Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a simple model of the price impact of institutional herding. The empirical literature indicates that institutional herding positively predicts short-term returns but negatively predicts long-term returns. We offer a theoretical resolution to this dichotomy. In our model, career-concerned money managers trade with security dealers endowed with market power and exhibit an endogenous tendency to imitate past trades. This tendency is exploited by dealers and thus affects prices. In equilibrium, institutional herding positively predicts short-term returns but negatively predicts long-term returns. Our article also generates several new, testable predictions that link institutional herding with the time-series properties of returns and volume.

We model a microstructure effect on daily security returns, embodied by zero returns and the bid-ask spread, and derive a closed-form solution for the resulting bias in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility. Our empirical tests show that controlling for the bias eliminates the ability of idiosyncratic volatility estimates to predict future returns. We also find a significant reduction in the pricing ability of idiosyncratic volatility after exogenous shocks to liquidity evidenced in the 1997 reduction in the quotes to sixteenths and the 2001 decimalization. Finally, minimizing liquidity's influence on the estimated idiosyncratic volatility, by orthogonalizing the percentage of zero-return and spread effects on the estimated idiosyncratic volatility, demonstrates that the resulting idiosyncratic volatility estimate has little pricing ability.

We compute and compare risk-adjusted CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and option incentives than U.K. CEOs. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, we find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. CEOs. We also examine differences in pay and equity incentives between a sample of non-U.K. European CEOs and a matched sample of U.S. CEOs, and find that risk-adjusting pay may explain about half of the apparent higher pay for U.S. CEOs. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We document a significant investment bank fixed effect in the announcement returns of M&A deals. The interquartile range of bank fixed effects is 1.26%, compared with a full-sample average return of 0.72%. The results remain significant after controlling for the component of returns attributable to the acquirer. Our findings suggest that investment banks matter for M&A outcomes, and contrast earlier studies that show no positive link between various measures of advisor quality and M&A returns. Differences in average returns across banks are also persistent over time and predictable from prior performance. Clients do not chase past returns, which may explain why persistence exists in M&A performance while it is absent in mutual funds.

Mortgage lenders that concentrate in a few markets invest more in information collection than diversified lenders. Concentrated lenders focus on the information-intensive jumbo market and on high-risk borrowers. They are better positioned to price risks and, thus, ration credit less. Adverse selection, however, leads to higher retention of mortgages relative to diversified lenders. Finally, concentrated lenders have higher profits than diversified lenders, their profits vary less systematically, and their stock prices fell less during the 2007—2008 credit crisis. The results imply that geographic diversification led to a decline in screening by lenders, which likely played a role in the 2007–2008 crisis.

Commercial banks acquire inside information about the firms they lend to. We study the impact of this informationally privileged position on the borrowing firm using a broad panel of U.S. firms over the 1993–2004 period. We measure the strength of the bank-firm relationship by bank-firm proximity, size of the loan, and the lender's insider potential. We show that a stronger relationship, by inducing better monitoring, improves the borrower's corporate governance. Simultaneously, it makes the bank a potentially more informed agent in the equity market. This information asymmetry increases adverse selection for the other market participants and lowers the firm's stock liquidity. This trade-off between improved corporate governance and greater information asymmetry affects the firm's value. Our results have normative implications for the role of banks in the development of financial markets.

This article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification, we exploit an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals. Second, the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals. Third, interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock. Finally, we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects. These results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications.

How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices (“familiarity effect”), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an “influence effect” as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge.

Traditional theories argue that governance is strongest under a single large blockholder, as she has high incentives to undertake value-enhancing interventions. However, most firms are held by multiple small blockholders. This article shows that, while such a structure generates free-rider problems that hinder intervention, the same coordination difficulties strengthen a second governance mechanism: disciplining the manager through trading. Since multiple blockholders cannot coordinate to limit their orders and maximize combined trading profits, they trade competitively, impounding more information into prices. This strengthens the threat of disciplinary trading, inducing higher managerial effort. The optimal blockholder structure depends on the relative effectiveness of manager and blockholder effort, the complementarities in their outputs, information asymmetry, liquidity, monitoring costs, and the manager's contract.

In contrast to previous studies documenting positive abnormal returns to target shareholders, we find that hedge fund activism significantly reduces bondholders' wealth. The average excess bond return is −3.9% around the initial 13D filing, and is an additional −4.5% over the remaining year. Excess bond returns are related inversely to subsequent changes in cash and assets (loss of collateral effects) and directly to changes in total debt. Confrontational campaigns and the acquisition of at least one seat on the target's board elicit more negative bond returns. We also find an expropriation of wealth from the bondholder to the shareholder.