Knowledge that Transforms

This article analyzes the impact of managerial discretion and corporate control mechanisms on leverage and firm value within a contingent claims model where the manager derives perquisites from investment. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantage of debt less bankruptcy costs and the agency costs of managerial discretion. Actual capital structure reflects the trade-off made by the manager between his empire-building desires and the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges. The model shows that manager-shareholder conflicts can explain the low debt levels observed in practice. It also examines the impact of these conflicts on the cross-sectional variation in capital structures.

I present a new approach to the dynamic portfolio and consumption problem of an investor who worries about model uncertainty (in addition to market risk) and seeks robust decisions along the lines of Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2002). In accordance with max-min expected utility, a robust investor insures against some endogenous worst case. I first show that robustness dramatically decreases the demand for equities and is observationally equivalent to recursive preferences when removing wealth effects. Unlike standard recursive preferences, however, robustness leads to environment-specific "effective" risk aversion. As an extension, I present a closed-form solution for the portfolio problem of a robust Duffie-Epstein-Zin investor. Finally, robustness increases the equilibrium equity premium and lowers the risk-free rate. Reasonable parameters generate a 4% to 6% equity premium.

The apparent conflict between the level of resources dedicated to technical analysis by practitioners and academic theories of market efficiency is a long-standing puzzle. We explore a previously unexamined feature of technical analysis–namely its relation to liquidity provision. We demonstrate that support and resistance levels coincide with peaks in depth on the limit order book and moving average forecasts reveal information about the relative position of depth on the book. Furthermore, we show that these relationships stem from technical rules locating depth already in place on the limit order book.

Dai and Singleton (2002) and Duffee (2002) show that there is a tension in affine term structure models between matching the mean and the volatility of interest rates. This article examines whether this tension can be solved by an alternative parametrization of the price of risk. The empirical evidence suggests that, first, the examined parametrization is not sufficient to solve the mean-volatility tension. Second, the usual result in the estimation of affine models, indicating that some of the state variables are extremely persistent, may have been caused by the lack of flexibility in the parametrization of the price of risk.

A dynamic model of a multistage investment project that captures many features of research and development (R&D) ventures and start-up companies is developed. An important feature these problems share is that firms learn about the potential profitability of the project throughout its life, but that technical uncertainty about the R&D effort is only resolved through additional investment. Consequently the risks associated with the ultimate cash flows have a systematic component even while the purely technical risks are idiosyncratic. Our model captures these different sources of risk and allows us to study their interaction in determining the value and risk premium of the venture.