Knowledge that Transforms

This article reviews tax research related to domestic and multinational capital structure, payout policy, compensation policy, risk management, and organizational form. For each topic, the theoretical arguments explaining how taxes can affect corporate decision making and firm value are reviewed, followed by a summary of the related empirical evidence and a discussion of unresolved issues. Tax research generally supports the hypothesis that high tax rate firms pursue policies that provide tax benefits. Many issues remain unresolved, however, including understanding whether tax effects are of first-order importance, why firms do not pursue tax benefits more aggressively, and whether corporate actions are affected by investor-level taxes. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

This article proposes a new approach to evaluate contagion in financial markets. Our measure of contagion captures the coincidence of extreme return shocks across countries within a region and across regions. We characterize the extent of contagion, its economic significance, and its determinants using a multinomial logistic regression model. Applying our approach to daily returns of emerging markets during the 1990s, we find that contagion is predictable and depends on regional interest rates, exchange rate changes, and conditional stock return volatility. Evidence that contagion is stronger for extreme negative returns than for extreme positive returns is mixed. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

This article provides evidence that financial development impacts growth by reducing financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment. The financing constraints are inferred from the investment Euler equation by assuming that the firm's stochastic discount factor is a function of the firm's financial position (specifically, the stock of liquid assets). The magnitude of the changes in the cost of capital is twice as large in a country with a low level of financial development as in a country with an average level of financial development. The size effect, business cycles, and legal environment effects are also considered. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

We investigate whether the volatility risk premium is negative by examining the statistical properties of delta-hedged option portfolios (buy the option and hedge with stock). Within a stochastic volatility framework, we demonstrate a correspondence between the sign and magnitude of the volatility risk premium and the mean delta-hedged portfolio returns. Using a sample of S&P 500 index options, we provide empirical tests that have the following general results. First, the delta-hedged strategy underperforms zero. Second, the documented underperformance is less for options away from the money. Third, the underperformance is greater at times of higher volatility.Fourth, the volatility risk premium significantly affects delta-hedged gains even after accounting for jump-fears. Our evidence is supportive of a negative market volatility risk premium.

We develop a theory of market crashes based on differences of opinion among investors. Because of short-sales constraints, bearish investors do not initially participate in the market and their information is not revealed in prices. However, if other previously bullish investors bail out of the market, the originally bearish group may become the marginal “support buyers,” and more will be learned about their signals. Thus accumulated hidden information comes out during market declines. The model explains a variety of stylized facts about crashes and also makes a distinctive new prediction—that returns will be more negatively skewed conditional on high trading volume.

This article provides several new insights into the economic sources of skewness. First, we document the differential pricing of individual equity options versus the market index and relate it to variations in return skewness. Second, we show how risk aversion introduces skewness in the risk-neutral density. Third, we derive laws that decompose individual return skewness into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Empirical analysis of OEX options and 30 stocks demonstrates that individual risk-neutral distributions differ from that of the market index by being far less negatively skewed. This article explains the presence and evolution of risk-neutral skewness over time and in the cross section of individual stocks.

Reload options, call options granting new options on exercise, are popularly used in compensation. Although the compound option feature may seem complicated, there is a distribution-free dominant policy of exercising reload options whenever they are in the money. The optimal policy implies general formulas for numerical valuation. Simpler formulas for valuation and hedging follow from Black-Scholes assumptions with or without continuous dividends. Time vesting affects the optimal policy, but numerical results indicate that it is nearly optimal to exercise in the money whenever feasible. The results suggest that reload options produce similar incentives as employee stock options and share grants.

I examine the empirical relation between real flexibility and financial structure. I test whether real flexibility increases debt capacity by lowering default risk and making assets more marketable or decreases debt capacity by facilitating risk shifting and asset substitution. I measure real flexibility as the sensitivity of marginal production and investment decisions to variations in the economic environment. I find that financial leverage is negatively related to production flexibility but positively related to investment flexibility. This split in results suggests that although asset substitution facilitated by investment flexibility can be prevented contractually, risk shifting facilitated by production flexibility is intractable.

When a collection of specialists organize as an exchange, each can reap net private benefits at the expense of the exchange by quoting a privately optimal pricing schedule. Coordination makes all specialists and customers better off, but requires a system of monitoring and punishment that breaks down when information asymmetries between the exchange and a specialist are high. The specialist may then seek a temporary trading halt to alleviate unjustified punishment, or the exchange may halt trading to prevent the quoting of damaging privately optimal pricing schedules. We test this theory on a sample of NYSE halts. As predicted, we find a significant increase in estimated information asymmetry immediately preceding trading halts.

We examine the effects of trading after hours on the amount and timing of price discovery over the 24-hour day. A high volume of liquidity trade facilitates price discovery. Thus prices are more efficient and more information is revealed per hour during the trading day than after hours. However, the low trading volume after hours generates significant, albeit inefficient, price discovery. Individual trades contain more information after hours than during the day. Because information asymmetry declines over the day, price changes are larger, reflect more private information, and are less noisy before the open than after the close.