Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze the information content of a digital footprint—that is, information that users leave online simply by accessing or registering on a Web site—for predicting consumer default. We show that even simple, easily accessible variables from a digital footprint match the information content of credit bureau scores. A digital footprint complements rather than substitutes for credit bureau information and affects access to credit and reduces default rates. We discuss the implications for financial intermediaries’ business models, access to credit for the unbanked, and the behavior of consumers, firms, and regulators in the digital sphere.

This paper finds that banks and nonbanks respond differently to increased competition in consumer credit markets. Increased competition and a greater threat of failure induces banks to specialize in relationship business lending, and surviving banks are more profitable. However, nonbanks change their credit policy when faced with more competition and expand credit to riskier borrowers at the extensive margin, resulting in higher default rates. These results show how the effects of competition depend on the form of intermediation. They also suggest that increased competition can cause credit risk to migrate outside the traditional supervisory umbrella.

We propose a no-arbitrage model of the nominal and real term structures that accommodates the different persistence and volatility of distinct inflation components. Core, food, and energy inflation combine into a single total inflation measure that ties nominal and real risk-free bond prices together. The model successfully extracts market participants’ expectations of future inflation from nominal yields and inflation data. Estimation uncovers a factor structure common to core inflation and interest rates and downplays the pass-through effect of short-lived food and energy shocks on inflation and interest rates. Model forecasts systematically outperform survey forecasts and other benchmarks.

We propose a methodology for estimating and testing beta-pricing models when a large number of assets is available for investment but the number of time-series observations is fixed. We first consider the case of correctly specified models with constant risk premia, and then extend our framework to deal with time-varying risk premia, potentially misspecified models, firm characteristics, and unbalanced panels. We show that our large cross-sectional framework poses a serious challenge to common empirical findings regarding the validity of beta-pricing models. In the context of pricing models with Fama-French factors, firm characteristics are found to explain a much larger proportion of variation in estimated expected returns than betas.

This paper studies the impact of public audit oversight on financial reporting credibility. We analyze changes in market responses to earnings news after public audit oversight is introduced, exploiting that the regime onset depends on fiscal year-ends, auditors, and the rollout of auditor inspections. We find that investors respond more strongly to earnings news following public audit oversight. Corroborating these findings, we find an increase in volume responses to 10-K filings after the new regime. Our results show that public audit oversight can enhance reporting credibility and that this credibility is priced in capital markets.

We exploit variation in demand induced by demographics to provide causal evidence of the precautionary motive of cash holdings. We show that firms significantly increase their cash levels in response to exogenous increases in investment opportunities. We also provide novel evidence of the dynamics of accumulation and use of cash. Financially constrained firms build their cash reserves using internal sources. Consequently, they start saving earlier and keep high cash levels longer. Unconstrained firms rely on external financing to both invest and build cash reserves, requiring them to save less and allowing them to incur lower costs of carry.

A common prediction of macroeconomic models of credit market frictions is that the tightness of financial constraints is countercyclical. Theory suggests a negative collateralizability premium; that is, capital that can be used as collateral to relax financial constraints insures against aggregate shocks and commands a lower risk compensation compared with noncollateralizable assets. We show that a long-short portfolio constructed using a novel measure of asset collateralizability generates an average excess return of around 8% per year. We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and financial constraints to quantitatively account for the collateralizability premium.

We show that individuals’ macroeconomic expectations are influenced by their socioeconomic status (SES). People with higher income or higher education are more optimistic about future macroeconomic developments, including business conditions, the national unemployment rate, and stock market returns. The spread in beliefs between high- and low-SES individuals diminishes significantly during recessions. A comparison with professional forecasters and historical data reveals that the beliefs wedge reflects excessive pessimism on the part of low-SES individuals. SES-driven expectations help explain why higher-SES individuals are more inclined to invest in the stock market and more likely to consider purchasing homes, durable goods, or cars. Received November 13, 2017; editorial decision February 12, 2019 by Editor Wei Jiang.

Combining granular daily data on temperatures across the continental United States with detailed establishment data from 1990 to 2015, we study the causal impact of temperature shocks on establishment sales and productivity. Using a large sample yielding precise estimates, we do not find evidence that temperature exposures significantly affect establishment-level sales or productivity, including among industries traditionally classified as “heat sensitive.” At the firm level, we find that temperature exposures aggregated across firm establishments are generally unrelated to sales, productivity, and profitability. Our results support existing findings of a tenuous relation between temperature and aggregate economic growth in rich countries.

We document a political cycle in the investment decisions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by using the constitutionally mandated election schedule in India as a source of exogenous variation in politicians’ incentive to cater to voters. Using a project-level investment database, we find that SOEs announce more capital expenditure projects in election years, especially in infrastructure, and in districts with close elections, high-ranking politicians, and left-wing incumbents. SOE projects in election years have negative announcement returns, suggesting a loss in shareholder value. These patterns are not seen in nongovernment firms or in off-election years.