Corporate debt sales have been regarded as “no news” events because there is no significant price reaction on average to their announcement. We explore the hypothesis that this lack of average price reaction to debt sale announcements is explained by the partial anticipation of debt offers. Theory suggests that the demand for debt capital is fundamentally related to changes in the sources and uses of funds, and we find evidence that earnings are significantly lower, investment growth is significantly higher, and, for some issuers, debt refunding requirements are significantly greater in the period immediately prior to issue than in periods well before and after the issue. We find that this preissue information conditions investors’ expectations of issue, thereby affecting the cross-sectional announcement date price reaction to debt sales in two ways. First, announcement date price reactions are negative, on average, for unanticipated offers or for those offers where prior information suggests that an issue is unlikely. Second, holding the probability of issue constant, announcement date price reactions are significantly more negative for offers that raise more capital than investors expected. These results are consistent with cash flow signaling and asymmetric information models of corporate financings.

[We test the theory of the term structure of indexed-bond prices due to Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR). The econometric method uses Hansen's generalized method of moments and exploits the probability distribution of the single-state variable in CIR's model, thus avoiding the use of aggregate consumption data. It enables us to estimate a continuous-time model based on discretely sampled data. The tests indicate that CIR's model for index bonds performs reasonably well when confronted with short-term Treasury-bill returns. The estimates indicate that term premiums are positive and that yield curves can take several shapes. However, the fitted model does poorly in explaining the serial correlation in real Treasury-bill returns.]

[In this article, we consider the possibility that some liquidity traders preannounce the size of their orders, a practice that has come to be known as "sunshine trading." Two possible effects preannouncement might have on the equilibrium are examined. First, since it identifies certain trades as informationless, preannouncement changes the nature of any informational asymmetries in the market. Second, preannouncement can coordinate the supply and demand of liquidity in the market. We show that preannouncement typically reduces the trading costs of those who preannounce, but its effects on the trading costs and welfare of other traders are ambiguous. We also examine the implications of preannouncement for the distribution of prices and the amount of information that prices reveal.]

In this article, we consider the possibility that some liquidity traders preannounce the size of their orders, a practice that has come to be known as “sunshine trading”. Two possible effects preannouncement might have on the equilibrium are examined. First, since it identifies certain trades as informationless, preannouncement changes the nature of any informational asymmetries in the market. Second, preannouncement can coordinate the supply and demand of liquidity in the market. We show that preannouncement typically reduces the trading costs of those who preannounce, but its effects on the trading costs and welfare of other traders are ambiguous. We also examine the implications of preannouncement for the distribution of prices and the amount of information that prices reveal.

[This article develops a model in which patterns in buy and sell volume, order imbalances, and expected price changes arise endogenously. The model covers cases in which the market maker is competitive and is a monopolist. Our results provide an explanation for the existence of patterns in mean returns within the trading day and across trading days.]

[This article develops a theory in which concentrated-trading patterns arise endogenously as a result of the strategic behavior of liquidity traders and informed traders. Our results provide a partial explanation for some of the recent empirical findings concerning the patterns of volume and price variability in intraday transaction data.]

Variation in monthly metro area house prices unrelated to expected rents clouds the information about future rents in price-rent ratios and lagged changes in house prices. The variation in house prices unrelated to expected rents is, however, correlated across areas, and the problem is mitigated by measuring rent growth regression variables net of their monthly cross-section (across-area) means. This control for price variation unrelated to expected rents substantially enhances the information about future rents that we extract from price-rent ratios and lagged changes in house prices.

We present evidence that several popular low-frequency measures of effective spread suffer from a volatility-induced bias and that volatility is the primary driver of the variation of these liquidity proxies. Using data for U.S. equities and major foreign exchange rates, we show that the bias arises when the effective spread is small relative to volatility. We document that the bias has become more acute over time and show that volatility-biased measures fail to replicate some well-known results in empirical finance. We conclude by providing guidance on the choice of low-frequency measures in empirical applications.

We use the cross-section regression approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973) to construct cross-section factors corresponding to the time-series factors of Fama and French (2015). Time-series models that use only cross-section factors provide better descriptions of average returns than time-series models that use time-series factors. This is true when we impose constant factor loadings and when we use time-varying loadings that are natural for time-series factors and time-varying loadings that are natural for cross-section factors.

We examine how banks use loan sales to manage liquidity during periods of marketwide stress and the associated spillovers to market prices. We track the dynamics of loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from a U. S. supervisory register of syndicated loans. Controlling for loan quality using loan-year fixed effects, we find that banks reliant on wholesale funding were more likely to exit syndicates through sales during 2007/08. This effect is stronger for banks dependent on short-term funding and holding fewer liquid securities. In addition, secondary market prices decrease significantly more for loans funded by liquidity-strained banks.