This paper uses a novel dataset of commodity-linked notes (CLNs) to examine the impact of the flows of financial investors on commodity futures prices. Investor flows into and out of CLNs are passed to and withdrawn from the futures markets via issuers' trades to hedge their CLN liabilities. The flows are not based on information about futures price movements but nonetheless cause increases and decreases in commodity futures prices when they are passed through to and withdrawn from the futures markets. These finding are consistent with the hypothesis that non-information-based financial investments have important impacts on commodity prices.

We present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest. Banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients' interest; on the other hand, banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so. A behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities. The model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks, as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral- and type-reputation concerns.

Following corporate spinoffs, unit boards are formed from scratch. We find that these "de novo" boards are smaller, more independent, include more outside directors with relevant industry expertise, and derive more industry expertise from outsiders than do industry- and size-matched peers. These differences are observed only when the unit CEO was not the CEO or a director of the pre-spinoff parent firm—that is, when there is a greater need to assess the CEO's ability and match with the firm. We conclude that the need for CEO assessment is an important element of the structure of newly formed boards.

Following corporate spinoffs, unit boards are formed from scratch. We find that these “de novo” boards are smaller, more independent, include more outside directors with relevant industry expertise, and derive more industry expertise from outsiders than do industry- and size-matched peers. These differences are observed only when the unit CEO was not the CEO or a director of the pre-spinoff parent firm—that is, when there is a greater need to assess the CEO's ability and match with the firm. We conclude that the need for CEO assessment is an important element of the structure of newly formed boards.

We present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest. Banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients' interest; on the other hand, banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so. A behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities. The model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks, as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral- and type-reputation concerns.

This paper uses a novel dataset of commodity-linked notes (CLNs) to examine the impact of the flows of financial investors on commodity futures prices. Investor flows into and out of CLNs are passed to and withdrawn from the futures markets via issuers' trades to hedge their CLN liabilities. The flows are not based on information about futures price movements but nonetheless cause increases and decreases in commodity futures prices when they are passed through to and withdrawn from the futures markets. These finding are consistent with the hypothesis that non-information-based financial investments have important impacts on commodity prices.