[Foreign exchange returns exhibit behavior difficult to reconcile with standard theoretical models. This article asks whether the recent findings of long swings in exchange rates between appreciating and depreciating periods affect estimates of the foreign exchange risk premium. We demonstrate how the "peso problem" introduced by expected shifts in exchange rate regimes can affect inferences about the risk premium in at least two ways: (1) it can make the foreign exchange risk premium appear to contain a permanent disturbance when it does not; and (2) it can induce bias in the foreign exchange return regressions such as in Fama (1984).]

[Nonprofit, mutually owned insurance and banking organizations have significant market shares in the insurance and banking industries. A first step in a systematic study of these financial mutuals is to examine the reasons for their formation. Doing so provides empirical support for the view that these mutuals arose as an efficient means of addressing contracting challenges caused by aggregate uncertainties and moral hazard. A formal model with this property is presented. We argue that information asymmetries do more to explain the kinds of contracts offered by financial mutuals than do agency problems between owners, managers, and customers.]

Foreign exchange returns exhibit behavior difficult to reconcile with standard theoretical models. This article asks whether the recent findings of long swings in exchange rates between appreciating and depreciating periods affect estimates of the foreign exchange risk premium. We demonstrate how the “peso problem” introduced by expected shifts in exchange rate regimes can affect inferences about the risk premium in at least two ways: (1) it can make the foreign exchange risk premium appear to contain a permanent disturbance when it does not; and (2) it can induce bias in the foreign exchange return regressions such as in Fama (1984).

Nonprofit, mutually owned insurance and banking organizations have significant market shares in the insurance and banking industries. A first step in a systematic study of these financial mutuals is to examine the reasons for their formation. Doing so provides empirical support for the view that these mutuals arose as an efficient means of addressing contracting challenges caused by aggregate uncertainties and moral hazard. A formal model with this property is presented. We argue that information asymmetries do more to explain the kinds of contracts offered by financial mutuals than do agency problems between owners, managers, and customers.