Knowledge that Transforms

Hedge fund strategies typically generate option-like returns. Linear-factor models using benchmark asset indices have difficulty explaining them. Following the suggestions in Glosten and Jagannathan (1994), this article shows how to model hedge fund returns by focusing on the popular "trend-following" strategy. We use lookback straddles to model trend-following strategies, and show that they can explain trend-following funds' returns better than standard asset indices. Though standard straddles lead to similar empirical results, lookback straddles are theoretically closer to the concept of trend following. Our model should be useful in the design of performance benchmarks for trend-following funds.

This article characterizes optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio decisions in the presence of capital gains taxes and short-sale restrictions. The optimal decisions are a function of the investor's age, initial portfolio holdings, and tax basis. Our results capture the trade-off between the diversification benefits and tax costs of trading over an investor's lifetime. The incentive to rediversify the portfolio is inversely related to the size of the embedded gain and investor's age. Contrary to standard financial advice, the optimal equity holding increases well into an investor's lifetime in our model due to the forgiveness of capital gains taxes at death.

We model owners as solving a multidimensional problem when taking their firms public. Owners can affect the level of underpricing through the choices they make in promoting an issue, such as which underwriter to hire or on what exchange to list. The benefits of reducing underpricing in this way depend on the owners' participation in the offering and the magnitude of the dilution they suffer on retained shares. We argue that the extent to which owners trade off underpricing and promotion is determined by the minimization of their wealth losses. Evidence from a sample of U.S. initial public offering confirms our empirical predictions.

We provide a price characterization of efficient contingent claims-that is, chosen by at least a rational agent-in multiperiod economies with market frictions. Frictions include market incompleteness, transaction costs, short-selling, and borrowing costs. We characterize the inefficiency cost of a trading strategy-its required investment minus the largest amount necessary to obtain the same utility level-and we propose a measure of portfolio performance. We show that arbitrage bounds cannot be tightened based on efficiency without restricting preferences or endowments. We observe common investment strategies becoming inefficient with market frictions and others rationalized by them.

This article studies the security-design problem of a cash-constrained firm facing investors with diverse beliefs. Investor "rational beliefs" are modeled as varying and yet rational in the sense of Kurz (1994a). With two investors, optimal designs are similar under rational beliefs and rational expectations. With many investors, however, optimal securities under rational beliefs maximize investor differences of opinion, while under rational expectations optimal designs minimize disagreements. We demonstrate that the common practice of issuing multiple securities backed by a single asset is optimal under rational beliefs but not under rational expectations. Researching market beliefs can create substantial value for firms.

We develop a multiperiod market model describing both the process by which traders learn about their ability and how a bias in this learning can create overconfident traders. A trader in our model initially does not know his own ability. He infers this ability from his successes and failures. In assessing his ability the trader takes too much credit for his successes. This leads him to become overconfident. A trader's expected level of over-confidence increases in the early stages of his career. Then, with more experience, he comes to better recognize his own ability. The patterns in trading volume, expected profits, price volatility, and expected prices resulting from this endogenous overconfidence are analyzed.

German dividends typically carry a tax credit which makes the dividend worth 42.86% more to a taxable German shareholder than to a tax-exempt or foreign shareholder. This results in a penalty for foreign investors who buy and hold German dividend-paying stocks. I document that, as a result of the credit, the ex-day drop exceeds the dividend by more than one-half of the tax credit, and show that futures and option prices embed more than one-half of the tax credit. The existence of the credit creates opportunities for cross-border tax arbitrage-in which foreign holders of German stock transfer the dividend to German shareholders-and implies that it is tax efficient for foreign investors to hold derivatives rather than investing directly in German stocks. The empirical findings are consistent with costly tax arbitrage activity by German investors, who face tax risk due to antiarbitrage rules. Since dividend tax credits exist in many other countries, the findings are potentially of broad interest.

The volatility smile changed drastically around the crash of 1987, and new option pricing models have been proposed to accommodate that change. Deterministic volatility models allow for more flexible volatility surfaces but refrain from introducing additional risk factors. Thus, options are still redundant securities. Alternatively, stochastic models introduce additional risk factors, and options are then needed for spanning of the pricing kernel. We develop a statistical test based on this difference in spanning. Using daily S&P 500 index options data from 1986-1995, our tests suggest that both in- and out-of-the-money options are needed for spanning. The findings are inconsistent with deterministic volatility models but are consistent with stochastic models that incorporate additional priced risk factors, such as stochastic volatility, interest rates, or jumps.

This article analyzes optimal, dynamic portfolio and wealth/consumption policies of utility maximizing investors who must also manage market-risk exposure using Value-at-Risk (VaR). We find that VaR risk managers often optimally choose a larger exposure to risky assets than non-risk managers and consequently incur larger losses when losses occur. We suggest an alternative risk-management model, based on the expectation of a loss, to remedy the shortcomings of VaR. A general-equilibrium analysis reveals that the presence of VaR risk managers amplifies the stock-market volatility at times of down markets and attenuates the volatility at times of up markets.

Using industrial firms from the United States, Germany, and Japan, we examine the effect of bank power on cash holdings. We show that Japanese firms hold more cash than U.S. or German firms. We also document that Japanese cash balances are affected by the monopoly power of banks. During periods with powerful banks, firms' high cash holdings are consistent with banks extracting rents. When banks weakened, Japanese cash levels became more like U.S. firms. We conclude that strong Japanese banks persuade firms to hold large cash balances. This is contrary to widely held beliefs about the Japanese governance system.