Knowledge that Transforms

Over 140 countries agreed on a fundamental corporate tax reform in 2021 to be implemented in 2023 and beyond. To measure its potential effects, we study asset price changes within minutes of the reform announcements. We construct proxies for the reform’s costs regarding U.S. companies’ tax burdens and countries’ public finances. Likely exposed companies exhibit significant negative stock returns. Our lower-bound estimates indicate total shareholder value losses of $112.6 billion one day after the reform announcements. Further, likely exposed countries experience increases in sovereign debt credit risk. Our findings inform the cost-benefit analysis of a historical international tax reform.

We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resultant distortion in the size distribution of banks reveals the magnitude of regulatory costs. Using U.S. bank data, we estimate the regulatory costs imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Although the estimated regulatory costs are substantial, they are significantly lower than banks’ self-reported estimates.

I examine how the investment and financing of innovation are affected by the contractual allocation of intellectual property rights using a Federal Circuit ruling that strengthened firms’ property rights to employee patents. I find that treatment firms’ total debt-to-assets ratio and R&D spending increase by 18% and 9%, respectively, as the residual control over patents increases firms’ incentives to innovate. These effects are more pronounced when ex ante holdup exposure is high. Furthermore, I find a positive marginal effect of asset complementarity as it limits the decline in employee incentives. Consistently, I show that firms’ ex post asset complementarity improves.

Using novel merger valuation data, we show that firms selected by investment banks as “comparable peers” are more than twice as likely to later become takeover targets themselves compared to matched control firms. Peer firms not subsequently acquired attract more institutional ownership and analyst coverage, deliver strong operating performance, reduce investments, and increase payouts. Investors are inattentive, though, to peer identification at the time of merger filings’ public disclosure. A portfolio that longs peers and shorts controls earns up to 15.6% alpha annually, which mainly comes from the long leg and is difficult to explain by short-sale constraints.

We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. We show that the proof-of-work system may lead to a situation in which some large firms in the blockchain industrial ecosystem—blockchain conglomerates—capture the governance of the blockchain.

This paper documents how extensive economic education can reduce the risk of getting into financial trouble by comparing people who enter business and economics programs with people who enter other higher education programs. To identify the causal effect, I exploit GPA admission thresholds that quasi-randomize applicants near the thresholds into different higher education programs. I find that admission to an economics program reduces the probability of loan default and delinquency by one half. This large reduction is associated with changes in financial behavior, but it is not associated with differences in the level or stability of people’s income.

We characterize the unique equilibrium in an economy populated by strategic CARA investors who trade multiple risky assets with arbitrarily distributed payoffs. We use our explicit solution to study the joint behavior of illiquidity of option contracts. Option bid-ask spreads are proportional to risk aversion and risk-neutral variances of option payoffs. Spreads may decrease in risk aversion, physical variance, open interest, and increase after earnings announcements in a result contrary to conventional wisdom. All these predictions are confirmed empirically using a large panel data set of U.S. stock options.

We assess how investors’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for sustainable investments responds to the social impact of those investments, using a framed field experiment. While investors have a substantial WTP for sustainable investments, they do not pay significantly more for more impact. This also holds for dedicated impact investors. When investors compare several sustainable investments, their WTP responds to relative, but not to absolute, levels of impact. Regardless of investments’ impact, investors experience positive emotions when choosing sustainable investments. Our findings suggest that the WTP for sustainable investments is primarily driven by an emotional, rather than a calculative, valuation of impact.

This paper documents an unprecedented decrease in young homeownership since the Great Recession driven by regions with high house prices. Using a panel of U.S. metro areas, I calibrate an equilibrium spatial macro-finance model with overlapping generations of mobile households. The dynamics of regional housing markets is explained by an aggregate credit contraction with heterogeneous local impacts rather than by local shocks. Lower millennial income and wealth amplify its effect. The impact of subsidies to first-time buyers is dampened, because they fail to stimulate regions that suffer from larger busts. Place-based subsidies achieve larger gains.

We study the impact of the refinancing channel of monetary policy on very small and medium-sized businesses. Using data covering the near universe of these businesses, we find that increased household refinancing reduces the probability that a business exits or exhausts its debt capacity in the calendar year, as well as 6 years after the first exposure. It also helps younger businesses maintain credit relationships. Financial factors, like business liquidity, as well as local demand dependence, amplify these effects, especially for very small businesses. These results suggest that the refinancing channel of monetary policy can have large long-run effects on local economies.