Knowledge that Transforms

[The role of ordinary options in facilitating the completion of securities markets is examined in the context of a model of contingent claims sufficiently general to accommodate the continuous distributions of asset pricing theory and option pricing theory. In this context, it is shown that call options written on a single security approximately span all contingent claims written on this security and that call options written on portfolios of call options on individual primitive securities approximately span all contingent claims that can be written on these primitive securities. In the case of simple options, explicit formulas are given for the approximating options and portfolios of options. These results are applied to the pricing of contingent claims by arbitrage and to irrelevance propositions in corporate finance.]

[A dividend-ratio model is introduced here that makes the log of the dividend-price ratio on a stock linear in optimally forecast future one-period real discount rates and future one-period growth rates of real dividends. If ex post discount rates are observable, this model can be tested by using vector autoregressive methods. Four versions of the linearized model, differing in the measure of discount rates, are tested for U.S. time series 1871-1986 and 1926-1986: a version that imposes constant real discount rates, and versions that measure discount rates from real interest rate data, aggregate real consumption data, and return variance data. The results yield a metric to judge the relative importance of real dividend growth, measured real discount rates, and unexplained factors in determining the dividend-price ratio.]

[While most takeover models assume atomistic stockholders, we analyze a single-raider model with finitely many stockholders. Because the raider can always make some stockholders pivotal, he can overcome the free-rider problem identified by Grossman and Hart (1980) and others in atomistic-stockholder models and profitably take over even without exclusion. One might expect that it would be harder for the raider to make stockholders of more widely held firms pivotal and that exclusion would thus become necessary; however, the infinite-stockholder game cannot yield this conclusion. We also consider the limit of the finite-stockholder game and give conditions under which exclusion is unnecessary. Finally, we show that exclusion leads to the possibility of inefficient takeovers.]

[This article investigates the structure on preferences required to derive Ross's arbitrage pricing theory (APT). It is shown that only ordinal preferences are required. In particular, the APT does not require that agents possess preferences representable as risk-averse expected utility functions. This characteristic of the APT is not shared by the standard equilibrium-based capital asset pricing models.]