[We examine short selling in US stocks based on new SEC-mandated data for 2005. There is a tremendous amount of short selling in our sample: short sales represent 24% of NYSE and 31% of Nasdaq share volume. Short sellers increase their trading following positive returns and they correctly predict future negative abnormal returns. These patterns are robust to controlling for voluntary liquidity provision and for opportunistic risk-bearing by short sellers. The results are consistent with short sellers trading on short-term overreaction of stock prices. A trading strategy based on daily short-selling activity generates significant positive returns during the sample period.]

This paper considers the impact of the takeover likelihood on firm valuation. If firms are more likely to acquire when there is more free cash or lower required rates of return, the targets become more sensitive to shocks to cash flows or the price of risk. Ceteris paribus, firms exposed to takeovers have different rates of return than protected firms. Using takeover likelihood estimates, we create a “takeover factor, ” buying (selling) firms with a high (low) takeover likelihood, which generates “abnormal ” returns. Several tests confirm that the takeover factor helps explaining cross-sectional differences in equity returns and is related to takeover activity. This paper considers the impact of the takeover channel on valuation. While it is well known that target shareholders receive a large premium on a takeover, how expectations about takeover premiums affect firm valuation has not been investigated. One possible reason for this lack of interest may be the assumption that differences in takeover exposure are purely idiosyncratic, and hence do not affect a firm’s cost of capital. In that case, the issue of incorporating the takeover channel into valuation is solved by simply adding the expected

[This paper considers the impact of the takeover likelihood on firm valuation. If firms are more likely to acquire when there is more free cash or lower required rates of return, the targets become more sensitive to shocks to cash flows or the price of risk. Ceteris paribus, firms exposed to takeovers have different rates of return than protected firms. Using takeover likelihood estimates, we create a "takeover factor," buying (selling) firms with a high (low) takeover likelihood, which generates "abnormal" returns. Several tests confirm that the takeover factor helps explaining cross-sectional differences in equity returns and is related to takeover activity.]

[We examine the theoretical predictions that link acquirer returns to diversity of opinion and information asymmetry. Theory suggests that acquirer abnormal returns should be negatively related to information asymmetry and diversity-of-opinion proxies for equity offers but not cash offers. We find that this is the case and that, more strikingly, there is no difference in abnormal returns between cash offers for public firms, equity offers for public firms, and equity offers for private firms after controlling for one of these proxies, idiosyncratic volatility.]

[We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impact of shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders) on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholder control is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points. Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bond covenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interests diverge.]

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impact of shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders) on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholder control is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points. Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bond covenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interests diverge.

Journal Article Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies Get access Alon Brav, Alon Brav Duke University Address correspondence to Alon Brav, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar J.B. Heaton J.B. Heaton Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott and Duke University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2 January 2002, Pages 575–606, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/15.2.575 Published: 16 June 2015

We estimate sequentially outcome probabilities and expected payoffs associated with first, second, and final bids in a large sample of tender offer contests. Rival bids arrive quickly and produce large bid jumps. Greater bidder toeholds (prebid ownership of target shares) reduce the probability of competition and target resistance and are associated with both lower bid premiums and lower prebid target stock price runups. The expected payoff to target shareholders is increasing in the bid premium and in the probability of competition, but decreasing in the bidder's toehold. The initial bidder's expected payoff is significantly positive in the “rival-bidder-win” outcome, in part reflecting gains from the pending toehold sale. Despite these dramatic toehold effects, only half of the initial bidders acquire toeholds.

[The dynamics of the unobservable short rate are frequently estimated directly using a proxy. We examine the biases resulting from this practice (the "proxy problem"). Analytic results show that the proxy problem is not economically significant for single-factor affine models. In the two-factor affine model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), the proxy problem is only economically significant for pricing discount bonds with maturities of more than five years. We also describe two different numerical procedures for assessing the magnitude of the proxy problem in a general interest rate model. When applied to a nonlinear single-factor model, they suggest that the proxy problem can be economically significant.]

[We reevaluate the IPO underpricing phenomenon using the stochastic frontier methodology. The advantage of the stochastic frontier is that it can be used to measure the level of deliberate underpricing in the premarket without using aftermarket information. This is accomplished through the estimation of a systematic one-sided error term that measures "inefficiency" or the difference between the maximum predicted offer price and the actual offer price. Data for the analysis are comprised of 1,035 IPOs of common stock issued by firm commitment between 1975 and 1984. IPOs appear to be deliberately underpriced in the premarket in both hot-market and nonhot-market periods. Moreover, the determinants of the maximum IPO price have different effects in the two time periods.]