Conventional estimates of the costs of taking liquidity in options markets are large. Nonetheless, options trading volume is high. We resolve this puzzle by showing that options price changes are predictable at high frequency, and many traders time executions by buying (selling) when the option fair value is close to the ask (bid). Effective spreads of traders who time executions are less than 40% of the size of conventional measures, and the overall average effective spread is one-quarter smaller than conventional estimates. Price impact measures are also affected. These findings alter conclusions about the after-cost profitability of options trading strategies.

The dynamics of the unobservable short rate are frequently estimated directly using a proxy. We examine the biases resulting from this practice (the “proxy problem”). Analytic results show that the proxy problem is not economically significant for single-factor affine models. In the two-factor affine model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), the proxy problem is only economically significant for pricing discount bonds with maturities of more than five years. We also describe two different numerical procedures for assessing the magnitude of the proxy problem in a general interest rate model. When applied to a nonlinear single-factor model, they suggest that the proxy problem can be economically significant.

Nonprofit, mutually owned insurance and banking organizations have significant market shares in the insurance and banking industries. A first step in a systematic study of these financial mutuals is to examine the reasons for their formation. Doing so provides empirical support for the view that these mutuals arose as an efficient means of addressing contracting challenges caused by aggregate uncertainties and moral hazard. A formal model with this property is presented. We argue that information asymmetries do more to explain the kinds of contracts offered by financial mutuals than do agency problems between owners, managers, and customers.

This article analyzes the volume of trade in a multiperiod noisy rational expectations model. When traders receive private signals at the first trading date and are allowed a second round of trade, two type of equilibria exist. In the first, traders do not learn about the average private signal from the second round of trade, and all trade takes place at the first date. In the second, traders do learn from the second round, and trade thus takes places at both the first and second dates. The article characterizes volume when a public signal is disclosed at the second date.

We document four secular trends about U.S. mortgage origination by traditional and FinTech lenders after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. First, since 2011, the overall number, size, and approval rate of small and medium-sized loans have been decreasing over time, relative to large loans. Second, the largest lenders redistribute their lending the most. Third, this loan-size redistribution of credit increases in the size of the lender. Fourth, the effects are stronger for mortgages further away from the conforming loan limit(s) in both directions. We argue that the supply of credit drives these secular trends, and we assess several potential economic mechanisms.

This paper studies how access to financial services among a previously unbanked group affects human capital, labor market, and wealth outcomes. We use novel data from the Freedman’s Savings Bank—created following the American Civil War to serve free Blacks—employing an instrumental variables strategy exploiting the staggered rollout of bank branches. Families with accounts are more likely to have children in school, be literate, work, and have higher occupational income, business ownership, and real estate wealth. Placebo effects are not present using planned but unbuilt branches, or for Whites, suggesting significant positive effects of financial inclusion.

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds have heterogeneous incentives to engage with portfolio firms. If funds view ESG as a value driver, then these incentives will affect funds’ behavior and thus their impact on firms. We compare ESG funds with similar levels of ESG investments but different incentives to engage. Funds with higher incentives to engage, that is, committed ESG funds, conduct more ESG-related information acquisition, pursue longer term investment strategies, engage more intensely on ESG issues, and have greater real impacts. Moreover, committed ESG funds have outperformed other ESG funds within subportfolios with higher and more effective ESG engagement.

We use brokerage account records to study trading during the Chinese put warrants bubble and find evidence consistent with extrapolative theories of speculative asset price bubbles. We identify the event that started the bubble and show that investors engaged in a form of feedback trading based on their own past returns. The interaction of feedback trading with the precipitating event caused additional buying and price increases in a feedback loop, and estimates of the trading volume due to this mechanism explain prices and returns during the bubble.

In this study, we take a comprehensive look at asymmetry in pay for luck, which is the finding that CEOs are rewarded for good luck, but are not penalized to the same extent for bad luck. Our main takeaway, which is based on over 200 different specifications, is that there is no asymmetry in pay for luck. Our finding is important given that the literature widely accepts the idea of asymmetry in pay for luck and typically points to this as evidence of rent extraction.

Buying recent winners and shorting recent losers guarantees time-varying factor exposures in accordance with the performance of common risk factors during the ranking period. Adjusted for this dynamic risk exposure, momentum profits are remarkably stable across subperiods of the entire post-1926 era. Factor models can explain 95% of winner or loser return variability, but cannot explain their mean returns. Momentum strategies which base winner or loser status on stock-specific return components are more profitable than those based on total returns. Neither industry effects nor cross-sectional differences in expected returns are the primary cause of the momentum phenomenon.