Knowledge that Transforms

[The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock price-price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)-have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock price about their own firms' fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporate investment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternative explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative channel contribute to this sensitivity.]

[We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand is larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then "recover" over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions: The price jump is larger and the recovery is slower in less liquid markets. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.]

[This article explores the implications of additive and endogenous habit formation preferences in the context of a life-cycle model of an investor who has stochastic uninsurable labor income. To solve the model, I analytically derive the habit-wealth feasibility constraints and show that they depend on the worst possible path of future labor income and on the habit strength, but not on the probability of the worst income. When there is only a slim chance of a severe income shock, the model implies much more conservative portfolios. The model also predicts that for some low to moderately wealthy households, the portfolio share allocated to stocks increases with wealth. Because of this feature, the model can generate more conservative portfolios for younger than for middle-aged households. The effects of habits on portfolio choice are robust to income smoothing through borrowing or flexible labor supply. One controversial finding is that for high values of the habit strength parameter, usually required for the resolution of asset pricing puzzles in general equilibrium, the life-cycle model predicts counterfactually high wealth accumulation.]

[The bookbuilding IPO procedure has captured significant market share from auction alternatives recently, despite the significantly lower costs related to the auction mechanism. In France, where both mechanisms were used in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages of bookbuilding were advertising-related benefits. Book-built issues were more likely to be followed and positively recommended by lead underwriters. Even nonunderwriters' analysts promote book-built issues more in order to curry favor with the IPO underwriter for allocations of future deals. Yet we do not observe valuation or post-IPO return differentials that suggest these types of promotion have any value to the issuing firm.]

[In the IPO market, investors coordinate on acceptable IPO price based on the performance of past IPOs, and this generates an incentive for investment banks to produce information about IPO firms. In hot periods, the information produced by investment banks improves the quality of IPO firms, and this allows ex ante low quality firms to go public and increases the secondary market price, thus synchronizing high IPO volumes and high first day returns. When investment banks behave asymmetrically in information production, the "reputations" of investment banks are interpreted as a form of market segmentation to economize on the social cost of information production]

[We relate the performance of mutual fund trades to their motivation. A fund manager who buys stocks when there are heavy investor outflows is likely to be motivated by the belief that the stocks are significantly undervalued. In contrast, when there are heavy inflows, the manager is likely to be motivated to work off excess liquidity by buying stocks. Our analysis reveals that managers making purely valuation-motivated purchases substantially beat the market but are unable to do so when compelled to invest excess cash from investor inflows. A similar, but weaker, pattern is found for stocks that are sold.]

[We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: why do banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarily with core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance such loans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationship loans informationally opaque and illiquid, but they also require the relationship between the bank and the borrower to endure in order for the bank to add value. However, the informational opacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawal risk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractive funding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidity services to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihood of premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuity of relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wish to match the highest value-added liabilities with the highest value-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizes the bank's fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizes the value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examine the impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liability matching and extract numerous testable predictions.]

[We investigate the trading of institutions immediately before the release of analysts' initial buy recommendations. We document abnormally high institutional trading volume and buying beginning five days before recommendations are publicly released. Abnormal buying is related to initiation characteristics that would require knowledge of the content of the report-such as the identity of the analyst and brokerage firm, and whether the recommendation is a strong buy. We confirm that institutions buying before the recommendation release earn abnormal profits. Our results are consistent with institutional traders receiving tips regarding the contents of forthcoming analysts' reports.]

[This article examines how in a context of limited enforceability of contracts suppliers may have a comparative advantage over banks in lending to customers because they are able to stop the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may act also as liquidity providers, insuring against liquidity shocks that could endanger the survival of their customer relationships. The relatively high implicit interest rates of trade credit are the result of insurance and default premiums that are amplified whenever suppliers face a relatively high cost of funds. I explore these effects empirically for a panel of UK firms.]

[We develop a model for an investor with multiple priors and aversion to ambiguity. We characterize the multiple priors by a "confidence interval" around the estimated expected returns and we model ambiguity aversion via a minimization over the priors. Our model has several attractive features: (1) it has a solid axiomatic foundation; (2) it is flexible enough to allow for different degrees of uncertainty about expected returns for various subsets of assets and also about the return-generating model; and (3) it delivers closed-form expressions for the optimal portfolio. Our empirical analysis suggests that, compared with portfolios from classical and Bayesian models, ambiguity-averse portfolios are more stable over time and deliver a higher out-of sample Sharpe ratio.]