This study investigates the excess funds hypothesis using samples of special dividends, regular dividend increases, and self-tender offers. All three types of firms tend to have funds in excess of industry norms before the events. The excess funds are largely nonrecurring for special dividend and self-tender offer firms and recurring for regular dividend increase firms. The analysis of the stock price reaction suggests that large incremental disbursements mitigate the agency problem associated with excess funds. In particular, the stock price reaction is positively related to excess funds for self-tender offers and large special dividends, but not for regular dividend increases (which tend to be smaller) or small special dividends.
This article empirically analyzes some properties shared by all one-dimensional diffusion option models. Using S&P 500 options, we find that sampled intraday (or interday) call (put) prices often go down (up) even as the underlying price goes up, and call and put prices often increase, or decrease, together. Our results are valid after controlling for time decay and market microstructure effects. Therefore one-dimensional diffusion option models cannot be completely consistent with observed option price dynamics; options are not redundant securities, nor ideal hedging instruments-puts and the underlying asset prices may go down together.
The Nasdaq market came under intense pressure from regulators and class-action lawsuits following allegations of tacit collusion by Christie and Schultz (1994). This article examines the changes in transaction costs on the Nasdaq from January 1993 through June 1996 using 16 million trades in 30 stocks. Effective spreads cannot be estimated during 1995 and 1996 because time-stamps of trades and quotes cannot be matched. However, the autocovariance spread estimator of Roll (1984) works well with intraday data over this period. This spread estimator reveals that trading costs declined significantly for 29 of the 30 stocks over 1993-1996.
This article develops a model for evaluating alternative hedging strategies for financially constrained firms. A key advantage of the model is the ability to capture the intertemporal effects of hedging on the firm's financial situation. We characterize the optimal hedge. A wide range of alternative hedging strategies can be specified and the model allows us to determine in each case if the hedging strategy raises or lowers firm value and by how much. We show that hedging firm value, hedging cash flow from operations and hedging sales revenue are not optimal. The article highlights the fact that every hedging strategy comes packaged with a borrowing strategy which requires careful consideration.
Empirical evidence that expected stock returns are weakly related to volatility at the market level appears to contradict the intuition that risk and return are positively related. We investigate this issue in a general equilibrium exchange economy characterized by a regime-switching consumption process with time-varying transition probabilities between regimes. When estimated using consumption data, the model generates a complex, nonlinear and time-varying relation between expected returns and volatility, duplicating the salient features of the risk/return trade-off in the data. The results emphasize the importance of time-varying investment opportunities and highlight the perils of relying on intuition from static models.
We estimate sequentially outcome probabilities and expected payoffs associated with first, second, and final bids in a large sample of tender offer contests. Rival bids arrive quickly and produce large bid jumps. Greater bidder toeholds (prebid ownership of target shares) reduce the probability of competition and target resistance and are associated with both lower bid premiums and lower prebid target stock price runups. The expected payoff to target shareholders is increasing in the bid premium and in the probability of competition, but decreasing in the bidder's toehold. The initial bidder's expected payoff is significantly positive in the "rival-bidder-win" outcome, in part reflecting gains from the pending toehold sale. Despite these dramatic toehold effects, only half of the initial bidders acquire toeholds.
A relationship exists between aggregate risk-neutral and subjective probability distributions and risk aversion functions. We empirically derive risk aversion functions implied by option prices and realized returns on the S&P500 index simultaneously. These risk aversion functions dramatically change shapes around the 1987 crash: Precrash, they are positive and decreasing in wealth and largely consistent with standard assumptions made in economic theory. Postcrash, they are partially negative and partially increasing and irreconcilable with those assumptions. Mispricing in the option market is the most likely cause. Simulated trading strategies exploiting this mispricing show excess returns, even after accounting for the possibility of further crashes, transaction costs, and hedges against the downside risk.
We analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the desirability of disclosure regulation. In our model disclosure is costly, it has private and social value, and its precision is endogenous. We show that (i) a convexity in the value of disclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy; (ii) the Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient; (iii) regulation that requires a minimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare; (iii) the same is true for subsidies that change the perceived cost of disclosures; and (iv) neither regulation method dominates the other.
We analyze a distressed firm indebted to many creditors. The firm's owners have the option of choosing the sequence of restructuring negotiations with the creditors. We show that sequencing flexibility is beneficial to firm owners, and that the optimal sequencing of restructuring negotiations involves exploiting the firm's liabilities to some creditors so as to moderate the demands of others. Moderately distressed firms will eschew renegotiations with creditors in strong bargaining positions. Severely distressed firms will extract concessions from all creditors. In this case, owners can gain if they can credibly commit to conditional restructuring agreements that link the concessions of one creditor to concessions by others.
The unique characteristics of bank loans emerge endogenously to enhance efficiency in a model of renegotiation between a borrower and a lender in which there is the potential for moral hazard on each side of the relationship. Firm risk is endogenous and renegotiated interest rates on the debt need not be monotone in firm risk. The initial terms of the debt are not set to price default risk but rather are set to efficiently balance bargaining power in later renegotiation. Loan pricing may be nonlinear, involving initial transfers either from the borrower to the bank or from the bank to the borrower.