We propose alternative generalized method of moments (GMM) tests that are analytically solvable in many econometric models, yielding in particular analytical GMM tests for asset pricing models with time-varying risk premiums. We also provide simulation evidence showing that the proposed tests have good finite sample properties and that their asymptotic distribution is reliable for the sample size commonly used. We apply our tests to study the number of latent factors in the predictable variations of the returns on portfolios grouped by industries. Using data from October 1941 to September 1986 and two sets of instrumental variables, we find that the tests reject a one-factor model but not a two-factor one.

We model firms' choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt, allowing for debt renegotiation in the event of financial distress. Entrepreneurs, with private information about their probability of financial distress, borrow from banks (multiperiod players) or issue bonds to implement projects. If a firm is in financial distress, lenders devote a certain amount of resources (unobservable to entrepreneurs) to evaluate whether to liquidate the firm or to renegotiate its debt. We demonstrate that banks' desire to acquire a reputation for making the 'right' renegotiation versus liquidation decision provides them an endogenous incentive to devote a larger amount of resources than bondholders toward such evaluations. In equilibrium, bank loans dominate bonds from the point of view of minimizing inefficient liquidation,. however, firms with a lower probability of financial distress choose bonds over bank loans.

Cross-bolding occurs when listed corporations own securities issued by other corporations. We analyze the effect of cross-holdings on market capitalization and return measures as well as implications for econometric testing of asset pricing theories. We show that cross-holdings generally distort standard market return and risk measures. The magnitudes of such distortions are calculated for simulated economies by using a variety of cross-holding patterns. In addition, cross-holdings are shown to induce nonstationarity in the covariance matrix of security returns. We examine the effect of this nonstationarity for estimating efficient frontiers and factor structures. We also discuss the implications for risk-return estimates in equilibrium asset pricing models.

I study the large premium (82 percent) attributed to voting shares on the Milan Stock Exchange. The premium varies according to the ownership structure and the concentration of the voting rights, and it can be rationalized in the presence of enormous private benefits of control. A case study seems to indicate that in Italy private benefits of control can easily be worth more than 60 percent of the value of nonvoting equity. A tentative explanation for these findings is provided. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

The use of analyst forecasts as proxies for investors' earnings expectations is commonplace in empirical research. An implicit assumption behind their use is that they reflect analysts' private information in an unbiased manner. As demonstrated here, this assumption is not necessarily valid. There is shown to be a tendency for analysts to release forecasts closer to prior earnings expectations than is appropriate, given their information. Further, analysts exhibit herding behavior, whereby they release forecasts similar to those previously announced by other analysts, even when this is not justified by their information. These results are shown to have interesting empirical implications. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

We test the empirical implications of several models of IPO underpricing. Consistent with the winner’s-curse hypothesis, we show that in markets where investors know a priori that they do not have to compete with informed investors, IPOs are not underpriced. We also show that IPOs underwritten by reputable investment banks experience significantly less underpricing and perform significantly better in the long run. We do not find empirical support for the signaling models that try to explain why firms underprice. In fact, we find that (1) firms that underprice more return to the reissue market less frequently, and for lesser amounts, than firms that underprice less, and (2) firms that underprice less experience higher earnings and pay higher dividends, contrary to the models’ predictions.

We test whether the home bias in equity portfolios is caused by investors trying to hedge inflation risk. The empirical evidence is consistent with this motive only if investors have very high levels of risk tolerance and equity returns are negatively correlated with domestic inflation. We then develop a model of international portfolio choice and equity market equilibrium that integrates inflation risk and deadweight costs. Using this model we estimate the levels of costs required to generate the observed home bias in portfolios consistent with different levels of risk aversion. For a level of risk aversion consistent with standard estimates of the domestic equity market risk premium, these costs are about a few percent per annum, greater than observable costs such as withholding taxes. Thus, the home bias cannot be explained by either inflation hedging or direct observable costs of international investment unless investors have very low levels of risk aversion.

I examine the capital expenditures of a sample of 700 takeover targets and firms that went private over the period 1972–1987. For the complete sample, I do not find evidence that takeover targets increase their capital expenditures over the four-year period before the acquisition or that they overinvest in capital expenditures relative to several benchmarks. Subsample results provide some evidence of overinvestment in oil and gas firms and large firms. There is no evidence of overinvestment, however, for firms acquired in a hostile takeover or firms that went private. In general, these results are not consistent with the conjecture that takeovers are motivated by the need to reduce excess investment in capital expenditures in target firms.

Exchange minimum price variation regulations create discrete bid-ask spreads. If the minimum quotable spread exceeds the spread that otherwise would be quoted, spreads will be wide and the number of shares offered at the bid and ask may be large. A cross-sectional discrete spread model is estimated by using intraday stock quotation spread frequencies. The results are used to project $1/16 spread usage frequencies given a $1/16 tick. Projected changes in quotation sizes and in trade volumes are obtained from regression models. For stocks priced under $10, the models predict spreads would decrease 38 percent, quotation sizes would decrease 16 percent, and daily volume would increase 34 percent. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

We consider the multiperiod relationship between a client and a portfolio manager and the resulting problem of motivating a manager of unknown ability to acquire valuable information. We explore the contractual forms and the optimal retention policy of the client and find that the optimal initial set of contracts features a smaller performance-based fee component paid to the manager than in a first-best contract, and the contract choice elicits only partial information about the manager. As a result, ex post performance measurement is critical to future recontracting. In general, managers are retained only if the returns on their portfolio exceed the benchmark by an appropriate amount.