Knowledge that Transforms

We propose an asset pricing model where preferences display generalized disappointment aversion These preferences, which are embedded in the Epstein and Zin (1989) recursive utility framework, overweight disappointing results as compared to expected utility, and display relatively larger risk aversion for small gambles. With a Markov switching model for the endowment process, we derive closed-form solutions for all returns moments and predictability regressions. The model produces first and second moments of price-dividend ratios and asset returns and return predictability patterns in line with the data. Compared to Differently from the Bansal and Yaron model, our results do not depend on a value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution greater than one.

This article develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e., closed-form) optimal contracts, with few restrictions on the utility function, cost of effort, or noise distribution. By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This tightly constrains the set of admissible contracts and allows for a simple solution to the contracting problem. Our results continue to hold in continuous time, where noise and actions are simultaneous. We illustrate the potential usefulness of our setup by a series of examples related to CEO incentives. In particular, the model derives predictions for the optimal measure of incentives and whether the contract should be convex, concave, or linear.

We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios sell off inherited momentum losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior is observed regardless of fund characteristics and is stronger when new managers are external hires. The tendency of continuing fund managers to hold on to losers could be consistent with either a behavior bias stemming from an inability to ignore the sunk costs associated with the stocks' past underperformance or a conscious desire to protect their careers by not admitting prior mistakes. Furthermore, we present evidence that selling off loser stocks helps improve fund performance.

We use a natural experiment to investigate the impact of participation constraints on individuals' decisions to invest in the stock market. Unexpected inheritance due to sudden deaths results in exogenous variation in financial wealth, and allows us to examine whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non-participation. We have three key findings. First, windfall wealth has a positive effect on participation. Second, the majority of households do not react to sizeable windfalls by entering the stock market, but hold on to substantial safe assets—even over longer horizons. Third, the majority of households inheriting stock holdings actively sell the entire portfolio. Overall, these findings suggest that participation by many individuals is unlikely to be constrained by financial participation costs.

A lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank market is crucial for banks facing uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This article studies the efficiency of the interbank market in allocating funds. We show that the central bank should lower the interbank rate when confronted with a crisis that causes a disparity in the liquidity held among banks. This suggests that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. We also show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs.

This paper develops a model of a self-fulfilling credit market freeze and uses it to study alternative governmental responses to such a crisis. We study an economy in which operating firms are interdependent, with their success depending on the ability of other operating firms to obtain financing. In such an economy, an inefficient credit market freeze may arise in which banks abstain from lending to operating firms with good projects because of their self-fulfilling expectations that other banks will not be making such loans. Our model enables us to study the effectiveness of alternative measures for getting an economy out of an inefficient credit market freeze. In particular, we study the effectiveness of interest rate cuts, infusion of capital into banks, direct lending to operating firms by the government, and the provision of government capital or guarantees to finance or encourage privately managed lending. Our analysis provides a framework for analyzing and evaluating the standard and nonstandard instruments used by authorities during the financial crisis of 2008-2009.

Bank mergers can increase or decrease loan spreads, depending on whether the increased market power outweighs efficiency gains. Using proprietary loan-level data for U.S. commercial banks, I find that, on average, mergers reduce loan spreads, with the magnitude of the reduction being larger when postmerger cost savings increase. My results suggest that the relation between spreads and the extent of the market overlap between merging banks is nonmonotonic. The market overlap increases cost savings and consequently lowers spreads, but when the overlap is sufficiently large, spreads increase, potentially due to the market-power effect dominating the cost savings. Furthermore, the average reduction in spreads is significant for small businesses. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Investor sophistication has lagged behind the growing complexity of retail financial markets. To explore this, we develop a dynamic model to study the interaction between obfuscation and investor sophistication in mutual fund markets. Taking into account different learning mechanisms within the investor population, we characterize the optimal timing of obfuscation for financial institutions who offer retail products. We show that educational initiatives that are directed to facilitate learning by investors may induce providers to increase wasteful obfuscation, further disorienting investors and decreasing overall welfare. Obfuscation decreases with competition among firms, since the information rents from obfuscation dissipate as each institution attracts a smaller market share.

We document market anticipation of merger bids and show that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns. Subsequent bidders in the industry experience significant and positive abnormal returns around the time of initial industry bid announcements. These results suggest that announcement period returns underestimate the wealth effects of bidding. After accounting for anticipation, bidding activity is, on average, a significant wealth-creating event. Moreover, bidders pursuing public targets increase shareholder wealth and bidders in stock swaps do not lose. These results contradict conventional wisdom. Our results shed light on the correct magnitude of acquisition returns and on the transfer of information throughout an industry around the time of an economic shock.