities. To address this major gap, it would be useful to understand whether and how firms in emerging economies operate their “internal capital markets, ” arguably the most active source of funding for Mark Garmaise provided generous feedback and his help is much appreciated. I am also grateful to Michael

This paper examines whether unobservable differences in firm volatility are responsible for the global loan pricing puzzle, which is the observation that corporate loan interest rates appear to be lower in Europe than in the United States. We analyze whether equity volatility, an error prone measure of firm volatility, can explain this difference in loan spreads. We show that using equity volatility in OLS regressions will result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the difference in U.S. and European loan spreads. We use instrumental variable methods to identify consistent estimates and find no difference in U.S. and European loan spreads.

Feedback from stock prices to cash flows occurs because information revealed by firms' stock prices influences the actions of competitors. We explore the implications of feedback within a noisy rational expectations setting with incumbent publicly traded firms and privately held new entrants. In this setting the equilibrium relation among stock prices and both future dividends and aggregate output depends on the strategic environment in which these firms operate. In general, under reasonable conditions, the relations between prices, dividends, and economic output in our framework are consistent with empirical evidence in the macroliterature. We also generate new, potentially testable, implications.

A mortgage program that offered borrowers greater flexibility in the timing of repayments increased a bank's volume by over 35%. Loans in the program exhibited superior performance. Despite this, a regression discontinuity analysis shows that the causal impact of offering flexibility was to attract borrowers to the bank who experienced quadruple the average delinquency rate. These contrasting findings are driven by the fact that the bank engaged in ex post sorting of stronger borrowers into the flexible program. This sorting masked the ex ante adverse selection effects that offering flexibility had on the entire borrowing pool.

Using a unique panel data set from a U.K. credit card company, we analyze the interest rate sensitivity of subprime credit card borrowers. In addition to all individual transactions and loan terms, we have access to details of a randomized interest rate experiment conducted by the lender on existing (inframarginal) loans. For the whole sample, we estimate a statistically significant £3.4 reduction in monthly credit demand in response to a five percentage point increase in interest rates. This aggregate response is small, but it masks very interesting heterogeneity in the sample. We find that only low-risk borrowers who fully utilize their credit cards lower their credit demand significantly when faced with an increase in interest rates. We also document that a five percentage point increase in interest rates generates significant additional revenue for the lender without inducing delinquency over a short horizon.

We analyze auctions for the settlement of credit default swaps (CDS) theoretically and evaluate them empirically. The requirement to settle in cash with an option to settle physically leads to an unusual two-stage process. In the first stage, participants affect the amount of the bonds to be auctioned off in the second stage. Participants in the second stage may hold positions in derivatives on the assets being auctioned. We show that the final auction price might be either above or below the fair bond price because of strategic bidding on the part of participants holding CDS. Empirically, we observe both types of outcomes, with undervaluation occurring in most cases. We find that auctions undervalue bonds by an average of 6% on the auction day. Undervaluation is related positively to the amount of bonds exchanged in the second stage of the auction, as predicted by the theory. We suggest modifications of the settlement procedure to minimize the underpricing.

We analyze optimal financial contracts when the specificity of investments is endogenous. Specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets, but improves the asset's long-term productivity. While the former is known to make financing more difficult, we show that the latter can ease financing constraints and increase financing capacity by improving an entrepreneur's incentive to repay. The overall impact of specialization on the terms of financing depends on which effect is more important. Specialization decisions interact with the nature of investments, their timing, the need for outside financing, and an entrepreneur's ability to commit to a level of specialization.

This paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs, contrary to conventional wisdom. Separate financing dominates joint financing when risk-contamination losses—that are associated with the contagious default of a well-performing project that is dragged down by the other project's poor performance—outweigh standard coinsurance gains. Separate financing becomes more attractive than joint financing when the fraction of returns lost under default increases and when projects have lower mean returns, higher variability, more positive correlation, and more negative skewness. These predictions are broadly consistent with evidence on conglomerate mergers, spinoffs, project finance, and securitization.

Average return differences among firms sorted on valuation ratios, past investment, profitability, market beta, or idiosyncratic volatility are largely driven by differences in exposures of firms to the same systematic factor related to embodied technology shocks. Using a calibrated structural model, we show that these firm characteristics are correlated with the ratio of growth opportunities to firm value, which affects firms' exposures to capital-embodied productivity shocks and risk premia. We thus provide a unified explanation for several apparent anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns—namely, predictability of returns by these firm characteristics and return comovement among firms with similar characteristics.