[Panel data on corporate ownership in thirty-four countries between 1995 and 2006 reveal that newly public firms have concentrated ownership regardless of the level of investor protection. After listing, firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration; these decreases occur in response to growth opportunities, and they are associated with new share issuance. We conclude that ownership concentration falls after listing in countries with strong investor protection, because firms in these countries continue to raise capital and grow, diluting blockholders as a consequence.]

Panel data on corporate ownership in thirty-four countries between 1995 and 2006 reveal that newly public firms have concentrated ownership regardless of the level of investor protection. After listing, firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration; these decreases occur in response to growth opportunities, and they are associated with new share issuance. We conclude that ownership concentration falls after listing in countries with strong investor protection, because firms in these countries continue to raise capital and grow, diluting blockholders as a consequence.

[Empirical evidence of imperfect integration across world capital markets suggests a role for cross-border arbitrage by multinationals. Consistent with multinational arbitrage as a determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns, we find that FDI flows increase sharply with source-country stock market valuations--particularly the component of valuations that is predicted to revert the next year, and particularly in the presence of capital account restrictions that limit other mechanisms of cross-country arbitrage. The results suggest the existence of a cheap financial capital channel in which FDI flows reflect, in part, the use of relatively low-cost capital available to overvalued parents in the source country.]

This article examines how financial constraints and product market exposures determine the response of multinational and local firms to sharp depreciations. U.S. multinational affiliates increase sales, assets, and investment significantly more than local firms during, and subsequent to, depreciations. Differing product market exposures do not explain these differences in performance. Instead, a differential ability to circumvent financial constraints is a significant determinant of the observed differences in investment responses. Multinational affiliates also access parent equity when local firms are most constrained. These results indicate another role for foreign direct investment in emerging markets--multinational affiliates expand economic activity during currency crises when local firms are most constrained. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

[This article examines how financial constraints and product market exposures determine the response of multinational and local firms to sharp depreciations. U.S. multinational affiliates increase sales, assets, and investment significantly more than local firms during, and subsequent to, depreciations. Differing product market exposures do not explain these differences in performance. Instead, a differential ability to circumvent financial constraints is a significant determinant of the observed differences in investment responses. Multinational affiliates also access parent equity when local firms are most constrained. These results indicate another role for foreign direct investment in emerging markets - multinational affiliates expand economic activity during currency crises when local firms are most constrained.F23,F31,G15,G31,G32]

This article evaluates the impact of capital controls and their liberalization on the activities of US multinational firms. These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducing reported local profitability and increasing the frequency of dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable with the effect of 27% higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8% more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.25% higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Capital control liberalizations are associated with significant increases in multinational activity-property, plant, and equipment grow at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations. The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates discourages investment in countries with capital controls, and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls.

Empirical evidence of imperfect integration across world capital markets suggests a role for cross-border arbitrage by multinationals. Consistent with multinational arbitrage as a determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns, we find that FDI flows increase sharply with source-country stock market valuations--particularly the component of valuations that is predicted to revert the next year, and particularly in the presence of capital account restrictions that limit other mechanisms of cross-country arbitrage. The results suggest the existence of a cheap financial capital channel in which FDI flows reflect, in part, the use of relatively low-cost capital available to overvalued parents in the source country. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

This article evaluates the impact of capital controls and their liberalization on the activities of US multinational firms. These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducing reported local profitability and increasing the frequency of dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable with the effect of 27% higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8% more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.25% higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Capital control liberalizations are associated with significant increases in multinational activity—property, plant, and equipment grow at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations. The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates discourages investment in countries with capital controls, and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls. (JEL F21, F23, F36, F42, G15, G32, G34)