Weekly returns of stock portfolios exhibit substantial autocorrelation. Analytical studies suggest that nonsynchronous trading is capable of explaining from 5% to 65% of the autocorrelation. The varying importance of nonsynchronous trading in these studies arises primarily from differing assumptions regarding nontrading periods of stocks. We simulate the effects of nonsynchronous trading by sampling stock returns from a return generating process using transactions data to obtain the precise time of each stock's last trade. We find that simulated weekly portfolio returns exhibit autocorrelations that are roughly 25% that of their observed (CRSP) weekly returns.

Journal Article A Critique of Size-Related Anomalies Get access Jonathan B. Berk Jonathan B. Berk University of British Columbia Address correspondence to Jonathan B. Berk, Faculty of Commerce, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mail, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, April 1995, Pages 275–286, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/8.2.275 Published: 28 May 2015

[This article argues that the size-related regularities in asset prices should not be regarded as anomalies. Indeed, the opposite result is demonstrated. Namely, a truly anomalous regularity would be if an inverse relation between size and return was not observed. We show theoretically (1) that the size-related regularities should be observed in the economy and (2) why size will in general explain the part of the cross-section of expected returns left unexplained by an incorrectly specified asset pricing model. In light of these results we argue that size-related measures should be used in cross-sectional tests to detect model misspecifications.]

[A testable single-beta model of asset prices is presented. If state variables have a long-run stationary joint density function, then the rate return on a very long-term default-free discount bond will be perfectly correlated with the representative investor's marginal utility of consumption. Thus, the covariance of an asset's return with the return on such a bond will be an appropriate measure of the asset's riskiness. The model can be, therefore, applied or tested even though the market portfolio or aggregate consumption may not be observable. It also is shown that the expected rate of return on a very long-term bond is equal to its variance. This proposition can be tested to determine whether state variables follow stationary processes.]

For a firm that cannot raise external funds, cash on hand serves as precautionary saving. We derive a closed-form expression for the target level of cash on hand in the presence of persistent cash flows. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a mean-preserving increase in the volatility of cash flow can decrease this target. Over the set of admissible parameter values, the average impact of volatility on the target is zero. Endogenous selection, reflecting termination of firms that run out of cash, leads to a positive average impact of volatility on the target level of cash, consistent with empirical findings.

We derive analytic solutions for the valuation, optimal investment, and optimal payout of a financially constrained firm. While marginal q and average q would be identically equal in the absence of financial constraints, they differ when financial constraints bind. We use analytic solutions to characterize the properties of regressions of investment on average q and cash flow. The coefficient on cash flow is positive, but does not isolate the impact of the financial constraint, since it also partially reflects the impact of persistent profitability. The coefficient on average q understates the impact of persistent profitability.

[We provide a model of governance in which a board arbitrates between an activist investor and a manager facing reputational concerns. The optimal level of internal board governance depends on both the severity of the agency conflict and the strength of external governance. Internal governance creates a certification effect, so greater intervention by the board can lead to worse managerial behavior. Internal and external governance are substitutes when external governance is weak (the board commits to an interventionist policy to induce participation from the activist) and complements when external governance is strong (the board relies to a greater extent on the activist's information).]

[Advisors often manage multiple versions of a fund. These "twins" have the same manager and similar performance but are sold to different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Comparing investor flows in retail and institutional twins, we find that institutional investors are more sensitive to high fees and poor risk-adjusted performance. Consistent with the reduction of agency problems from greater monitoring, retail funds with an institutional twin outperform other retail funds by 1.5% per year. After the institutional twin is created, expenses decrease while measures of managerial effort at the retail fund increase.]

We compare two competing theories of financial anomalies: "behavioral" theories built on investor irrationality, and "rational structural uncertainty" theories built on incomplete information about the structure of the economic environment. We find that although the theories relax opposite assumptions of the rational expectations ideal, their mathematical and predictive similarities make them difficult to distinguish. Even if irrationality generates financial anomalies, their disappearance still may hinge on rational learning-that is, on the ability of rational arbitrageurs and their investors to reject competing rational explanations for observed price patterns.

We estimate sequentially outcome probabilities and expected payoffs associated with first, second, and final bids in a large sample of tender offer contests. Rival bids arrive quickly and produce large bid jumps. Greater bidder toeholds (prebid ownership of target shares) reduce the probability of competition and target resistance and are associated with both lower bid premiums and lower prebid target stock price runups. The expected payoff to target shareholders is increasing in the bid premium and in the probability of competition, but decreasing in the bidder's toehold. The initial bidder's expected payoff is significantly positive in the "rival-bidder-win" outcome, in part reflecting gains from the pending toehold sale. Despite these dramatic toehold effects, only half of the initial bidders acquire toeholds.