Collecting large asset managers’ capital market assumptions, we revisit the relationships between subjective equity premium expectations, equity valuations, and financial portfolios. In contrast to the well-documented extrapolative expectations of retail investors, asset managers’ equity premium expectations are countercyclical: they are high (low) when valuations are low (high). We find that asset managers’ portfolios reflect their heterogeneous expectations: allocation funds of asset managers with larger U.S. equity premium expectations invest significantly more in U.S. equities. The sensitivity of portfolios to expectations seems to be muted by investment mandates and is smaller than the one predicted by a standard portfolio choice model.

We present the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Among contests where voting takes place, passive funds are 10 percentage points less likely than active funds to vote for dissidents. The gap shrinks significantly when accounting for votes withheld from management nominees, settled contests, and votes by non-“Big-Three” fund families. Passive and active funds are equally informed about firm fundamentals, although passive funds view contest-related SEC filings more often than active funds during contests, in absolute levels and incrementally relative to noncontest periods. We conclude that passive funds are engaged shareholders in high-stakes voting events.

Stress tests convey information about the strictness of future tests, creating incentives for banks to alter their future lending behavior. Regulators recognize and use this influence: they may conduct softer stress tests to encourage lending or tougher stress tests to reduce risk-taking. This information management can lead to inefficiencies when (a) the test loses credibility or (b) the test becomes self-fulfilling. In addition, banks may distort their lending behavior in anticipation of the stress test design, leading to further surplus losses. The analysis applies to banking supervision and regulation more broadly.

Changes in the propagation of shocks along firm networks are important to understanding aggregate and cross-sectional features of stock returns. When calibrated to match key characteristics of supplier–customer networks in the United States, a model in which firms are interlinked via enduring relationships generates long-run consumption risks, high and volatile risk premiums, and a small and stable risk-free rate. The model also matches cross-sectional patterns of portfolio returns sorted by firm centrality, a feature unaccounted for by standard asset pricing models.

We construct a novel panel data set to provide new evidence on how the largest nonfinancial firms manage their financial assets. Our granular data show that, over the past decade, bond portfolios have grown to be at least as large as cash-like instruments, driven by the meteoric rise of corporate bond holdings. To shed light on the drivers of this growth, we conduct a pair of event studies around the 2017 tax reform and the 2020 liquidity crisis. We find that large holdings of marketable securities are primarily driven by cross-border tax incentives, while cash-like instruments are driven by liquidity motives.

We identify two issues in the work of Ouazad and Kahn (2022). Correcting either reverses the original result. The two changes are to use the correct FHFA conforming loan limits for each county and year and to compare the individual loan amount to that limit correctly. There is no evidence that lenders transfer climate risk by altering loan origination and securitization behavior. None of our results calls into question the value and importance of the O&K model as a test for adverse selection. The question addressed and the setup of the test are important and should be replicated over time

We examine the value of due diligence recommendations on Reddit’s Wallstreetbets (WSB) platform. Before the Gamestop (GME) short squeeze, recommendations are significant predictors of returns and cash-flow news. This predictability is eliminated post-GME. Post-GME, the fraction of reports emphasizing price-pressure or attention-grabbing stocks dramatically increases, and the decline in informativeness is concentrated in these reports. Similarly, retail trade informativeness is particularly strong following DD reports in the pre-GME period, but not post-GME. Our findings are consistent with the view that the Gamestop event altered the culture of WSB, leading to a deterioration in investment quality that adversely affected smaller investors.

Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce a carbon tax back in 1991. We assemble a unique data set tracking CO2 emissions from Swedish manufacturing firms over 26 years to estimate the impact of carbon pricing on firm-level emission intensities. We estimate an emission-to-pricing elasticity of around two, with substantial heterogeneity across subsectors and firms, where higher abatement costs and tighter financial constraints are associated with lower elasticities. A simple calibration suggests that 2015 CO2 emissions from Swedish manufacturing would have been roughly 30% higher without carbon pricing.

Funds investing in illiquid assets report returns with spurious autocorrelation. Consequently, investors need to unsmooth these funds’ returns when evaluating their risk exposures. We show that funds with similar investments share a common source of spurious autocorrelation not fully resolved by traditional unsmoothing methods and thereby leading to underestimation of systematic risk. Thus, we propose a generalized unsmoothing technique and apply it to hedge funds and private commercial real estate funds. Our method significantly improves the measurement of funds’ risk exposures and risk-adjusted performance, especially for highly illiquid funds. Overall, the average illiquid fund alpha is lower than previously thought.

We present a method for determining whether errors in expectations explain asset pricing puzzles without imposing assumptions about the error mechanism. Using accounting identities and survey forecasts, we find that errors in expected long-term inflation explain price variation, return predictability, and the rejection of the expectations hypothesis for aggregate stock and bond markets. Errors in short-term (long-term) nominal earnings growth expectations explain (do not explain) stock price variation and return predictability. The relevant errors are consistent with mistakes about the persistence of forecasted variables and the response to surprises. A simple framework based on fundamental extrapolation successfully replicates these findings.