Knowledge that Transforms

Multivariate density estimation (MDE) suggests that mortgage-backed security (MBS) prices can be well described as a function of the level and slope of the term structure. We analyze how this function varies across MBSs with different coupons. An important finding is that the interest rate level proxies for the moneyness of the option, the expected level of prepayments, and the average life of the cash flows, while the term structure slope controls for the average rate at which these cash flows should be discounted. Though the origination and prepayment behavior of mortgages differ substantially across coupons, there remains an unexplained common factor in MBS prices. This factor does not seem to be related to the usual suspects and therefore presents a puzzle to financial economists.

We provide a framework in which we link the valuation and asset allocation policies of defined benefits plans with the lifetime marginal productivity schedule of the worker and the pension plan formula. In turn, we examine the retirement policies that are implied by the primitives of the model and the value of pension obligations. Our model provides an explicit valuation formula for a stylized defined benefits plan. The optimal asset allocation policies consist of the replicating portfolio of the pension liabilities and the growth optimum portfolio independent of the pension liabilities. We show that the worker will retire when the ratio of pension benefits to current wages reaches a critical value which depends on the parameters of the pension plan and the discount rate. Using numerical techniques we analyze the feedback effect of retirement policies on the valuation of plans and on the asset allocation decisions.

This article presents a microstructure model of liquidity provision in which a specialist with market power competes against a competitive limit order book. General solutions, comparative statics and examples are provided first with uninformative orders and then when order flows are informative. The model is also used to address two optimal market design issues. The first is the effect of "tick" size–for example, eighths versus decimal pricing–on market liquidity. Institutions trading large blocks have a larger optimal tick size than small retail investors,but both prefer a tick size strictly greater than zero. Second, a hybrid specialist/limit order market (like the NYSE) provides better liquidity to small retail and institutional trades, but a pure limit order market (like the Paris Bourse) may offer better liquidity on mid-size orders.

We examine whether sharp debt increases through leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations interact with market structure to influence plant closing and investment decisions of recapitalizing firms and their rivals. We take into account the fact that recapitalizations and investment decisions are both endogenous and may be simultaneously influenced by the same exogenous events. Following their recapitalizations, firms in industries with high concentration are more likely to close plants and less likely to invest. Rival firms are less likely to close plants and more likely to invest when the market share of leveraged firms is higher.

[Asymmetric information between banks and firms can preclude financing of valuable projects. Trade credit can alleviate this problem by incorporating in the lending relation the private information held by suppliers about their customers. Incentive compatibility conditions prevent collusion between two of the agents (e.g., the buyer and the seller) against the third (e.g., the bank). Consistent with the empirical findings of Petersen and Rajan (1995), firms without relationships with banks resort more to trade credit, and sellers with greater ability to generate cash flows provide more trade credit. Finally small firms react to monetary contractions by using trade credit, consistent with the empirical results of Nilsen (1994).]

We analyze the ability of various market mechanisms to provide liquidity for large equity trades. Using data on 21,077 block transactions in Dow Jones stocks, we find that the "downstairs" NYSE floor market is a significant source of liquidity. Although negotiation in the informal "upstairs" market provides better execution than the downstairs market for large trades, these differences are economically small. We find, however, that upstairs markets are used by traders who can credibly signal that their trades are liquidity motivated. Thus, upstairs markets allow trades that may not otherwise occur.

In this article we characterize and estimate the process for short-term interest rates using federal funds interest rate data. We presume that we are observing a discrete-time sample of a stationary scalar diffusion. We concentrate on a class of models in which the local volatility elasticity is constant and the drift has a flexible specification. To accommodate missing observations and to break the link between "economic time" and calendar time, we model the sampling scheme as an increasing process that is not directly observed. We propose and implement two new methods for estimation. We find evidence for a volatility elasticity between one and one-half and two. When interest rates are high, local mean reversion is small and the mechanism for inducing stationarity is the increased volatility of the diffusion process.

[This article synthesizes some recent progress in the theories of corporate control and political lobbying to model the proxy campaign as a political campaign. The model yields a number of testable implications, only some of which have been examined in the literature. For example, if the loss from voting for a "bad" dissident, exceeds the gain from voting for a "good" dissident, the model predicts that as communication costs fall, the number of proxy fights increases, announcement day returns decrease, and the fraction of dissident wins first increases and then decreases.]

Recent studies show that when a regression model is used to forecast stock and bond returns, the sample R2 increases dramatically with the length of the return horizon. These studies argue, therefore, that long-horizon returns are highly predictable. This article presents evidence that suggests otherwise. Long-horizon regressions can easily yield large values of the sample R2, even if the population R2 is small or zero. Moreover, long-horizon regressions with a small or zero population R2 can produce t-ratios that might be interpreted as evidence of strong predictability. In general, the analysis provides little support for the view that long-horizon returns are highly predictable.

[We examine intertemporal asset pricing when short sales are constrained in proportion to the value of an investor's portfolio. All assets' prices exceed every investor's marginal utility of consumption-based valuation of the associated dividends if every investor finds himself constrained in some asset in some state; we exhibit such an equilibrium. An asset's price decomposes into three (investor-specific) components: the consumption value of its dividends, a speculative value premium, and a collateral value premium. The validity of the no-arbitrage pricing approach is shown to depend critically on the difference between real securities and their synthetic counterparts.]