We show that the need to "posture" can help solve the holdup problem inherent in many multistage relationships, including those between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Posturing arises when an informed party needs to send a strong signal to induce skeptical third parties like employees, suppliers, customers, or competitors to develop/maintain relationships with the firm or take other actions that increase firm value. In the venture capital context, this can be credibly achieved if the VC publicly invests at high prices in later rounds. This tempers holdup by shifting ex-post bargaining power toward the entrepreneur, inducing him to exert greater effort.

We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around Russell index thresholds. Our estimates indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in institutional ownership causes a $7 million (8%) increase in dividends. We also find differences in shareholder proposals and voting patterns that suggest that even nonactivist institutions play an important role in monitoring firm behavior. The effect of institutional ownership on dividends is stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs.

We show that the need to “posture” can help solve the holdup problem inherent in many multistage relationships, including those between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Posturing arises when an informed party needs to send a strong signal to induce skeptical third parties like employees, suppliers, customers, or competitors to develop/maintain relationships with the firm or take other actions that increase firm value. In the venture capital context, this can be credibly achieved if the VC publicly invests at high prices in later rounds. This tempers holdup by shifting ex-post bargaining power toward the entrepreneur, inducing him to exert greater effort.

We propose a novel human capital model that decomposes aggregate income risk into highand low-income risk. We find that high-income risk is priced, while low-income risk is insignificant. The high-income factor alone explains 77% of the cross-sectional variation in the twenty-five size and book-to-market portfolios, earns a risk premium of about 7% per year, and its pricing power extends to the full cross-section of individual stocks. It is also related to the value factor, suggesting that the value premium might be compensation for income risk. Overall, our evidence indicates that high-income risk is an important macroeconomic risk factor.

We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around Russell index thresholds. Our estimates indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in institutional ownership causes a $7 million (8%) increase in dividends. We also find differences in shareholder proposals and voting patterns that suggest that even nonactivist institutions play an important role in monitoring firm behavior. The effect of institutional ownership on dividends is stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs.

We propose a novel human capital model that decomposes aggregate income risk into high- and low-income risk. We find that high-income risk is priced, while low-income risk is insignificant. The high-income factor alone explains 77% of the cross-sectional variation in the twenty-five size and book-to-market portfolios, earns a risk premium of about 7% per year, and its pricing power extends to the full cross-section of individual stocks. It is also related to the value factor, suggesting that the value premium might be compensation for income risk. Overall, our evidence indicates that high-income risk is an important macroeconomic risk factor.