Knowledge that Transforms

In a Kyle (1985) model, the sign of the correlation between a firm's debt and equity returns is the same as the sign of the cross-market Kyle's lambda. The sign is positive (negative) if private information concerns the mean (risk) of the firm's assets. We show empirically that information conveyed by order flows is primarily about asset means. The cross-market lambdas are quite large; consequently, the portions of bond and stock returns explained by order flows are highly correlated, even though the order flows themselves are virtually uncorrelated.

Following corporate spinoffs, unit boards are formed from scratch. We find that these “de novo” boards are smaller, more independent, include more outside directors with relevant industry expertise, and derive more industry expertise from outsiders than do industry- and size-matched peers. These differences are observed only when the unit CEO was not the CEO or a director of the pre-spinoff parent firm—that is, when there is a greater need to assess the CEO's ability and match with the firm. We conclude that the need for CEO assessment is an important element of the structure of newly formed boards.

Evidence shows that the stochastic discount factor (SDF) is not always a downward-sloping function of S&P 500 returns when estimated using options data. In contrast, our results suggest that SDFs as functions of individual stock returns are generally downward sloping. A simple jump-diffusion model can reconcile these empirical findings. The same model also implies a steeper implied-volatility curve for the index than for the typical stock, a well-known empirical fact from the options literature. Both the SDF and volatility-curve results can be explained by a common source of jump risk among stocks, together with diversification of Brownian risk in the index. We also devise novel empirical tests of SDF monotonicity based on average returns of option trading strategies, thus avoiding the estimation of the return density functions.

We examine the effect of a permanent change to a country corporate income repatriation tax system on corporate financial policies. In 2009, Japan and the United Kingdom switched from a worldwide system to a territorial system for the taxation of repatriated foreign earnings, effectively reducing the tax liabilities of most multinational firms when repatriating earnings. We find that after the change firms accumulate less cash, pay out larger amounts through dividends and share repurchases, and invest less abroad. We do not find that the tax system change has significantly affected domestic investments even when controlling for capital constraints.

Reduced-form models of default that attribute a large fraction of credit spreads to compensation for credit-event risk typically preclude the most plausible economic justification for such risk to be priced, namely, a contemporaneous drop in the market portfolio. When this “contagion” channel is introduced within a general equilibrium framework for an economy comprising a large number of firms, credit-event risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points, and are dwarfed by the contagion premium. We provide empirical evidence that indicates credit-event risk premia are less than 1 bp, but contagion risk premia are significant.

This paper characterizes how firms' strategic interaction in product markets affects the industry dynamics of investment and expected returns. In imperfectly competitive industries, a firm's exposure to systematic risk is affected by both its own investment strategy and the investment strategies of its peers, so that the dynamics of its expected returns depend on the intraindustry value spread. In the model and the data, firms' betas and returns correlate more positively in industries with low value spread, low dispersion in operating markups, and low concentration.

We provide evidence that higher-quality disclosure standards are associated with stock returns that are less sensitive to noise driven by investors' moods. We identify return-mood sensitivity (RMS) based on the association between index returns and urban cloudiness, a source of short-term variation in mood. Based on a stylized model, we predict and find evidence consistent with higher-quality disclosure standards reducing RMS by tilting susceptible investors' trades toward information and by facilitating sophisticated investors' arbitrage. Our findings suggest that disclosure standards play an important role in enhancing price efficiency by reducing noise in returns, particularly noise related to investors' short-term moods. Received January 31, 2014; accepted August 5, 2015 by Editor David Hirshleifer.

We build a model of universities combining their real production decisions with their choice of endowment size and asset allocation. Variation in opportunity cost, that is, the productivity of internal projects, has a first-order effect on these choices. Adding the UPMIFA-mandated 7% payout constraint, the endowment size and asset allocations match those empirically observed. This constraint has little effect on universities that do not value the output of their internal projects but harms those that do: it prevents the endowment's use as an effective buffer stock, thereby increasing the volatility of production, and it slows the growth of the most productive universities.

We estimate the risk and expected return of private equity using market prices of publicly traded funds of funds holding unlisted private equity funds and of publicly traded private equity funds participating directly in private equity transactions. We find that the market expects unlisted private equity funds to earn abnormal returns between −0.5% and 2% per year. In addition, private equity has a market beta close to one and a positive beta on the SMB factor. These listed funds exhibit greater systematic risk than an index based on the self-reported net asset value of unlisted private equity funds.

We study a market for funding real investment where valuation—meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs—creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. This strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. With multiple equilibria, the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofitable investments. Switches to valuation equilibria, valuation runs, look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and potentially, only if subsidized.