We examine how alumni ties with corporate boards differentially affect male and female analysts' job performance and career outcomes. Connections improve analysts' forecasting accuracy and recommendation impact, but the effect is two to three times as large for men as for women. Connections also contribute to analysts' likelihood of being voted by institutional investors as "star" analysts, but act as a partial substitute to performance for men, while a complement to performance for women. Our evidence indicates that men benefit more than women from connections in both job performance and the subjective evaluation by others.

[Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.]

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we study how intellectual property right (IPR) protection affects innovation in China in the years around the privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Innovation increases after SOE privatizations, and this increase is larger in cities with strong IPR protection. Our results support theoretical arguments that IPR protection strengthens firms' incentives to innovate and that private sector firms are more sensitive to IPR protection than SOEs.

[This paper demonstrates a positive effect of stock liquidity on blockholder governance. Liquidity increases the likelihood of block formation. Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that the blockholder governs through voice (intervention)—as shown by the lower propensity for active investment (filing Schedule 13D) than passive investment (filing Schedule 13G). The lower frequency of activism does not reflect the abandonment of governance, but governance through the alternative channel of exit (selling one's shares): A 13G filing leads to positive announcement returns and improvements in operating performance, especially in liquid firms. Moreover, taking into account the increase in block formation, liquidity has an unconditional positive effect on voice as well as exit. We use decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to identify causal effects.]

This paper links the CEO's concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. We identify short-term concerns using the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter. Vesting equity is associated with a decline in the growth of research and development and capital expenditure, positive analyst forecast revisions, and positive earnings guidance, within the same quarter. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities, we provide evidence that CEO contracts affect real decisions.

We examine whether the quality differentials in earnings forecasts between reputable and nonreputable analysts vary with the severity of conflicts of interest. We measure personal reputation using the Institutional Investor All-American (AA) awards, and bank reputation using Carter-Manaster ranks. While both personal and bank reputation are associated with higher quality forecasts overall, their effectiveness against conflicts of interest differs. The severity of conflicts has a negative and significant effect on the performance of non-AAs at top-tier banks relative to other analysts, while it has a positive and significant effect on the performance of AAs at top-tier banks relative to others. Thus personal reputation is an effective disciplinary device against conflicts of interest, while bank reputation alone is not.

We examine how alumni ties with corporate boards differentially affect male and female analysts’ job performance and career outcomes. Connections improve analysts’ forecasting accuracy and recommendation impact, but the effect is two to three times as large for men as for women. Connections also contribute to analysts’ likelihood of being voted by institutional investors as “star” analysts, but act as a partial substitute to performance for men, while a complement to performance for women. Our evidence indicates that men benefit more than women from connections in both job performance and the subjective evaluation by others.Received August 27, 2015; editorial decision January 24, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.

This paper studies whether investor composition affects the sovereign debt market. We construct a data set of sovereign debt holdings by foreign and domestic bank, nonbank private and official investors for 101 countries across three decades. Compared with other investors, private nonbank investors absorb a disproportionate share of the debt supply, and their demand for emerging market debt is most price responsive. A counterfactual analysis of emerging market sovereigns shows a 10% increase in debt leads to a 5.8% yield increase but an outsized 8.4% increase without nonbank investors. We conclude that sovereigns are vulnerable to the loss of nonbanks.

Fractional trading (FT)—the ability to trade less than a whole share—removes barriers to high-priced stocks and facilitates entry by capital-constrained retail investors. We observe a surge of tiny trades, measured using off-exchange one-share trades, among high-priced stocks compared to low-priced stocks after FT is introduced to the U.S. equity markets. These tiny trades, when coordinated during attention-grabbing events, are forceful enough to exert large price pressure on high-priced stocks. Further evidence suggests that FT can even fuel meme-stock-like trading frenzies and bubbles in high-priced stocks, for which the feedback effect likely plays a role.