Knowledge that Transforms

Academic and practitioner research evaluates portfolio performance using size and value/growth attributes or factors. We assess the merits of popular evaluation procedures based on matched-characteristic benchmark portfolios or time-series return regressions by applying them to a sample of active money managers and passive indexes. Estimated abnormal returns display large variation across approaches. The benchmarks typically used in academic research--attribute-matched portfolios from independent sorts, the three-factor time-series model, and cross-sectional regressions of returns on stock characteristics--track returns poorly. Some simple alterations improve the performance of these methods. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Brokerage houses normally structure their research activities along either country or sector lines. I investigate whether organizational structure affects the quality of financial analysts' earnings forecasts. Specifically, I compare the performance of country-specialized financial analysts with that of sector-specialized financial analysts. The former issue forecasts considerably more accurately than the latter. Country specialists benefit from an informational advantage over sector specialists. A superior knowledge of country-specific factors, as well as geographical proximity between analysts and the firms they cover, are significant determinants of this advantage. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

We study the effect of introducing a nonredundant derivative on the volatilities of the stock market return and the locally risk-free interest rate. Our analysis uses a standard, frictionless, full-information, dynamic, continuous-time, general-equilibrium, Lucas endowment economy in which there are two classes of agents who have time-additive power utility functions and differ only in their risk aversion. Our main result is to show analytically that if the intensity of the precautionary demand for savings is not too high, then the introduction of a nonredundant derivative increases the volatility of stock market returns. Furthermore, in the economy with the derivative, the volatility of stock market returns can be substantially greater than that of aggregate dividend growth (fundamental volatility). We also show that the volatility of the locally risk-free interest rate increases with the introduction of the derivative.

We investigate why banks pressured research analysts to provide aggressive assessments of issuing firms during the 1990s. This competitive strategy did little to directly increase a bank's chances of winning lead-management mandates and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly structural reform. We show that aggressively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase their chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships. If recent regulatory reforms compromise this entry mechanism, they may have the unintended consequence of diminishing competition among securities underwriters.

This paper shows that persistent mispricing is consistent with a market that includes ambiguity-averse investors. In particular, ambiguity-averse investors may prefer to trade based on aggregate signals that reduce ambiguity at the cost of a loss in information. Equilibrium prices may therefore fail to impound publicly available information. While this creates profit opportunities for ambiguity-neutral investors, ambiguity-averse investors perceive that the benefit of ambiguity reduction outweighs the cost of trading against investors who have superior information. The model can explain both underreaction, such as that evident in postearnings announcement drifts and momentum, and overreaction to accounting accruals. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

We analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel dataset in which we can track all unique blockholders among large public firms in the United States. We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. We also find blockholder fixed effects in firm performance measures, and differences in corporate policies are systematically related to differences in firm performance. We study potential sources of the heterogeneity and find that blockholders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involvement, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.

We present evidence on the benefits of changes in control from mergers and acquisitions. We find that the stronger the acquirer's shareholder rights relative to the target's, the higher the synergy created by an acquisition. This result supports the hypothesis that acquisitions of firms with poor corporate governance by firms with good corporate governance generate higher total gains. We also find that the synergy effect of corporate governance is shared by target shareholders and acquiring shareholders, in that both target returns and acquirer returns increase with the shareholder-rights difference between the acquirer and the target.

This article offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock. The ownership of U.S. firms is similar to and by some measures more concentrated than the ownership of firms in other countries. These findings challenge current thinking on a number of issues, ranging from the nature of the agency conflict in domestic corporations to the relationship between ownership concentration and legal protections for investors around the world. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the effects of institutionalized saving on the ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance. The Swedish pension reform increased the stock market participation of pension funds, causing a significant reshuffling in the ownership of pension funds. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. Firm valuation improves if public pension funds and large independent private pension funds increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.

We take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC) and show that portfolio size and scope affect both the entrepreneurs' and the VC's incentives to exert effort. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate the limited human capital on a smaller number of startups, adding more value. A large and focused portfolio is beneficial because it allows the VC to reallocate the limited resources and human capital in the case of startup failure and allows the VC to extract greater rents from the entrepreneurs. We show that the VC finds it optimal to limit portfolio size when startups have higher payoff potential--that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands portfolio size only when startup fundamentals are more moderate and when he can form a sufficiently focused portfolio. Finally, we show that the VC may find it optimal to engage in portfolio management by divesting some of the startups early since this strategy allows him to extract a greater surplus. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.