Knowledge that Transforms

We use stock market data to test cross-sectional implications of theories of sovereign default and provide a market-based estimate of sovereign default costs. We find that the stock prices of firms vulnerable to financial intermediation disruption, or firms more exposed to the government, are particularly sensitive to changes in sovereign credit spreads. This is consistent with theories in which default is costly because it disrupts financial intermediation and damages government reputation. Estimation of a structural valuation model indicates that the market prices stocks as if sovereign default has large effects on vulnerable stocks, translating to a 12% destruction of the value of their productive assets.

We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs.

Direct government intervention in a market may induce violations of the law of one price in other, arbitrage-related markets. I show that a government pursuing a nonpublic, partially informative price target in a model of strategic market-order trading and segmented dealership generates equilibrium price differentials among fundamentally identical assets by clouding dealers’ inference about the targeted asset’s payoff from its order flow, to an extent complexly dependent on existing price formation. I find supportive evidence using a sample of American Depositary Receipts and other cross-listings traded in the major U.S. exchanges, along with currency interventions by developed and emerging countries between 1980 and 2009. Received May 18, 2016; editorial decision May 10, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

No. In the presence of speculative opportunities, investors can learn about both asset fundamentals and the beliefs of other traders. We show that this learning exhibits complementarity: learning more along one dimension increases the value of learning about the other. As a result, regulatory changes may be counterproductive. First, increasing transparency (i.e., making fundamental information cheaper to acquire) can make prices less informative when investors respond by learning relatively more about others. Second, public disclosures discourage private learning about fundamentals, while encouraging information acquisition about others. Accordingly, disclosing more fundamental information can decrease overall informational efficiency by decreasing price informativeness. Received April 20, 2016; editorial decision September 30, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

This paper examines debt maturity management through early refinancing, where firms retire their outstanding bonds before the due date and simultaneously issue new ones as replacements. Speculative-grade firms frequently refinance their corporate bonds early to extend maturity, particularly under accommodating credit supply conditions, leading to a procyclical maturity structure. In contrast, investment-grade firms do not manage their maturity in the same manner. I exploit the protection period of callable bonds to show that the maturity extension is not driven by unobservable confounding factors. The evidence is consistent with speculative-grade firms dynamically managing maturity to mitigate refinancing risk. Received June 6, 2016; editorial decision September 21, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We use a very accurate panel of all individual spending, income, balances, and credit limits from a personal finance software to document spending responses to the arrival of both regular and irregular income. These payday responses are robust and homogeneous for all income and spending categories throughout the income distribution. Moreover, we find that few people hold little or no liquidity. We then analyze whether people hold liquidity cushions to cope with future liquidity constraints. However, we find that peoples’ responses are consistent with standard models without illiquid savings, in which neither present nor future liquidity constraints are frequently binding. Received May 31, 2016; editorial decision September 30, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We investigate shareholders’reactions to the increased transparency of corporate tax haven activities in a hand-collected subsidiary data set covering 17,331 publicly listed firms in 52 countries. An increase in transparency through the staggered signing of bilateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) between home countries and tax havens is associated with a 2.5% increase in the value of affected firms. The results are stronger for firms with more complex tax haven structures and weakly governed firms. Furthermore, firms that respond to TIEAs by haven hopping (i.e., they move subsidiaries from affected to nonaffected tax havens) do not experience an increase in firm value. These results are consistent with tax havens being used for expropriation activities that extend beyond pure tax-saving activities.

A previous literature has documented that bond returns are predicted by macroeconomic information not contained in yields contemporaneously. That literature has mostly relied on final revised, rather than real time macroeconomic data. We show that the use of real time data substantially reduces the predictive power of macro variables for future bond returns as well as the implied countercyclicality of term premiums. We discuss potential interpretations of our results.

We examine the effects of financial reporting regulation on firms’banking. Exploiting discontinuous public disclosure and auditing requirements assigned to otherwise similar small and medium-sized private firms, we document that financial reporting regulation reduces firms’ reliance on concentrated and local bank relationships and increases banks’ reliance on firms’ financial reporting, consistent with a shift in firms’ banking from relationship toward transactional approaches. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulation substitutes for banks’ information production role by burdening firms with the disclosure and auditing of their financial statements, consistent with institutional complementarities between reporting and banking systems.

We analyze the heterogeneous employment effects of financial shocks using a rich data set of job contracts, matched with the universe of firms and their lending banks in one Italian region. To isolate the effect of the financial shock, we construct a firm-specific time-varying measure of credit supply. The preferred estimate indicates that the average elasticity of employment to a credit supply shock is 0.36. Adjustment affects both the extensive and the intensive margins and is concentrated among workers with temporary contracts. We also examine the heterogeneous effects of the credit crunch by education, age, gender and nationality. Received January 27, 2017; editorial decision December 1, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.