[We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new dataset of top officers of large firms from 1936 to 2005. The median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the late 1940s to the 1970s, revealing a weak relationship between pay and aggregate firm growth. By contrast, this correlation was much stronger in the past thirty years. This historical perspective also suggests that compensation arrangements have often helped to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders because executive wealth was sensitive to firm performance for most of our sample. These new facts pose a challenge to several common explanations for the rise in executive pay since the 1980s.]

[In February 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission officially certified a fourth credit rating agency, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), for use in bond investment regulations. After DBRS certification, bond yields change in the direction implied by the firm's DBRS rating relative to its ratings from other certified rating agencies. A one-notch-higher DBRS rating corresponds to a 39-basis-point reduction in a firm's debt cost of capital. The impact on yields is driven by cases where the DBRS rating is better than other ratings and is larger among bonds rated near the investment-grade cutoff. These findings indicate that ratings-based regulations on bond investment affect a firm's cost of debt capital.]

[Using a unique dataset of complete bid information for every IPO auction in Taiwan during 1995-2000, we examine the behaviors and returns of two groups—institutional and retail investors—in a setting in which underwriters do not have pricing or allocation discretion. We find that the bids of institutional investors are generally consistent with the predictions of IPO auction theory for informed bidders, while those of individual investors are not. Specifically, returns are higher when more institutional investors enter the auction or bid higher prices, suggesting institutional investors are informed and are also able to shave bids adequately. However, individual investors as a group exhibit return-chasing behavior, are uninformed, and systematically overbid.]

[Welch and Goyal (2008) find that numerous economic variables with in-sample predictive ability for the equity premium fail to deliver consistent out-of-sample forecasting gains relative to the historical average. Arguing that model uncertainty and instability seriously impair the forecasting ability of individual predictive regression models, we recommend combining individual forecasts. Combining delivers statistically and economically significant out-of-sample gains relative to the historical average consistently over time. We provide two empirical explanations for the benefits of forecast combination: (i) combining forecasts incorporates information from numerous economic variables while substantially reducing forecast volatility; (ii) combination forecasts are linked to the real economy.]

[As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from twenty-nine countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.]

We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new dataset of top officers of large firms from 1936 to 2005. The median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the late 1940s to the 1970s, revealing a weak relationship between pay and aggregate firm growth. By contrast, this correlation was much stronger in the past thirty years. This historical perspective also suggests that compensation arrangements have often helped to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders because executive wealth was sensitive to firm performance for most of our sample. These new facts pose a challenge to several common explanations for the rise in executive pay since the 1980s.

[We study the importance of time-varying bond risk premia in a consumption and portfoliochoice problem for a life-cycle investor facing short-sales and borrowing constraints. Tilts in the optimal asset allocation in response to changes in bond risk premia exhibit pronounced life-cycle patterns. We find that the investor is willing to pay an annual fee up to 1% to implement a strategy that optimally conditions on prevailing bond risk premia in addition to her age and wealth. To solve our model, we extend recently developed simulation-based techniques to life-cycle problems featuring multiple state variables and multiple risky assets.]

In February 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission officially certified a fourth credit rating agency, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), for use in bond investment regulations. After DBRS certification, bond yields change in the direction implied by the firm's DBRS rating relative to its ratings from other certified rating agencies. A one-notch-higher DBRS rating corresponds to a 39-basis-point reduction in a firm's debt cost of capital. The impact on yields is driven by cases where the DBRS rating is better than other ratings and is larger among bonds rated near the investment-grade cutoff. These findings indicate that ratings-based regulations on bond investment affect a firm's cost of debt capital.

We study the importance of time-varying bond risk premia in a consumption and portfolio-choice problem for a life-cycle investor facing short-sales and borrowing constraints. Tilts in the optimal asset allocation in response to changes in bond risk premia exhibit pronounced life-cycle patterns. We find that the investor is willing to pay an annual fee up to 1% to implement a strategy that optimally conditions on prevailing bond risk premia in addition to her age and wealth. To solve our model, we extend recently developed simulation-based techniques to life-cycle problems featuring multiple state variables and multiple risky assets. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Welch and Goyal (2008) find that numerous economic variables with in-sample predictive ability for the equity premium fail to deliver consistent out-of-sample forecasting gains relative to the historical average. Arguing that model uncertainty and instability seriously impair the forecasting ability of individual predictive regression models, we recommend combining individual forecasts. Combining delivers statistically and economically significant out-of-sample gains relative to the historical average consistently over time. We provide two empirical explanations for the benefits of forecast combination: (i) combining forecasts incorporates information from numerous economic variables while substantially reducing forecast volatility; (ii) combination forecasts are linked to the real economy. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.