Knowledge that Transforms

[This article presents a dynamic, rational expectations equilibrium model of asset prices where the drift of fundamentals (dividends) shifts between two unobservable states at random times. I show that in equilibrium, investors' willingness to hedge against changes in their own "uncertainty" on the true state makes stock prices overreact to bad news in good times and underreact to good news in bad times. I then show that this model is better able than conventional models with no regime shifts to explain features of stock returns, including volatility clustering, "leverage effects," excess volatility, and time-varying expected returns.]

[This article investigates the distribution of equity ownership between entrenched management and dispersed outsiders when management has the ability to manipulate the cash flows and when it is costly for equity holders to prove managerial wrongdoing in court. Management chooses the distribution of equity ownership so as to maximize private benefits against the risk of potential control challenges. When shareholders are long-term oriented, then outside shares trade at a premium over their value to management, and management is inclined to sell off its equity stake to dispersed outsiders. When shareholders are short-term oriented, then outside shares trade at a discount below their value to management, and disciplinary pressure can be substantially reduced via strategic share purchases. Changes in the cost of capital drive a wedge between entrenched management's and dispersed outsider's valuation of shares. Management exercises its option to buy (sell) shares when the option is in the money: when management values shares more (less) than outsiders do.]

[In many real-world situations, agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information. In such a setting, agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies. The building of an office building, the drilling of an exploratory oil well, and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants. This article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information. Many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed. In particular, informational cascades, where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon, may arise endogenously.]

[We empirically examine whether access to deposits with inelastic rates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for funds. Such access insulates a bank's costs of funds from exogenous shocks, allowing it to insulate its borrowers against exogenous credit shocks. We find that, controlling for loan market competition, banks funded more heavily with core deposits provide more loan rate smoothing in response to exogenous changes in aggregate credit risk. Thus we provide evidence for a novel channel linking bank liabilities to relationship lending.]

[Weekly returns of stock portfolios exhibit substantial autocorrelation. Analytical studies suggest that nonsynchronous trading is capable of explaining from 5% to 65% of the autocorrelation. The varying importance of nonsynchronous trading in these studies arises primarily from differing assumptions regarding nontrading periods of stocks. We simulate the effects of nonsynchronous trading by sampling stock returns from a return generating process using transactions data to obtain the precise time of each stock's last trade. We find that simulated weekly portfolio returns exhibit autocorrelations that are roughly 25% that of their observed (CRSP) weekly returns.]

[This article integrates strategic product market analysis with price-taking asset pricing theory. We demonstrate that a firm's market power can lead to scale-dependent and potentially infinite required returns. Scale dependency, which we relate to risk spillovers between expansionary and existing cash flows, reflects the divergence of incremental from existing required returns. The firm-specific nature of risk spillovers potentially destroys the concept of a common industry "risk class." Our analysis raises important questions regarding the validity of widely used "comparables" methods for determining risk-adjusted discount rates.]

[This article uses bond market data to empirically test the asset pricing model of Kazemi (1992). According to this model the rate of return on a long-term, pure-discount, default-free bond will be perfectly correlated with changes in the marginal utility of the representative investor. The covariability between financial asset returns and returns on such a bond can therefore serve as a measure of the riskiness of assets. The aim of this study is to determine whether the model can explain cross-sectional differences in the monthly returns of bonds with different maturity dates. We estimate and test the restrictions imposed by the model on returns of default-free bonds, while allowing the conditional distribution of bond returns to be time varying. The model is rejected during the full sample period (1973-1995) and the subperiod (1973-1980) when the Federal Reserve's focus is on interest rates, while the model is not rejected during the subperiod (1981-1995) when the Federal Reserve's focus is on money supply.]

[Statistical model selection criteria provide an informed choice of the model with best external (i.e., out-of-sample) validity. Therefore they guard against overfitting ("data snooping"). We implement several model selection criteria in order to verify recent evidence of predictability in excess stock returns and to determine which variables are valuable predictors. We confirm the presence of in-sample predictability in an international stock market dataset, but discover that even the best prediction models have no out-of-sample forecasting power. The failure to detect out-of-sample predictability is not due to lack of power.]

[We address the question: At what stage in its life should a firm go public rather than undertake its projects using private equity financing? In our model a firm may raise external financing either by placing shares privately with a risk-averse venture capitalist or by selling shares in an IPO to numerous small investors. The entrepreneur has private information about his firm's value, but outsiders can reduce this informational disadvantage by evaluating the firm at a cost. The equilibrium timing of the going-public decision is determined by the firm's trade-off between minimizing the duplication in information production by outsiders (unavoidable in the IPO market, but mitigated by a publicly observable share price) and avoiding the risk-premium demanded by venture capitalists. Testable implications are developed for the cross-sectional variations in the age of going-public across industries and countries.]

[The dynamics of the unobservable short rate are frequently estimated directly using a proxy. We examine the biases resulting from this practice (the "proxy problem"). Analytic results show that the proxy problem is not economically significant for single-factor affine models. In the two-factor affine model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), the proxy problem is only economically significant for pricing discount bonds with maturities of more than five years. We also describe two different numerical procedures for assessing the magnitude of the proxy problem in a general interest rate model. When applied to a nonlinear single-factor model, they suggest that the proxy problem can be economically significant.]